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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Although almost all scholars have recognized that the prologue
of the Symposium is a literary gem, few have given it the attention that
it deserves.

Despite the wealth of recent scholarship on the

Symposium, the prologue has not received as much attention as
other aspects of that dialogue have: the structure of the dialogue, 1
1 Martin Warner, "Dialectical Drama: The Case of Plato's
Symposium" in The Language of the Cave, ed. Andrew Barker and
Martin Warner (Edmonton, Alberta:
Academic Printing and
Publishing, 1992), 157-175; Charles E. Salman, "The Contrivance of
Eros in Plato's Symposium" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1986);
Steven Lowenstam, "Paradoxes in Plato's Symposium," (hereafter,
Lowenstam, "Paradoxes") Ramus 14 (1985): 85-104; John Miller,
"The Esoteric Unity of Plato's Symposium," Apeiron 12:2 (1978): 1925; Henry G. Wolz, "Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to Plato's
Symposium," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30
(1970): 323-353.
In addition, four commentaries have recently been published on
the Symposium: Daniel Anderson, The Masks of Dionysos: A
Commentary on Plato's "Symposium" (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1993); Robert Lloyd Mitchell, The Hymn to Eros: A
Reading of Plato's "Symposium" (Lanham, Maryland: University
Press of America, 1993); R.E. Allen, The Symposium, vol. 2 of The
Dialogues of Plato (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
1991 ); Stanley Rosen, Plato's Symposium, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale.
University Press, 1987). Dover has also written a mainly grammatical
commentary on the Symposium that elaborates somewhat on the
philosophy of the dialogue. See K.J. Dover, ed. Plato: Symposium
(hereafter Dover, Symposium), Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

2

the speeches of Pausanias,2 Eryximachus,3 Aristophanes,4
Agathon,5 Socrates,6 and Alcibiades?; the seating arrangement of
2 Donald K. Gallagher, "In Praise of Pausanias," Kinesis 6
(1974): 40-55; Robert Nola, "On Some Neglected Speakers in Plato's
Symposium: Phaedrus and Pausanias," Prudentia 22:1 (1990): 5473.
3oavid Konstan and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "Eryximachus'
Speech in the Symposium," Apeiron 16 {1982): 40-46.
4Steven Lowenstam, "Aristophanes' Hiccups," Greek, Roman,
and Byzantine Studies 27 (1986): 43-56. Hereafter Lowenstam,
"Hiccups."
5John G. Griffith, "Static Electricity in Agathon's Speech in
Plato's Symposium," Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 547-548.
6Sylvie Gresillon, "L'ironie du discours de Diotime dans le
Banquet de Platon," Revue des Etudes Grecques 100 (1987): xxi-xxii;
Walter Benjamin, "Socrates," The Philosophical Forum 15:1-2 (19831984): 52-54; Reinhard Brandt, "Platon, Symposion 199c3-201 c9,"
Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 64 (1982): 19-22.
7Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 87-233.
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the speakers, 8 immortality, 9 beauty and love, 1O lexical and textual
matters.11
Often when analyzing the Symposium, scholars ignore or
merely summarize the prologue, even though they would not let any
other part of the dialogue escape with such little comment.12 Nor-8Peter H. von Blanckenhagen, "Stage and Actors in Plato's
Symposium," Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 33: 1 (Spring
1992): 51-68.
9M. Dyson, "Immortality and Procreation in Plato's Symposium,"
Antichthon 20 (1986): 59-72. Michael J. O' Brien, "'Becoming
Immortal' in Plato's Symposium," in Greek Poetry and Philosophy:
Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury, ed. Douglas E. Gerber
(Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1984), 186-205.
1Ocatherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of
Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Vigdis Songe-M0ller,
"Sexualitat und Philosophie in Platons Symposion," Symbolae
Osloenses 63 (1988): 25-50; David L. Roochnik, "The Erotics of
Philosophical Discourse," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4, no. 2
(1987): 117-129; David M. Halperin, "Plato and Erotic Reciprocity,"
(hereafter, Halperin, "Reciprocity") Classical Antiquity 5 (1985): 6080; Halperin, "Platonic Eros and What Men Call Love," (hereafter
Halperin, "Eros") Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985): 161-204; Ludwig C.H.
Chen, "Knowledge of Beauty in Plato's Symposium," Classical
Quarterly 33:1 (1983): 66-74; Gerhard Kruger, Eros und Mythos bei
Plato, Klostermann Texte Philosophie, ed. Richard Schaeffler
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978).
11 R. Renehan, "Three Places in Plato's Symposium," Classical
Philosophy 85 (1990): 120-126. Joseph Cotter, "' E TTaTTo8aveTv
TETEAEVTTJKOTL: Plato, Symp. 180A," Glotta 62 (1984): 161-165.
12An extreme example of this phenomenon is Miller, 19-25,
who ignores the prologue entirely in his discussion of the structure of
the dialogue. Friedlander does little more than give the historical
background of the dialogue; Paul Friedlander, Platon, 2d ed. (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960), 3:1-3. Anderson, Mitchell, and Allen
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with one exception13--have recent in-depth studies of the

Symposium explicitly connected the prologue to the heart of the
subject of the dialogue, Eros.

Instead most scholars have

concentrated upon explaining the historical or cultural background of
the drama of the prologue, occasionally alluding to the implications for
our understanding of the rest of the dialogue, including Socrates'
description of Eros.14 Furthermore, David Halperin, the sole scholar
to treat the prologue primarily as a dramatization of Eros' effect on
people believes that the prologue refutes Socrates' philosophy of
Eros.15 Thus, even those scholars who have explored the prologue
have not fully understood the prologue's relationship to Socrates'
presentation of Eros.
In order to give the prologue its due, this dissertation will
examine how it is organically connected to the dialogue as a whole. In
particular, this relationship will be shown by examining how the
prologue dramatizes the philosophies of Eros espoused in the
dialogue and how, contra Halperin, it vindicates Socrates' speech. In
summarize the content of the prologue and then explore one or two
aspects of the prologue in their commentaries: Anderson, 7-19,
explores the Dionysian allusions in the prologue; Mitchell, 3-17,
explains primarily the cultural context of the prologue; Allen, 3-12,
places the Symposium's prologue in the context of the Platonic
corpus.
13David M. Halperin, "The Erotics of Narrativity" (hereafter,
Halperin, "Narrativity"), in Innovations in Antiquity, ed. Ralph Hexter
and Daniel Selden (New York: Routledge, 1992), 95-126.
14See, for example, Rosen, 1-38; Allen, 3-12; Mitchell, 3-17.
15David M. Halperin, "Narrativity," 95-126.
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the dissertation I will argue that the dramatic action of the prologue is
not an unnecessary literary adornment, but drama in the service of
philosophy, for Plato uses the drama of the prologue to put in
concrete terms the theories of Eros espoused in the dialogue. Thus,
we will see that a portion of the text that seems to be devoid of
philosophy is in reality as serious in philosophical purpose as the
arguments in the body of the dialogue.
In making this claim, I will be arguing primarily against two
interpretations of the Symposium. The first is that of the analytical
philosophers, who claim that the prologue is not an essential element
in the dialogue, but can be overlooked in deriving Plato's view of Eros.
The second interpretation is that of most dramatic critics, who take
the drama of the prologue seriously, yet do not always connect its
action to the philosophies of Eros expounded in the dialogue. When
the dramatic critics do interpret the prologue in terms of Eros, it is as
often as not critical of Socrates' view. Their reticence to equate the
arguments of Plato's Socrates with the views of Plato is usually well
justified, but, as we will see later, in the case of this dialogue Socrates'
views on Eros do in fact reflect Plato's own approach to philosophy.
The Analytical Philosophers and the Prologue
In the discussion that follows the term "analytical philosophy"
will be used in a broader sense than is used in contemporary
philosophy. The term will be applied to all individuals who scrutinize
the logic and language of isolated statements from Plato's dialogues
and largely ignore those elements in the dialogue that cannot easily
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be analyzed in such fashion, even if they would not claim to be
adherents of that modern philosophy. Thus, such a designation will
include such diverse scholars as G.M.A. Grube, Karl Popper, Paul
Shorey, and A.E. Taylor. This term will even include a few scholars
such as Francis Cornford who acknowledge in theory the importance
of dramatic elements but in practice ignore them.16
Against these analytical philosophers we must maintain that the
prologue is an essential element of the dialogue as it now stands-philosophically as well as dramatically. That the prologue fulfills a
literary requirement is fairly well accepted even by those scholars who
disregard the prologue's philosophical significance, but that the
prologue dramatizes Plato's philosophy of Eros is by no means
universally accepted.17 Yet there is a good reason for approaching
the prologue as a dramatization of Plato's view of Eros: Plato himself
16G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London: Methuen Publishing
Company, 1935; reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1980); Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1, The
Spell of Plato, 5th ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966);
Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1903; reprint, 1960); A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man
and His Work, 7th ed. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1960); Francis
MacDonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (New York: The Humanities
Press, n.d.; reprint, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1975.); Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: The
Humanities Press, n.d.; reprint, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1957).
17For a summary of current scholarship on the Symposium,
see the discussion on pages 1-4. As will be shown, almost all scholars
believe that Plato's dialogues are literary masterpieces, but many
scholars deny that there is any philosophical significance to the
ostensibly non-philosophical portions of the dialogues.
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hints that the prologue can--and ought to--be read in this way.
Throughout the dialogue the guests of the symposium 18 state that
Eros is a force that governs nearly all human behavior. Eros is not
mere gratification of carnal desires between an epaaTfis and
epwµevos, but is the cause of all the good in society. Agathon credits
Eros with the power to create peace (195c1-6), 19 Phaedrus and
Pausanias state that civic virtue comes through Eros (178d1-179b1;
182b6-c6), and Eryximachus says that Eros is a cosmic principle
(186a3-b1 ), at work not only in bodies, but also in the sciences
(186a7-187a1), music (187a1-d4), divination (188b6-d3), and the
governance of the whole world (188a 1-b6).

Socrates goes even

further: For him, all men are by nature epaaTai--men under the
influence of Eros.20 All men love or desire because they value
1BSymposium, when italicized and capitalized, refers to the
dialogue written by Plato; symposium, when not capitalized, refers to
the fictional banquet described in Plato's dialogue, the Symposium.
19Unless otherwise noted, the line numbers of all ancient texts
will refer to those of the Oxford Classical Text.
202osa5-d9. The word Epc.us has traditionally been translated
"love", although "desire" is a better translation, since Eros is not
limited to romantic love. As Socrates argues in the Symposium, epc.us
is the recognition of a lack of something and the concomitant desire to
fill that lack (199d1-201 c5).
In this dissertation, Epc.us will generally be transliterated rather
than translated to prevent the reader from adopting a too narrow
definition of Eros. At the same time, however, I have generally
preferred tO translate rather than transliterate Epav, epaCTTTJS', and
epwµevos for the sake of fluent reading. I have translated these three
words as "love" or "desire," "lover," and "beloved," respectively. On
those occasions when I have translated epav as "love", it is because

8
Beauty and its kin, the Good {204c8-e7), and long for immortality
(206ce8-207e4). To be sure, not all men are epaaTai in the same
way--some desire bodies; others, ideas--but all are epaaTaL Thus,
throughout the dialogue and especially in the climax of the speeches
on Eros, Plato portrays all important human activities as driven by
Eros.
At the same time, Plato criticizes actions ostensibly carried out
in the name of Eros. Pausanias, for example, concedes that base
men do love, but their love is inspired by Vulgar Eros, not the
Heavenly one (181a7-c2). Similarly, Eryximachus sees two types of
Eros operative in the world, one which creates harmony and the other
which upsets the balance (186a2-b2, b5-d5). This point is driven
home by Socrates, who says that Eros urges all men to procreate, but
some beget ideas, while others, being less noble, beget children
(208e1-209a5). In his description of the Ascent to Beauty (210a1211d1), Socrates elaborates this distinction. He gives several objects
of desire--bodies, souls, fields of learning, ideas, and Absolute
Beauty. In all the dialogue's speeches--and particularly in that of
Socrates--Plato suggests that a person may be influenced by Eros,
but may not be loving the right object or loving in the correct way.
Thus, it is appropriate not only to see that Eros governs the actions of
men, but also to evaluate the type of Eros present in those men.
Plato is using it in a more narrow definition at that time. Thus, in the
next paragraph, I have Pausanias speaking about "love", not "desire",
since he views Eros primarily as sexual desire.
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Since men can be evaluated in terms of Eros, this dissertation
will examine the philosophies of Eros implicit in the action and
characters of the prologue and will also evaluate these philosophies
in light of the arguments made in the speeches of the dialogue. This
dissertation will also show how Plato uses literary methods (e.g.,
narration, foreshadowing, verbal echoes) not to be an end in
themselves, but to connect the actions of the prologue's characters
with the philosophies of Eros expounded in the dialogue. In so doing,
this dissertation will show that the prologue is meant by Plato to be not
merely a charming literary device, but also a serious philosophical
statement.
Of course, the analytical philosophers would not agree that the
prologue is serious philosophy and we must examine, therefore, why
they make short shrift of the prologue. Their attitude to the prologue
is derived from their understanding of "dramatic" details in Plato's
dialogues: For them, the drama of the dialogues is unimportant for
understanding Plato's philosophy.

Thus, they leave dramatic

considerations (i.e., those parts of the text that cannot be reduced to
logical propositions) to the philologists and concern themselves with
various propositions stated by Plato.

The tendency of analytical

philosophers to examine a dialogue as if reading a treatise is seen in
how Cornford names his commentaries. He turns Plato's Timaeus
and Theaetetus into treatises: Plato's Cosmology and Plato's Theory
of Knowledge, respectively.21

10
What lies behind this popular method of examining Plato's
dialogues? There are two driving forces behind it, one philosophical
and the other historical. Because analytical philosophy dominates the
English speaking world,22 it is not surprising that scholars often
employ its techniques to study Plato. Scholars who have been trained
in the methods of analytical philosophy know how to examine the
language and argument of a text, but are not necessarily prepared to
evaluate the import of dramatic elements. Analytical philosophers,
21 Also representative of this approach is Karl Popper who,
ignoring dramatic elements in the Republic that hint at the irony in
Socrates' statements, portrays Plato as a proto-fascist. No better is
R.B. Levinson's In Defense of Plato (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1953), which replies to Popper without
stating the dramatic context of Plato's seemingly fascist ideas. For
better replies to Popper see Diskin Clay, "Reading the Republic," in
Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings (hereafter Platonic Writings)
(New York: Routledge, Chapman, & Hall, Inc., 1988), 19-33, and
Jonathan Ketchum, "The Structure of the Plato Dialogue," Ph.D. diss.
(State University of New York at Buffalo), 1981.
Among the analytical philosophers there is disagreement over
whether Plato had a unified system throughout his career or changed
his mind over time. Especially debated is whether or not Plato's views
on the forms, immortality, the soul, and the state changed from the
early dialogues to the late ones. For the former ("unitarian") position,
see Shorey. The notion that Plato developed as a philosopher over
time was unanimously upheld in the nineteenth century and still
prevails among analytical philosophers today. For an example of this
view, the "genetic" approach, see Ulrich van Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,
Platon, 2d ed., (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1920). For a
survey of the problem and criticism of both approaches, see E.N.
Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato (hereafter Tigerstedt, Interpreting
Plato), Stockholm Studies in History of Literature 17 (Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell International), 25-62.
22G.S. Kirk, "Analytical Philosophy," in The Concise
Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, ed., J.O.
Urmson and Jonathan Ree (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 11.
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thus, are understandably less attracted to the prologue, which
contains more drama and fewer propositions for debate, than they
are to other portions of the dialogue.
Analytical philosophers, moreover, are following a long tradition
in the history of Plato scholarship. Rarely have past scholars given
the dramatic elements in Plato's dialogues thorough treatment.
Already in late antiquity, Plato scholars saw their task as merely
collating the views espoused by the character Socrates in Plato's
writings; often they selected those statements of Socrates that
supported their own Neoplatonism or Skepticism.23 In the process
they ignored dramatic elements. This trend continued in the Middle
Ages:

Medieval interpreters were interested chiefly in Plato's

metaphysics, not his dialogues.

They were interested in his

metaphysics because they were chiefly concerned with the
metaphysics of Neoplatonism, which they equated with Platonism. To
compound the problem, they had little firsthand exposure to Plato's
writings: Until the early fifteenth century little of Plato besides the
Timaeus had been translated into Latin and scholars of Western
Europe were by and large ignorant of Greek.24 Scholars of that era
23The chief exception is Proclus; see page 21. For a good
summary of the history of interpretation of Plato before
Schleiermacher see Tigerstedt, The Decline and Fall of the
Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato: An Outline and Some
Observations (hereafter Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation),
Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, vol. 52 (Helsinki: Societas
Scientiarum Fennica, 1974).
24 Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation, 10-18. Only in 1403,
when the Republic was translated into Latin by Manuel Chrysoloras,

12
would obviously not have had a sufficient basis to appreciate Plato's
dialogue form.
Even after Western Europe became familiar with Plato's
dialogues again, there was no clean break with the previous method
of scholarship. Neoplatonism gradually yielded to new interpretations
of Plato's thought,25 but scholars did not give serious attention to
Plato's choice of the dialogue as the vehicle for his philosophy. When
Jakob Brucker and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann in the eighteenth
century proposed new systematizations of Plato, they did not ask why
Plato chose to present his philosophy in an unsystematized form.
Both men, though rejecting Neoplatonism's systematization of Plato,
assumed that they could derive Plato's philosophy by arranging the
arguments of his dialogues.

They assumed that Plato, like any

philosopher worthy of the name, must have possessed an organized
set of doctrines and desired to set them forth in an orderly fashion.
Because the dialogues do not arrange Plato's teaching in an orderly
way, Brucker and Tennemann took it upon themselves to create that
order. In the process they completely ignored the dialogue form.26
The analytical philosophers, then, merely continue the medieval
pattern of examining isolated arguments drawn from Plato's
dialogues. But whereas the medieval philosophers had little firstdid post-classical Western Europe have that seminal work of Plato.
The first translation of all of Plato's works into Latin was completed by
Marsilio Ficino in 1484.
25Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation 45-46, 63, 69-70.
26Tigerstedt, Neoplatonic Interpretation, 58-61, 65-68.
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hand knowledge of Plato, the analytical philosophers have less
excuse for ignoring the dialogue form of Plato's philosophy.

By

refusing to interpret the dialogue as a whole and instead focusing on
isolated statements, the analytical philosophers are not reading Plato,
but only select elements from his works. No matter how helpful their
logical or linguistic analysis of arguments drawn from Plato may be,
their approach cannot be called a full exposition of Plato since they
leave much of the dialogues' content out of consideration.
A similar criticism applies to the esotericists, another modern
school of Plato studies. The existence of an "esoteric" doctrine27 in
Plato was first proposed by Tennemann.

Although Tennemann

eschewed secondary sources in reconstructing the esoteric teaching,
modern esotericists derive Plato's true teaching chiefly from a few
statements in Plato's late dialogues and from Aristotle's
Metaphysics.28 They dismiss most of the content of the dialogues as

dissembling or ironic.29 In so doing they remove from themselves the
27Tennemann and the TQbingen School (as the modern
esotericists are often called) hold that Plato had an "exoteric"
teaching, intended for wide dissemination, and an "esoteric" teaching,
which was passed down orally only to his closest pupils.
28Typical of this approach is Konrad Gaiser, Pia tons
ungeschriebene Lehre (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1968). Most of
the work in this school centers around ontology.
29The esotericists' keen perception of irony sometimes allies
them with the dramatic critics, who are discussed on pages 19-29.
Some scholars, thus, are able to be in both camps. Rosen, for
example, argues for an esoteric teaching that can be found _through
recognition of the irony in Plato's dialogues. See Rosen, xlii-xliii, as
well as Tigerstedt's criticism of Rosen (Interpreting Plato, 79).
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burden of a detailed exegesis of the dialogues. Not surprisingly, they
ignore the dramatic elements of the dialogues as well, since they
discount the dialogues themselves as "exoteric."
Dismissing the dialogues from serious consideration, however,
creates several problems. If Plato's dialogues are not meant to be
taken seriously, why did Plato write some thirty dialogues?30 The
esotericists' half-response to the question reveals that they operate
under the same anachronism as the analytical philosophers do: The
esotericists search for an esoteric doctrine because they believe that
Plato, if he was a true philosopher, must have had a "system."
Because the dialogues are notoriously unsystematic, esotericists
assume that Plato must have imparted his true (i.e., systematized)
beliefs elsewhere. But the concept that philosophical works must be
systematic is a thoroughly modern notion.31
The chief error of both the esotericists and the analytical
philosophers, then, is the anachronistic view that philosophy must be
a completely systematic presentation of a philosopher's beliefs. Both
schools force Plato to follow modern norms of systematic thought and
logical analysis. They choose what pleases them in his dialogues and
reject whatever does not conform to modern views of how philosophy
30Cf. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 76.
31 Rosen, Ix; Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 16, 67, 87-88.
Tigerstedt traces the presupposition to Hegel's influence on Eduard
Zeller, who influenced Platonic studies in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Tigerstedt is perhaps correct in detecting HegeJ as the
primary source of this notion, although scholars such as Jakob
Brucker had attempted to systematize Plato before Hegel.
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ought to be practiced. Such a method is not a study of Plato, but of
modern reactions to Plato.

If a modern scholar is to understand

Plato's works, he must forego the modern preoccupation with the
proper format of philosophical treatises. Instead, he must examine
the works of Plato in a way that respects the manner in which Plato
expounded his philosophy.
This is actually the position of those who take a dramatic
approach to the dialogues. Although scholars who take this approach
do not agree on how to interpret the dialogues, they at least agree
that the dramatic elements are as worthy of consideration in deducing
the philosophy of Plato as the "more philosophical" elements are.
Furthermore, scholars who take the dramatic approach explain the
dialogues more fully because they study an entire dialogue, not
merely some of its passages. This approach fulfills a reasonable
assumption of exegesis, namely, that a hermeneutical approach that
accounts for more details is to be preferred to one that explains less,
even as in other fields of learning, the more complete explanation is
preferred over the less complete one.32 Therefore, an approach to
Plato that explains the "dramatic" passages as well as the
32For this reason the physics of Einstein has been adopted
because it is able to explain certain phenomena more fully than that of
Newton. Tigerstedt makes the keen observation that the foremost
duty of philosophers, like the ancient astronomers, is "to save the
phenomena" {Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 21 ). By this phrase he
argues against those scholars who attempt to solve the difficulty of
interpreting Plato by excising the difficult passages from
consideration.
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"philosophical" ones is to be preferred to one that explicates only the
philosophical passages. David Roochnik argues this point well:
The nod must be given to that interpretation that incorporates
more of the text as it is written into its account. The
interpretation that recognizes the law of logographic necessity
and is not predisposed to dismiss large segments of the text
because they appear philosophically implausible will read the
dialogues more openly and comprehensively than the one that
does not. It will include detailed examinations of characters,
settings, digressions and myths.33
The dramatic approach to Plato also recognizes the importance
of the context of Plato's philosophical statements. His statements are
not isolated propositions, which can be studied in the abstract, as
modern logical-positivism avers. 34 His statements are instead part of
33David L. Roochnik, "Terence Irwin's Reading of Plato,"
Platonic Writings, 189. Cf. Robert Lloyd Mitchell, The Hymn to Eros: A
Reading of Plato's Symposium (Lanham, Maryland: University Press
of America, 1993), xiii.
34Certainly Plato offers a number of propositions, which may be
isolated and examined by themselves quite profitably.
Cf.
Whitehead's famous remark: "The safest general characterization of
the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of
footnotes to Plato ... I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought
which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to
the wealth of general ideas scattered through them."--Alfred North
Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected
ed., ed. D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press,
1978), 39, as quoted by Charles Griswold, "Introduction," Platonic
Writings, 1. The real task for Plato scholars, however, is not to
discover all the ways in which Plato anticipates the positions taken in
the history of philosophy, but to explain how Plato uses an idea in a
particular dialogue and how in drama and words he comments on that
idea.
-
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a dramatic context; if this dramatic context is recognized, often
apparent contradictions in his philosophy will be resolved.

Plato

emphasizes the dramatic context in which a philosophical statement
is given because he recognizes that language is ambiguous. Often a
statement that is made in one context in a particular dialogue will be
rejected in another dialogue--or even later in the same dialogue-because the statement is being used in a different sense. 35 Hence
the dramatic elements in a dialogue are crucial for understanding
Plato's thought and for comparing one dialogue's arguments with
those in a similar dialogue.36
The dramatic approach to Plato also gives proper attention to
the medium in which Plato chose to communicate his philosophy.
Plato chose the dialogue form, even though he could have written
prose treatises, as some of his predecessors had done.37 Any sound
35As Rosemary Desjardins notes, Plato argues against many of
his "doctrines," such as "virtue is knowledge" (in the Meno) and
"knowledge is 86~a combined with :\6yos" (in the Theaetetus) not
because he was a skeptic, but because he knew that a statement
could be interpreted in different ways. Plato never merely gives a
proposition, but shows how the statement can be understood to be
true and in what contexts it is false. Rosemary Desjardins, "Why
Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," Platonic Writings, 115-118.
36George Plochmann, "Interpreting Plato's Symposium," The
Modern Schoolman 48 (1970), 32-33, rightly urges steering a middle
course between "seeking an expoundable Platonic doctrine" and
"doing away with all traces of doctrine by conceiving the dialogues
simply as literary... exercises." It might well be added that the opposite
of systematized thought need not be incoherent babbling. Plato
makes distinctions all the time, even if he refuses to gather all his
ideas into one systematic treatise.
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interpretation of Plato, therefore, must explain why Plato used the
dialogue form.

Analytical philosophy cannot offer an explanation

because it focuses on isolated statements of Plato, not on the way the
statements are presented. The esoteric approach simply ignores the
question. The dramatic approach, however, explains Plato's choice
of medium: Plato's early and middle dialogues ape Socratic elenchus
and are an application of Plato's epistemology of µaiEvms: A teacher,
Socrates holds,38 cannot teach pupils by lecturing--as the treatise
format would suggest--but must help the students acquire knowledge
37Rosemary Desjardins is correct in stating that much of
philosophy before Plato had been written in poetry, often of a rather
enigmatic nature; Desjardins, 113. But there were other forms of
writing available to Plato. The historians had pioneered the field of
prose and the orators were writing speeches that were disseminated
as pamphlets. Several philosophical treatises had already been
written: Anaxagoras' On Nature, Zeno's On Nature, Democritus'
Ethics and Physics, to name a few. If Gilbert Ryle is correct, the
panegyrics of the orators may have originally been delivered at the
same time the dialogues of Plato were recited; Gilbert Ryle, Plato's
Progress (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), 21-44. There would
have been nothing unusual, therefore, if Plato had written prose
treatises or pamphlets as the orators did. Plato, nonetheless, chose a
more dramatic form of presentation.
Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1963), 202-210, offers another explanation
for the dialogue form. Plato is the key figure in the transition of Greek
education. The earlier mode of education emphasized poetry and
mimesis. Plato made use of the technology of writing, which enabled
him to submit statements made by poets and other experts to
questioning (elenchus). Hence Plato, especially in the Republic,
rejected poetry as a means of education. Havelock's interpretation of
Plato explains much, but not everything, about the dialogue form. In
most of his dialogues Plato includes a fair amount of "dramatic"
material that is not always immediately relevant to the dialectic of the
dialogue.
38Theaetetus 149a-151d; cf. Phaedrus 275d-277a.
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for themselves by asking them questions on a particular matter. Only
when students are forced to answer questions and to have their
cherished notions refuted, can they learn. Through the dialogue form
Plato puts this theory into practice. He challenges his readers to
confess their ignorance on certain matters and to attempt to argue
better than Socrates' interlocutors do in the dialogues. Thus, the
dramatic approach to the dialogues reveals that the form of Plato's
dialogues reflects his philosophy and method. Form and content in
Plato are inextricably connected. Since the philosophical and the
dramatic are so closely connected in Plato, there are only two serious,
consistent options:

one can either reject the philosophical

significance of the dialogues (the modern esoteric approach) or
explicate both the dramatic and philosophical elements in the
dialogues (the dramatic approach).

One cannot choose some

elements in the dialogues and ignore others, as the analytical
philosophers do.

The choice, then, is between the esoteric and

dramatic approaches.

Of these two the former is ultimately

unsatisfactory because it requires a scholar to dismiss as trivial
hundreds of Stephanus pages of often carefully crafted prose. Only
an approach that explains both the dramatic and the philosophical in
the dialogues--as well as the relationship between the two--gives the
dialogues the full attention they deserve.
The Dramatic Approach and the Prologue
Merely saying that the

dramatic elements

deserve

consideration does not, however, answer all the questions. Not all
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scholars who take a dramatic approach to Plato agree on the
significance of a particular dramatic element or even on the method a
scholar ought to use to determine what the dramatic elements signify.
This disagreement among dramatic critics of Plato is not surprising;
after all, not all analytic philosophers agree among themselves on
matters of interpretation.

But this disagreement does raise an

important issue: It is one thing to say that dramatic elements are
philosophically significant and quite another matter to state the

.

significance.
It is not the purpose here to establish a hermeneutic that will
interpret all the dramatic elements in Plato's works. Indeed, Plato
may not have intended for the dramatic elements to have the same
significance in all the dialogues. But it is not necessary for us to have
such a hermeneutic in order to interpret the dramatic elements in the
prologue of the Symposium. As we have already seen,39 Plato gives
a clue how to interpret the action and characters of the prologue: they
are manifestations of Eros. The events, words, and characters of the
prologue depict Eros at work in the lives of philosophers (e.g.,
Apollodorus and Aristodemus) and ordinary people (e.g., Glaucon
and the unnamed friends of Apollodorus). The drama of the prologue
also offers an opportunity to test the theories of Eros proposed by the
guests at the symposium: The theories succeed or fail to the degree
that they explain the behavior of the characters in the prologue.
39See pages 6-9.
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This method of using the drama of the Symposium to learn and
evaluate its philosophy ought to be distinguished from neo-Platonic or
medieval allegorical interpretation. Although there is nothing wrong
per se in investing the characters with philosophical significance or
evaluating their actions in philosophical terms, it is wrong to import
arbitrarily a philosophy derived from a reading of other dialogues (or
even later philosophers) to explain the characters in a dialogue.
These objectionable methods are best seen in Proclus, a
Neoplatonist who lived nearly a millennium after Plato. He argues in
his commentary on the Parmenides that Parmenides, Zeno, and
Socrates portray Being, '=-ife, and Intellect, respectively.

When

Cephalus arrives in Athens from Ionia (the home of natural science)
to hear Socrates' conversation with the Eleatics (the home of the
study of the intelligible world), this action represents the soul leaving
nature or the body in order to ascend to Intellect or Being.40 Of
course, the trichotomy of Being, Life, and Intellect is that of
Neoplatonism; it is certainly not a distinction elaborated in the
Parmenides.
In contrast to Proclus and other allegorists, we will approach the
Symposium in terms that the dialogue itself suggests. The difference
between Proclus' allegory and our approach can be seen in Corinne
Sze's and Hayden Ausland's treatment of the Republic. Sze and
Ausland rightly look to the philosophical content of the dialogue,
40Proclus, Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, tr. Glenn R.
Morrow and John M. Dillon (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987), 27, 48-49 [628, 660-661].
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searching for the main points made by the dialogue, and then
examine the drama in those terms. By so doing they avoid importing
a foreign philosophy.

Sze argues that the process of education,

especially as outlined in the cave analogy in book seven of the
Republic, is the central theme of the dialogue and that the first book of

the dialogue dramatizes this analogy. Socrates descends from the
realm of light (Athens) into the cave (the Piraeus, which is physically
lower than Athens), just as all philosophers must deal with the
unenlightened. There he encounters Cephalus, who because of his
old age is as restricted in movement as the people chained in the
cave. Cephalus shows himself to be a true troglodyte, a man of
conventional wisdom.

He remains unconvinced by Socrates and

soon drops out of the conversation.

His place is taken by

Thrasymachus, a sophist who rejects Cephalus' traditional wisdom
and Polemarchus' reliance on poetry.

Thrasymachus is

representative of those men in the cave analogy who have broken
loose from their seats in the cave and can see that the shadows on
the wall are not substantial, but have not yet ascended to the sunlight.
Both Socrates and Thrasymachus reject traditional wisdom--the
wisdom of those chained to their seats in the cave analogy--but
Thrasymachus assumes that he is truly wise because he has seen
the folly of his peers. Socrates, however, must point out that there is a
much higher plane of knowledge, of which sophists like
Thrasymachus know nothing. 41 Like Sze, Ausland sees the prologue
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as a dramatization of the cave analogy, but also demonstrates that
the prologue portrays the analogies of the sun and divided line, as
well.42

Thus, Sze and Ausland have not arbitrarily chosen the

meaning of the dramatic elements, but have allowed the chief
philosophical themes and passages in the dialogue to govern their
interpretation.
It is this concern for looking at the main topic of the dialogue that
separates Sze, Ausland, and the approach taken in this dissertation
from the allegorists. This is not to say that there are no difficulties in
determining what the emphasis of a dialogue is. But as Ausland
notes, interpreting the dialogue dramatically is no more fraught with
dangers than interpreting it analytically or linguistically. Scholars have
stretched Plato's arguments to conform to their notions of his
"'predicational logic', or his 'theory of ideas' or his 'political idealism'."
Ausland adds, "[T]he truth is that the dramatic portions of Plato's
dialogues are intrinsically no more susceptible of ill-founded,
subjective or tendentious interpretations than are their hardest
stretches of dialectical argument."43 In reality, with the Symposium
we are on more solid ground than with most dialogues, for although
there is a real debate as to what the heart of the Republic is, there can
41 Corinne Sze, "Plato's Republic I: Its Function in the Dialogue
as a Whole" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1971 ), especially 93-244.
42Hayden Weir Ausland, "On the Dialogue-Proem to Plato's
Republic' (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1987).
43Ausland, 46.
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be no doubt that the Symposium is chiefly about Eros.44 Thus, there
is not as much room for disagreement on what philosophical concern
ought to govern the interpretation of the drama in the Symposium.
The dramatic approach also differs from the allegorical in
understanding the dramatic elements not only as a dramatization of
the philosophy in the dialogue, but also as the setting in which Plato
can discuss certain questions. Plato does not formulate arguments
entirely in the abstract and then surround them with dramatic events
that act out the philosophical arguments. 45 The arguments of Plato's
dialogues are dependent upon their characters and events. One
would not expect Socrates to discuss courage with effeminate Ionian
sophists, but with Laches and Nicias, two premier generals. Nor is it
surprising that Plato debates with the teacher Protagoras whether
virtue can be taught or that Eros is the topic at a party. The dramatic
details not only serve as commentary on the philosophical portion of
44James A. Arieti, Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama
(Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991 }, 107,
states that the dialogue is really about men creating a god in their own
image, not about Eros. Arieti is correct in recognizing the influences
of each character's personality in depicting Eros, but the dialogue is
nonetheless about the longings and wants (Eros) of each person,
even as he does create Eros in his own image.
45See the discussion on pages 41-42 for a model of how the
prologue was written in connection with the rest of the dialogue. In
short we will see there that, while Plato most likely had a particular
setting in mind throughout, the final edition of the prologue was not
complete until the dialogue had either been written or all its details
planned.
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the dialogue (as the allegorists rightly aver), but often determine the
matter of discussion and the direction of the arguments.
Yet it is not only allegorists who abuse the dramatic approach.
Some scholars, most notably Stanley Rosen, view the dramatic
elements as a vehicle to appreciate Plato's sense of irony.46 Rosen,
in particular, emphasizes the irony to be found in the dialogue
because he believes that by irony the careful reader is led to discover
Plato's esoteric teaching. Unlike most esotericists, Rosen rejects an
esoteric teaching outside the dialogues; instead he believes that the
esoteric teaching exists within the dialogues.

Careless readers

overlook the esoteric teaching, because they do not ponder the
dramatic context of the philosophical arguments, but a careful reader
understands Plato's esoteric teaching, as he sees how the drama of
the dialogue undermines the philosophical arguments. For Rosen
irony is the key to solving the dilemma of the Phaedrus' and the
Seventh Letter's rejection of written philosophy: Plato never writes in

such a way that the masses can grasp his esoteric teachings, but a
reader keen on Plato's irony can understand Plato's secret message.
Thus, Plato in one sense did not write down his philosophy (as the
Seventh Letter states) and yet in another sense he did, using the veil

of irony to keep his philosophy from the masses.47 In pursuit of this
46David Halperin has a somewhat similar approach, although
argued on different theoretical grounds. The differences between the
two are so significant that, although they can both be counted among
the pan-ironists, I will treat Halperin separately on pages 28-29.
47Rosen, xiv, liv-lvii.
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irony, Rosen subjects every last event, character, and detail of the
Symposium to close scrutiny, detecting philosophical presuppositions

behind the seemingly non-philosophical and observing any
contradictions between the philosophy espoused by the characters
and the philosophy implied by their actions.48
Rosen's approach, however, is not without its problems.
Although there is much irony in Plato's writings and a keen reader of
Plato will discern as much, Rosen overstates his case.

Merely

because Plato employs irony from time to time does not mean his
whole corpus is ironic or that there is an esoteric teaching lurking in
his dialogues beneath the cover of irony.49 If Plato's secret teachings
were shielded only by irony, Plato could not have counted on their
remaining hidden from sharp opponents. For if Rosen twenty-five
centuries later can detect the irony and the esoteric teachings,
certainly Plato's opponents would have detected them, too.SO
Furthermore, the dramatic elements are not fully explained
when they are merely assumed to be clues for the detection of irony;
48Rosen, xv.
49Cf. Tigerstedt's comments on Rosen, Interpreting Plato, 7879. Alan Bowen criticizes Rosen and his teacher Leo Strauss as "a
new species of esotericist to be distinguished from those depreciate
the dialogues and rely on the oral tradition"; see Bowen, "On
Interpreting Plato," Platonic Writings, 276 fn. 13.
50Rosen, Iv, quotes Friedlander approvingly to the effect that
our knowledge of irony has declined over the last century. But
Friedlander's observation is a two-edged sword: Not only would
Plato's friends have been more adept at detecting Plato's irony, but
his enemies would have been also.
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the dramatic details of Plato's dialogues surely do not exist solely to
add irony to the words spoken by its characters. S 1 This point
becomes clear, if we examine the role of dramatic elements in Greek
tragedy.

Sometimes dramatic elements add irony to statements

made in a tragedy,S2 but dramatic elements perform other functions,
too. They may allow the audience to understand better the plot of the
playS3 or the motives of some of the characters, S4 or may add a
realistic touch to the play, thereby evoking more sympathy from the
audience.SS They may even undergird emotionally or dramatically a
point made intellectually by a character.S6

Often they work

unobtrusively; the audience is affected on an emotional level, not on
S1 Cf. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 9S-96.
S2cf. Oedipus' vow to avenge the death of Laius as if he were
his own father (Soph., 0. T. 264). Oedipus' speech in lines 216-27S is
full of dramatic irony because he does not know who he really is;
therefore, examples will be drawn from this play to demonstrate how
dramatic details can have other uses besides irony.
S3cf. the role of the chorus of suppliants who open Sophocles'
0. T. (lines 1-S7). Oedipus does not need to be informed that a plague
has befallen Thebes, but the audience does.
S4 The motive for Oedipus' diligence in searching for Laius'
murderer is explained in an aside spoken by Oedipus (0. T. 137-140).
He proves that self-interest, not mere altruism, motivates his action:
the murderer of Laius might one day kill Oedipus.
SSAristotle (Poetics 14S3b) was undoubtedly correct when he
argued that a tragedy evokes an emotional response from the
audience. The members of the audience identify with the protagonist
and pity his misfortunes and fear lest something similar befall t_hem.
S6Cf. the garb and posture of the suppliants in 0. T. 1-S.
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an intellectual plane.57 Thus, good dramatic critics examine the
characters, order of events in the plot, structure of a work, metaphors,
etc., and then note how each element contributes to the work as a
whole. In particular, dramatic critics place the dramatic action in its
historical context and explain how it influences the philosophical
content of the dialogue and vice versa.

Rosen, fortunately,

recognizes this truth, if not in theory, at least in practice; he has a
greater dramatic sense in his exposition of the Symposium than his
principles of exegesis might suggest.
A similar criticism applies to Halperin's discussion of the
prologue. Although Halperin would deny that he has adopted a panironical interpretation, since he believes that Plato is as serious in
presenting his beliefs as he is in refuting them by dramatic means, he
claims that in the Symposium Plato "systematically goes about
undermining and subverting the very theories that his philosophical

personae propound and that many elements of the Dialogue
systematically combine to promote."58

Halperin adds that the

dialogue cannot be interpreted wholly as literature or philosophy or
some combination of the two: the dialogue appears to be both a
literary game and a serious work of philosophy--and yet one cannot
approach it in such contradictory ways at the same time. The net
57Hence Plato's criticism of poetry in the Republic 10.598b608b, especially 601 b, 603c-607a. There poetry is criticized for its
lack of real knowledge and its playing on the emotions of man.
58Halperin, "Narrativity," 114.
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result is a nihilistic interpretation, not far removed from a pan-ironic
interpretation: "[T]here's no success like failure, and failure's no
success at all."59
Halperin, however, misinterprets Socrates' speech by making
Socrates' Ascent to Beauty easier than Socrates intends.

Since

Halperin ascribes a much more positive doctrine of Eros to Socrates
than what Socrates gives, Halperin is disappointed when the
characters of the prologue fail.

Halperin only focuses on those

statements of Socrates where Eros begets amidst Beauty; Halperin
ignores the statements of Socrates to the effect that Eros is always
poor, strives for the Good, but rarely obtains it and loses it as he does.
Since Eros is fraught with failure, it is not surprising to see such erotic
figures as Apollodorus and Aristodemus fail in their narration of the
dialogue and their imitation of Socrates.

Halperin is wrong to

conclude that the prologue shows the failure of Plato's "official"
doctrine of Eros.60 The prologue confirms, not refutes, Plato's theory
of Eros.
While Rosen and Halperin employ dramatic criticism to detect
Plato's irony, James Arieti employs it to disparage a close reading of
the dialogues for their philosophical content. Arieti, unlike Rosen,
focuses on the broad sweep of the drama. Arieti rejects a close
reading of the text, as practiced both by the analytical philosophers
and by dramatic critics of Plato, because it pays too much attention to
59Halperin, "Narrativity," 122.
60Halperin, "Narrativity," 101-102, 104.
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the details and loses the big picture. Arieti believes that the dialogues
were not meant as serious philosophy, but as recruitment speeches
for prospective students at the Academy. When these dialogues were
presented in a public reading, the audience would have been unable
to remember every last detail; thus, the broad sweep of the dialogue,
not the trivia, must be studied.61 Plato uses dramatic elements only
to keep the audience's attention; each element is insignificant in itself,
unless combined with others to form a major theme.
Arieti correctly warns against overinterpretation,62 but
underestimates the importance of specific dramatic elements.
Audiences are able to remember and appreciate small details in a
dramatic performance. As the large number of lines from tragedy
quoted in other works indicates, the more alert members of an
audience can remember small details from a work even years later. 63
61Arieti, 3-5, 7-9, 250. In this way Arieti takes a stance similar to
the esotericists, who view the dialogues as protreptic to further,
formal study in the Academy. See Konrad Gaiser, Protreptik und
Paranese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des Platonischen
Dialogs, Tubingen Beitrage zur Altertumswissenschaft 40 (Stuttgart:
W. KohlhammerVerlag, 1959), 17-21.
62Plochmann, 35, is correct in criticizing Rosen for treating
every detail of the Symposium with such seriousness that he "drain[s]
it of humor, drama, personality, vitality," a trap into which Arieti rarely
falls. Rosen sometimes borders on allegory. For example, he
interprets the transmission of the dialogue through Phoenix to
Glaucon as symbolic of the "rebirth of the Socratic circle through the
instrumentality of the publication of the dialogue," even as the
phoenix reproduces asexually. Rosen, 15, n. 39. Rosen himself, lxiv,
admits that his analysis might seem on occasion to be "too talmudic."

31
Although some lines (and some plays) are more memorable than
others and no audience can memorize every last word uttered in a
play, the details of drama and dialogues are not bereft of significance.
Keen members of an audience, as certainly existed in ancient Athens,
would be able to follow most of the relevant details of a work quite
well. An author, furthermore, must craft his work, because he does
not know for certain which details will stick with an audience and which
will not. In any case, since composing a work requires greater time,
energy and personal involvement from the author than reading
requires from the reader, every author imbues a creation with more
nuanced meaning than can be fully comprehended in a single
reading. Arieti's minimalism is unwarranted.
Arieti, as well as Rosen and Halperin, demonstrates the
tendency to nihilism that is sometimes--and wrongly--associated with
the dramatic approach.

This nihilism arises when the dramatic

elements are seen as trivial or as only undermining, rather than
dramatizing, supplementing, and altering, the philosophy of the
dialogue. But such a nihilism is unwarranted. Even if Plato sometimes
uses the dramatic elements to express irony, it does not follow that
there is nothing but irony in the text.64 Nor do the dramatic qualities
63For example, Aristophanes' Frogs is full of citations from the
plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles; e.g., Frogs 1138, 1156, 1172,
1182, 1187, 1206-1208, 1217-1219, 1225-1226, 1232-1233, 12401241.
64As Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, 96, rightly notes, "By
becoming absolute Irony destroys itself. It can exist only as the
opposite to Seriousness. And there are some matters about which
Socrates-Plato is deadly serious. The 'pan-ironical' interpretations
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of Plato's dialogues mean that he was less than serious in writing
them to convey his philosophy.
dialogues

should

not

be

Dramatic interpretation of the
associated

with

nihilism

or

deconstruction ism.
The dramatic approach, in fact, has usually offered a rather
positive way of interpreting Plato.

Friedrich Schleiermacher

pioneered this approach by suggesting that a scholar needed to
appreciate the dialogue form if he wanted to understand Plato.
Schleiermacher rejected an esoteric reading of Plato and the attempt
to reconstruct Plato's thought from secondary testimony like
Aristotle's. 65

He decried the practice of analyzing only the

philosophical statements of the chief characters in Plato's dialogues
(Socrates in most dialogues; the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist and
Statesman); instead Schleiermacher argued that Plato's dramatic

form helped one to understand his philosophy. Plato, a "Philosophical
Artist,"

rejected

communication."66

"the

ordinary

forms

of

philosophical

His dialogue format caused utter confusion

entirely overlooks the religious basis of the Platonic Irony and its
inseparable companion, the Socratic Ignorance. Human life in
general and philosophy in particular are, indeed, but a play. But this
play is God's own play, which we must play in all seriousness."
65Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher's
Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, tr. William Dobson (London:
John William Parker, 1836; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1973), 913 (page references are to reprint edition). See also Tigerstedt,
Neoplatonic Interpretation, 5-6, 69-70.
66For a full discussion, see Schleiermacher, 3-40.
quotations are taken from pages 4 and 5.
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among interpreters because the contradictions in them gave the
impression that Plato was "more of a dialectician than a logical
Philosopher."67 The solution, Schleiermacher argued, was not to
adopt skepticism or to view Plato merely as a writer of beautiful prose,
but rather to recognize the Socratic method of Plato's writing. In order
to challenge his readers, Plato could not write treatises, which offered
solutions to readers. Instead he wrote dialogues that did not answer
the philosophical questions directly, but allowed the readers to
formulate solutions from the material given them.

To understand

Plato, therefore, a reader ought to read the dialogues in the order in
which they were written and allow himself to be challenged by the
dialogues.68 In this way, Schleiermacher argued, a scholar ought to
combine attention to dramatic elements with concern for Plato's
philosophy.
Since Schleiermacher's time, and especially in the last few
decades, a number of scholars have paid attention to the dialogue
form and the significance of dramatic details for the arguments in the
dialogues.69 Although not all such scholars agree with one another
67 Schleiermacher, 8.
68Schleiermacher, 10-19. Schleiermacher concludes his
introduction on pages 19-47 by arranging the dialogues in an
appropriate order and giving criteria to determine the genuineness
and order of the dialogues.
69A number of general introductions to Plato have commented
on the dramatic elements in Plato's dialogues but have covered too
much ground to do a detailed analysis of Plato's works. See, for
example, Arieti; Victorino Tejera, Plato's Dialogues One by One: A
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on specific interpretations, most would assent to the following
definition and hermeneutic of dramatic elements:

A "dramatic

element" is anything that is not a proposition for discussion by the
interlocutors in the dialogue or the debate of the propositions
themselves. Dramatic elements include not only the description of the
setting of the dialogue, but also the light-hearted banter or
pleasantries that may precede the more "serious" philosophical
conversation, as well as any interruptions of the debate by seemingly
extraneous circumstances. Also included as a dramatic element is
any characterization of the interlocutors in the dialogue because a
philosophical argument may be determined as much by the
psychology of the participants as by strict logic or desire for the truth.
In short, the dramatic elements are those details that may not be

Structural Interpretation (New York: Irvington, 1984); J.H. Randall, Jr.,
Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1970). Supplementing these works have been a
number of articles on isolated aspects of Plato, as well as
commentaries on individual dialogues. It is impossible to include in a
footnote all such articles. Platonic Writings, 301-311, has one of the
most comprehensive bibliographies of articles and books written from
a dramatic approach. For representative articles offering an overview
of a dramatic hermeneutic for interpreting Plato, see Drew Hyland,
"Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 3850; Arthur Krentz, "Dramatic Form and Philosophical Content in
Plato's Dialogues," Philosophy and Literature 7 (April 1983): 32-47;
John Hartland-Swann, "Plato as Poet: A Critical Interpretation,"
Philosophy 26 (1951 ): 3-18. Dorothy Tarrant has shown the
similarities in style and form between Attic drama and Plato's
dialogues; see Dorothy Tarrant, "Plato as Dramatist," Journal of
Hellenic Studies 75 (1955): 82-89. For examples of a dramatic
approach to an individual dialogue, see Hyland, 44-49, on the Crito;
Wolz, 323-353, on the Symposium; Warner, 157-175, on the
Republic. For more extensive commentaries, see, for example, Allen;
Mitchell; Rosen; and Nussbaum, 87-233.
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logically necessary for the argument of the dialogue, but may speak
to the less rational, more emotional side of the reader--a part of
human nature that needs as much convincing as the more logical
aspect of humanity and, as the Symposium argues, is a proper
subject of philosophy. The dramatic approach to Plato, therefore,
considers how these dramatic elements of the dialogue interplay with
the more philosophical ones.
Those who take a dramatic approach to Plato, thus, should be
interested in the sort of dramatic details that abound in the prologue
of the Symposium. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, even among them
the prologue has not received due attention. Dramatic critics have
tended to explicate how an entire dialogue fits together, drama and
all, or how Plato weaves dramatic elements into a philosophical
episode, rather than to look solely at the prologue.70 When they have
examined the prologue, they have not always shown the connections
between it and the philosophy of the dialogue. Thus, much work on
Plato's prologues remains to be done.
What work has been done in this area does deserve some
consideration. Sze and Ausland, as has already been noted, attempt
to link the prologue of the Republic to the rest of the work.71 Both
70Roger Duncan, for example, puts the main speakers of the
dialogue in their historical and dramatic context, but ignores the
prologue completely in his discussion; Roger Duncan, "Plato's
Symposium: The Cloven Eros," Southern Journal of Philosophy 15
(1977): 277-291. Miller, 19-25, in his quest for the unity of the
dialogue ignores the prologue.
71 See pages 21-23.
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demonstrate that book one of the Republic is an integral part of the
dialogue, not an independent work carelessly tacked on to the
beginning of Republic 2-10, and that the proem is a µ(µf)aLs of the
philosophical content of the Republic.

Jonathan Ketchum, in

commenting on the structure of Plato's dialogues, has acknowledged
the importance of the prologue.

Ketchum argues that all the

dialogues of Plato have a three part structure, prefaced by a
prologue. 72 Even if Ketchum's Procrustean division of each dialogue
into three parts is not wholly satisfactory, his acknowledgment of the
prologue as a significant structural element in each dialogue is
welcome.
More helpful in his approach is Diskin Clay, who demonstrates
how the prologues of Plato's Phaedo and Republic not only prefigure
the major themes of the dialogues, but are closely connected with
their epilogues. 73 Clay adds that there is more to Plato's careful
72Ketchum, 2-3, argues that all of Plato's dialogues have the
same structure: a prologue, followed by a protrepsis (which raises a
particular philosophical question}, an incursion (an excursus
discussing the presuppositions that underlie the debate in the
protrepsis), and an exegesis (a new examination of the debate in the
protrepsis or the beginning of a new, but related, topic). Ketchum is
mainly concerned about the last three elements of the dialogue, but
does at least recognize the significance of the prologue and its kinship
to prologues in other works, such as those of Hesiod. The purpose of
his study of the dialogues' structure is to prove that some of the
dialogues (the Republic, tor example) are incomplete and are not to
be thought of as Plato's last statement on the topic. For Ketchum's
analysis of the prologue, see especially 45-49.
73Diskin Clay, "Plato's First Words" (hereafter, Clay, "Words")
in Beginnings in Classical Literature, Yale Classical Studies
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 120-129.
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crafting of prologues than the desire to create an organically unified
work: Plato sometimes uses the prologue to link his contemporary
audience with the times of Socrates and to comment on this
connection. 7 4

Clay is on the right path, but could add a fuller

exposition on the philosophical significance of the historical eras
portrayed by the prologues and the prologues' relation to the middle
portions of the dialogue. 75
Thus, even though Plato's prologues merit more attention from
scholars, they have not been entirely ignored. The same can be said
about the Symposium's prologue. As we have already noted,76 two
scholars have thoughtfully examined the Symposium's prologue:
Halperin and Rosen. Halperin focuses on one particular aspect of the
prologue, the ruse of Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue, and
traces its effect upon Platonic epistemology and literary criticism. 77
His article on narrativity, therefore, will be examined in the next
chapter.

Rosen examines the prologue's characters and the

74Clay, "Words," 122.
75Qther recent studies on the prologue of a dialogue of Plato
include Richard J. Klonaski, "The Portico of the Archon Basileus: On
the Significance of the Setting of Plato's Euthyphro," Classical Journal
81 (1986): 130-137; Christine Leclerc, "Socrate aux pieds nus: Notes
sur le preamble du 'Phedre' de Platon," Revue de L'histoire des
Religions 200 (1983): 355-384; Joan C. Harrison, "Plato's Prologue:
Theaetetus 142a-143c," Tulane Studies in Philosophy 27 (1978):
103-123.
76see page 4.
77Halperin, "Narrativity," 95-126.
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transmission of the dialogue, as described in the prologue. 7 8
Rosen's treatment of the prologue, however, does not give due
attention to the significance of the date in which the dialogue is set or
to the fourth century milieu in which Plato was writing,79 and his "panironical" approach to Plato occasionally skews his reading of the
prologue.BO Nonetheless, Rosen's analysis offers a good starting
point for further examination of the dialogue.81
The Audience and the Composion of the Prologue
Before we investigate the role which the prologue plays in the
Symposium, we ought to have a working model of the audience of the

dialogue and the manner in which the dialogue was composed. We
must do so, even though it is nearly impossible to determine the state
of letters in ancient Athens. Suffice it to say that a fair number of
Athenians, probably the overwhelming majority, would have been
unable to read the dialogues on their own.

Since there was no

78Rosen, 5-20.
79Cf. Plochmann, 40-41.
BOsee the earlier discussion on Rosen's hermeneutic on pages
25-28.
81 Mitchell and Allen have also written recent commentaries on
the Symposium and discussed the prologue, but their works are not
as thorough as Rosen's. Both works, in fact, tend to be more
philosophical essays based upon the text--sometimes ranging far
afield from the Symposium into modern philosophy.
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printing press, few people would have been able to afford their own
copy of the Symposium. 82
We need not conclude, however, that only students at the
Academy or a few wealthy bookworms would have been able to read
the dialogues. Plato may have read his dialogues publicly, thereby
allowing people who were not his students and even illiterate
Athenians to hear his works. Such a possibility is likely, since the
works of Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and lsocrates were read in
public.83
But who would have attended such readings? Both Arieti and
Ryle have offered highly speculative answers. Arieti has suggested
that the dialogues were meant as recruitment speeches or brochures
82William Harris has suggested that only ten percent of
Athenians could read and write. He bases this estimate on the
assumption that ostracism is still the strongest indication of literacy
levels in ancient Athens. At least six thousand men were needed to
ostracize someone; if there was some competition between two
candidates for ostracism--but not enough to ostracize two people-roughly ten thousand men must have been literate, or approximately
ten percent of the citizenry. Harris also notes that no modern culture
gained widespread literacy until a large number of subsidized schools
were set up; their absence in antiquity suggests that most Athenians
were illiterate. Although Harris' construction of Athenian literacy is
fairly plausible, it is by the nature of the problem difficult to prove.
Moreover, the number of mass-produced ostraca could call into
question whether there were even ten thousand literate people.
William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1989), 15-16, 114.
83So maintains Harris, 86, who argues from Diogenes Laertius
9.54; Plato, Phaedrus 97b8-c1, and lsocrates 5.26. Diogenes is
admittedly a later source, but Plato and lsocrates r_efer to
contemporary practice.
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for Plato's Academy.84 If this is so, then the audience must have
been fairly sophisticated; only people interested in higher education
for their sons would have listened to the dialogues. Ryle, however,
has suggested that the dialogues were read at literary competitions,
where Plato's dialogues would have competed against the speeches
of Isac rates and other orators. 85

If this were the case, Plato's

audience would have included a number of illiterate people who
nonetheless loved a well crafted speech or dialogue.
In the case of the Symposium, Ryle is probably closer to the
truth than Arieti is.

The dialogue was likely written not for

philosophers or would-be philosophers only, but for an audience that
would have loved the rhetorical flair in that dialogue. To appreciate
the Symposium does not require a philosopher's background or
training in Plato's thought.

Furthermore, the dialogue defends

Socrates from the charge that he corrupted the youth; -Socrates, the
Symposium tells us, never seduced Alcibiades and refused to have

intercourse with him, even when Alcibiades tried to seduce him.
Because the dialogue is in part a defense of Socrates, it is more likely
that Plato would have wanted this dialogue to be more widely
circulated than most of his other dialogues. And since the dialogue is
84Arieti, 7.
85Ryle, 32-43. Ryle claims that the dialogues could not have
been intended for members of the Academy only, since some of the
dialogues pre-date it. Nonetheless, he concedes that some of the
dialogues, such as the Timaeus and the Parmenides, were written for
the Academy alone. It is difficult, indeed, to imagine a general
audience sustaining interest in the Parmenides.
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within the grasp of most audiences, we ought to assume that illiterate
as well as literate people heard the dialogue.
If the nature of the Symposium's intended audience can be
determined only with difficulty, it is equally difficult to answer
questions about Plato's manner of composing the dialogue and its
prologue. Was the prologue written first and then the rest of the
dialogue, or was the prologue written after the dialogue, so that it
might better reflect the dialogue's content?

These questions, of

course, cannot be answered with finality since we do not know for
certain what procedure Plato followed in composing any dialogue.
Several later authors comment on Plato's method of composition, but
their stories may be apocryphal. Diogenes Laertius (3.37) states that
Plato composed the Laws on wax tablets; the dialogue was
transcribed by Philip the Opuntian after Plato's death.

If this

statement is true, we can conclude that Plato revised his dialogues a
number of times before publishing them. This conclusion is also
supported by the remarks of Diogenes (3.37) and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus (6.25.2-3), who note that Plato wrote several variants
of the first sentence in the Republic.86 If this is true, then it is likely
that Plato revised the prologue as he wrote the dialogue, so that the
final edition of the prologue matched the thought and structure of the
final edition of the dialogue.
Thesleff would go even further. He argues that the dialogue
was originally published without the Apollodorus prologue (172a 186Cf. Clay, "Words," 114.
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174a2); then, after Plato had written the Republic, he added the
Apollodorus prologue to the Symposium.87 In this way Thesleff
accounts for the similarities between the prologues of the Symposium
and the Republic, allowing the prologue of the Symposium to imitate
that of the Republic and the body of the Symposium to predate that of
the Republic. Thesleff's suggestion would explain how the prologue is
so integrally connected to the theme of the dialogue--it was written
after the dialogue was completed. But we need not adopt this theory
to explain the connection between the prologue and the content of the
dialogue. Plato may have known exactly how the whole dialogue
would be written before he even wrote the first word. More likely, he
began by composing the prologue, then proceeded to write the body
of the dialogue, and edited the prologue to make it conform to the final
edition of the dialogue.

This hypothesis accords with Diogenes

Laertius' statements that Plato plaited and wove the dialogue until he
was satisfied and that Plato had several first sentences for the
Republic. For our purposes, however, all that need be said is that the
final form of the prologue was not complete until the final form of the
whole dialogue was complete.

87Holger Thesleff, Studies in Platonic Chronology (hereafter
Thesleff, Chronology), Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 70
(Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1982) 136, 180-183.
Thesleff also argues that Plato added the narrative frame to the
Protagoras, Menexenus, and Theaetetus in their second editions.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that the prologue has not been
explained in terms of its relationship to Socrates' exposition of Eros.
We have rejected the approach of analytical philosophy because it
does not explain the whole dialogue, but only selected portions of it.
And, though praising the theory behind the dramatic approach to
Plato, we have also criticized some of its practitioners for ignoring the
philosophical implications of the prologue.
In the next four chapters we will examine the prologue of the
Symposium in four ways. In chapter two, we will see the purpose of

Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue (172a 1-174a1). Then in the
following chapters, we will demonstrate how the prologue's
connections with specific portions of the dialogue undergird Socrates'
arguments about Eros:

in chapter three we will examine the

prologue's relationship with the body of the dialogue; in chapter four,
the vocabulary of the prologue and that of the dialogue; and in
chapter five, the prologue's relationship with the epilogue.

CHAPTER TWO
EROS IN THE TRANSMISSION OF THE DIALOGUE
In the last chapter we argued that the prologue is an integral
part of the dialogue, connected to the rest of the dialogue by literary
means and philosophical purpose.

This thesis, however, is

immediately challenged by the first two pages of the prologue (174a1174a2): The conversation of Apollodorus and his friends seems at
first glance irrelevant to the rest of the dialogue. In particular, it seems
senseless for Plato to spend so much time discussing how the
dialogue was transmitted by Apollodorus and his friends. Whether the
dialogue is narrated and by whom it is narrated should have no effect
on the content of the dialogue.1

Furthermore, if Plato wanted to

choose a narrator, he would have done better to choose Aristodemus
or Socrates. Both were present at the symposium and could have told
the story soon after the events took place.

As the dialogue now

stands, it is told twelve years later by a person who was a child at the
time of the symposium. Even if Plato's choice of narrator can be
excused, it seems entirely out of place for Apollodorus to describe his
earlier conversation with Glaucon, who never appears elsewhere in

1 As Arieti, 96, notes, all the discussion concerning the
transmission of the dialogue is ironic. The Symposium is a work of
fiction, not a transcript of an event that took place at Agathon's house
in416 BC.
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the Symposium. In sum, the part of the prologue that establishes
Apollodorus as the narrator seems extraneous to the rest of the
dialogue. Yet, as we shall observe, the narrative frame is an essential
part of the dialogue.
The Purpose of the Narrative Frame
One approach to understanding the Symposium's narrative
frame is to look at it as merely a representative of a certain form used
by Plato in his middle dialogues.

Thesleff, in particular, has

approached the question from this perspective. He argues that the
narrated dialogue is a particular form which Plato adopted for a few
years and then abandoned. This form was merely one of several that
Plato used as he progressed from dialogues of question-and-answer
to monologues. Thus, the main significance of the Symposium's
narrated form is its close chronological link to certain early middle
dialogues, specifically, the Lysis,

Charmides,

Protagoras,

Euthydemus, Republic, Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Parmenides.2
But why did Plato change the form of his dialogues? According
to Thesleff, Plato, as is seen in his first dialogues, was initially most
concerned with defending the late Socrates. After his trip to Sicily,
however, Plato set up the Academy and began writing dialogues to
disseminate to a larger audience the content of his lectures. At that
time he discovered that the aporetic dialogue, which had been

2Thesleff places all of these dialogues in the 380's BC: .Studies
in the Styles of Plato (hereafter Thesleff, Styles), Acta Philosophica
Fennica 20 (Helsinki: Akateeminen Kirjakaupa, 1967), 21-22, 45.
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designed to portray Socrates as an honest seeker of the truth, was ill
suited for expounding the philosophy of the Academy. Thus, he used
the narrated dialogue, an adaptation from memoir literature, which
was more suited to a general audience.
Thesleff's suggestion explains a great deal, but leaves many
other questions unanswered. It does not explain why Plato chose the
dialogue with narrative frame over other forms, such as the treatise,
that would have been suitable for disseminating his views to a wide
audience.

In addition, Thesleff does not explain why Plato later

abandoned the narrated dialogue: He merely states that Plato's late
dialogues reflect his disillusionment after his second trip to Sicily. Nor
does Thesleff explain the peculiar emphasis the theme of narration
receives in the Symposium.

For although other dialogues are

narrated, few of them go to such great lengths to emphasize the
process of narration. Nor does Thesleff explain why Plato puts the
dialogue in the mouth of Apollodorus instead of Aristodemus or
Socrates--or why the narrated prologue is an integral part of the
dialogue as it now stands. 3

Thus, although Thesleff is right to

observe that the narrative frame is a stylistic convention of the middle
dialogues, his thesis does not explain many important facets of the
Symposium's narrative frame.

3Thesleff, Chronology, 136, 181, suggests that in the first
edition of the Symposium Aristodemus narrated the dialogue and that
Plato later added the frame (Apollodorus) with its unmistakable
parallels to the Republic.

47
Other explanations for the peculiarities of the narrative frame
have been given by recent commentators. Socrates cannot relate the
dialogue since he is praised in it.

Apollodorus' role as narrator

questions the accuracy of his narration and the setting of the narrative
frame forms a contrast with the body of the dialogue. Apollodorus'
presence connects the Symposium to the Apology and the Phaedo,
reminding the reader of the connection between death and Eros.4
But these explanations, though correct as far as they go, leave a
number of questions unanswered. If Socrates cannot narrate the
dialogue, why must Apollodorus be the narrator?

Why cannot

Aristodemus narrate it--and in 416 BC, when the dialogue took place,
rather than some twelve years later? Why must Plato cast doubts
upon the narration of the dialogue?

Why should Glaucon be

introduced into the narrative frame? How does any of this advance
the philosophy of the dialogue?
To answer these questions, we must understand that the
narrative process has a specific purpose in the Symposium. For
although Plato uses the technique of narration in other dialogues,

4Allen, 4, notes that the narrative form preserves Socrates'
modesty; Mitchell, 225, adds that it prevents Socrates from destroying
the coherence of the narrative. Allen, 4-5, and Rosen, 11, observe
that the narrative form emphasizes the role of Apollodorus. Mitchell,
4-6, and Rosen, 7-8, note that the narrative form contrasts the date of
the narration with that of the dialogue's occurrence. Tilman Krischer,
"Diotima und Alkibiades: Zur Struktur des platonischen Symposion,"
Grazer Beitrage 11 (1984): 55, notes the connection between the
Symposium's prologue and the Aplogoy and Phaedo. For the
relationship between death and Eros, see also Diotima's argument in
207a6-208b6.
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only in the Symposium is it a major motif. Apollodorus is not the only
person in the Symposium to narrate information he has received.
Throughout the dialogue the characters are learning information and
passing it on to others. Apollodorus recounts events that took place
twelve years earlier, even as Socrates' encounter with Diotima,
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One individual after another claims that he learned a particular fact
from another person: Eryximachus, himself eager to praise Eros,
credits the choice of topic to his beloved (177a3-4); Socrates puts his
beliefs about Eros in the mouth of Diotima.5 Phaedrus quotes Hesiod
(178b5-7) and Parmenides (178b11) in his speech; Eryximachus,
Heraclitus (187a5-6); Agathon, Homer (195d4-5) and Euripides
(196e2-3). 6 This motif of narration, furthermore, is underscored by
the placement of speeches within speeches. Glaucon's conversation

5Andrea Nye misses the point when she argues that Diotima
must have been a real woman who truly taught Socrates Ta EpwTtKcx:
"The Hidden Host: lrigaray and Diotima at Plato's Symposium,"
(hereafter Nye, "Diotima") Hypatia 3 (1989): 46. All of Plato's
characters are fictional to the extent that Plato employs real people of
the fifth century in conversations which he invents. Nye's belief that,
since Diotima's views differ from Platonic philosophy, she must have
been a real person and her words in the Symposium must be the very
words she spoke to Socrates is a throwback to the hopelessly naive
notion of A.E. Taylor and John Burnet that Plato's dialogues are the
faithful records of actual Socratic conversations. Nor would Diotima
be the only "made up" person in Plato, as Nye avers, if Diotima's
historicity is rejected. The Er of the Republic is probably also
completely a creation of Plato.
6As Arieti observes, the guests in the Symposium prove their
view of Eros with "proof-texts"; Arieti, 107.
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is placed in Apollodorus' conversation with his friends two days later,
just as Diotima's conversation is placed in Socrates' speech. First
hand information is rare in the Symposium.
No other dialogue--not even the narrated dialogues-emphasize narration to the degree the Symposium does. To be sure,
the prologues of the Phaedo, Theaetetus, and Parmenides discuss in
nearly as much detail as the Symposium does how the narrators
learned the dialogue. Phaedo and Euclides explain how they were
present at the events of the Phaedo and Theaetetus, respectively;
Cephalus of Clazomenae describes how he found a reliable source
for the content of the Parmenides. In all three dialogues, however,
narration is not a major motif in the rest of the dialogue. There is no
passage in those dialogues comparable to Diotima's discourse in the
Symposium. Nor do the characters in those three dialogues use

"proof passages" as the Symposium does; more often than not,
authorities are cited to be disproved, not to support an argument.?
The Symposium, thus, is unique in its emphasis on narration.8

7Allen, 3, places the Symposium second to the Parmenides in
terms of complicated schemes of narration. In terms of the tortuous
path to the original dialogue, Allen may be correct, but the
introduction to the narration of the dialogue takes fewer lines in the
Parmenides than in the Symposium. More importantly, the body of
the Parmenides is not concerned with narration. The Parmenides
refutes various notions concerning the forms rather than approving
any one solution. Although the works of Zeno and Parmenides are
alluded to (127c5-d5), the purpose of the dialogue is not to establish a
Parmenidean cosmology, but to emphasize weakness in Socrates'
own views concerning unity and plurality. Similarly, the Theaetetus
explores different explanations of what knowledge is--including
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Why all this emphasis on narration?

One can argue that

narration serves a practical purpose in this dialogue: It allows Plato to
use the Symposium as an encomium to Socrates. 9 By having the
dialogue narrated by Apollodorus and Aristodemus, Plato has added
two more characters to the chorus praising Socrates. One of them,
Aristodemus, is a lover (EpaaTfis) of Socrates who imitates his
teacher down to walking barefoot all the time (172b1-4); the other,
Apollodorus, is a "Boswell" in his desire to know about the life of
Socrates and in his admiration of him (172c5-6; 173d5-6).1 O
Aristodemus and Apollodorus, however, are not merely two more
people who praise Socrates in the dialogue.

As narrators, they

preserve Socrates' modesty. Socrates cannot tell how Alcibiades and

Protagoras' dictum that man is the measure of all things (160c8-9, dB9)--but none of the suggestions receive Socrates' approval.
BRosen, 2-3, calls the dialogue "a series of recollections within a
recollection." According to Wolfgang Rosier, this motif accords well
with the dialogue's dramatic setting, the symposium, since the
symposium was dedicated to recalling past events, particularly the
history of the community. (Rosier goes so far as to see symposiastic
poetry as a partial precursor to the writing of history.) Wolfgang
Rosier, "Mnemosyne in the Symposion," in Sympotica: A Symposium
on the Symposion, ed. Oswyn Murray (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), 230-236.
9Cf Allen, 4; Mitchell, 6, 225. To some degree, all of Plato's
dialogues are encomia to Socrates. In no other dialogue, however, is
Socrates praised so openly as in the Symposium.
1OR.G. Bury applies the epithet "Boswell" to Aristodemus, but
the description fits Apollodorus equally well. See R.G. Bu-ry, The
Symposium of Plato, 2d ed. (Cambridge: W. Hefter and Sons, Ltd.,
1932), xvi.
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the other guests were in love with him 11--nor for that matter how the
guests offered somewhat ironic criticism of him.12 Indeed, Socrates
cannot even be the primary source of this information, but
Aristodemus must be. Socrates can only confirm that the symposium
occurred as Aristodemus said (173b5-6). Thus, the unique emphasis
on narration is partly due to Plato's intention of praising Socrates in
the dialogue.
By emphasizing narration, Plato also draws attention to the
fictional nature of the Symposium.

The reader is not involved

firsthand with Socrates, a fact easy to forget when simply reading a
conversation between Socrates and other people.13

Plato is

describing events that took place in 416 BC, when he was
approximately thirteen years old--too young to have attended the
symposium.14 If Plato were portraying a real event, he would have

11Allen, 4; Bury, xvi; Friedlander, 3:1.
12Rosen and Duncan believe that the Symposium portrays
Socrates in a bad light. Rosen, 20, argues that Socrates' faults are
revealed, "soberly and unthinkingly by Aristodemus, drunkenly and
with real penetration by Alcibiades." Duncan, 287-288, argues that
Socrates is indeed hybristic in scorning his beloveds and forcing them
to become his lovers instead, as Alcibiades maintains (222b3-4). To
a degree, Rosen and Duncan are correct. The negative side of
Socrates' behavior, nonetheless, need not be emphasized. If
Alcibiades praises Socrates with great irony, Alcibiades also criticizes
him with the same degree of irony.
13Hyland, 43, aptly notes that these dialogues are "imitations of
imitations," which, ironically, are condemned in Plato's Republic.
14Ancient sources are divided between 429 and 427 BC as the
year of Plato's birth. See Diog. Laert., 3.1-4; cf. Johannes Kirchner,
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had to rely on the accounts of the older pupils of Socrates like
Aristodemus to reconstruct the events of the symposium. Plato, thus,
warns the reader not to expect that the Symposium is an account of a
historical event.
Yet there is a more important reason narration is emphasized:
The process of narration exemplifies the main theme of the dialogue,
Eros. As we argued in the first chapter, Plato suggests throughout the
dialogue that all actions of mankind are governed by Eros. This truth
applies also to narrators, for narration is a form of procreation, akin to
the procreation of ideas, which is praised by Diotima (208e5-209b4).
A narrator achieves a degree of immortality when his narration
outlasts him, even as people achieve immortality by begetting
offspring who outlive them and carry on the family name. Narrators
perform their task through µeAETTJ, by which the natural forgetfulness
(:\fi6n) is driven out and the continued remembrance of the dialogue

guaranteed (208a3-7).

Narrators, moreover, must be inspired by

beauty, even as other men can beget ideas and children only when
beauty is present (209b3-4).

Only because the speeches in the

symposium are beautiful can Apollodorus relate them to his friends:
Apollodorus finds the speeches useful and moving (173c2-5).15
Eros is also to be seen in the interest that many people show in
the symposium, for Eros is a lack that longs to be satisfied. Thus, an
ed., Prosopographia Attica (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1961 ), 2:204;
J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971 ), 333.
1Scf Alcibiades' comments on the beauty and lure of Socrates'
speeches (215d1 -6); see also Halperin, "Narrativity," 111-112.
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audience always inquires for more information from the narrator, for
the audience must satisfy its desire for the dialogue. Glaucon and
Apollodorus' friends ask for the dialogue to be narrated because they
lack, yet long for, the words of Socrates. Since Glaucon does not
know the content of the dialogue, he actively pursues Apollodorus to
obtain the information (172a3-b7). Even Apollodorus at one time did
not know the dialogue, but has inquired about it from Socrates and
Aristodemus (173a8-b6). Likewise, Socrates seeks Diotima's wisdom
on Eros because he recognizes his own inability to understand Eros
or to answer the questions Diotima asks (201 d1-2).
Narration, thus, is an erotic activity. The narrators retell the
dialogue, just as all men long to procreate. The audience listens
eagerly to the dialogue, just as all men strive to fill in what is missing.
As Halperin argues, the prologue shows that Plato's theory of the
erotics of the process of narration is both a success and a failure. On
the one hand, both narrator and audience perform their tasks eagerly.
Glaucon, Phoenix, Apollodorus and his friends are all interested in
Aristodemus' story. On the other hand, the narration does not seem
to stick in the minds of the audience. Several people have heard the
dialogue, but by the time their story reaches Glaucon and his friend,
the account is so confused that Glaucon does not even know when it
took place (172b4-5, 7, c2-3)

Furthermore, the people most

knowledgeable about the dialogue, Apollodorus and Aristodemus,
are not good philosophers.

Intimate knowledge of the narration

seems to have had little effect upon their lives. Narration, then, as
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Halperin suggests, is as much a failure as a success in the
Symposium.16

This failure in the midst of success is especially evident in
Apollodorus' efforts to present a truthful account of the symposium.17
At first glance, Apollodorus seems to succeed in his presentation. He
argues against several misconceptions of Glaucon concerning the
symposium, gives the correct date of the symposium, and claims to
have thoroughly researched this event. He states that he has even
consulted Socrates about some details of the symposium (173b4-6).
As far as Apollodorus is concerned, this dialogue, as it is about to be
narrated, is free from error.18

But misinformation still remains.

Socrates does not--and probably cannot--correct Aristodemus'
account; he merely affirms it.19 Too much time has passed since the

16Halperin, "Narrativity," 108-111.
17The Symposium, of course, is fiction. Thus, when we say that
Apollodorus presents a truthful account of the symposium, we do not
mean that he is accurately describing a particular banquet of 416 BC.
Instead, we are speaking of "dramatic verisimilitude" (as Guthrie calls
it), i.e., that Apollodorus' account reflects the fiction that Plato wants
the reader to adopt. See W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek
Philosophy, vol. 4, Plato: The Man and his Dialogues: Earlier Period
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 336.
18Bury, xviii, believes that Plato was writing against an earlier
account of the symposium given by Polycrates the rhetor. It is difficult
to say, however, whether the almost polemical defense of Socrates in
this dialogue was directed against an earlier version of the
symposium written by someone else. Bury is right in rejecting any
polemic by Plato against Xenophon's Symposion, since the latter was
probably written after Plato's work and is set at a different time (the
Panathenean Festival ca. 420 BC).
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symposium for Socrates to be of much help to Apollodorus when the
latter learns about the dialogue from Aristodemus. The passage of
time, however, is not the only culprit.
Ar!~todemus

At the S_Y!!!.Q.9Sium itself

became drowsy ..)~.~us, Aristodemus' account of the last
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178a5).22
Both the failure and success of narration can be explained if we
adopt Diotima's view of Eros. For her, Eros is a daemon who never
achieves perfection--or as soon as he achieves it, loses it (203d8-e5).
Thus, all philosophers (who by definition take after Eros) are not
perfect (204a1-2, b1-5), nor will they be able to transmit knowledge
perfectly to other people.
1 9173b5-6:
µot
'AptoT68T]µos) 0tT]yeTTo.

Not surprisingly, then, neither of the
wµoA6yet

Ka86:nep

EKElVOS (viz,

20Rosen, 9.
21 Rosen, 17, cites 185c4: n avoaviov OE navoaµEvov-8t86:oKovm yap µe '(oa AEyetv ouTwol ol oocpoi.
22As Mitchell, 4, notes, this raises the question whether
Apollodorus' account is any more accurate than any other account
Glaucon has heard or would be likely to hear.
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narrators in the dialogue is infallible. Yet, like all men under the
influence of Eros, they strive to gain what they are missing or have
lost. For just as all men are constantly forgetting and relearning what
they know (207e5-208b2), so narrators must practice (µEAETav) to
retain their narration.23

Because of their natural forgetfulness,

however, narrators will not be able to grasp and maintain the content
of the whole dialogue.
The fault lies, then, not with the process of narration itself, but
with the human beings who narrate it. When narration is portrayed in
the prologue to be not completely reliable, this does not so much
refute as confirm Plato's "official" view that narration is erotic. The
narrators and their narration must be imperfect, for the erotic is by
definition imperfect. Thus, Halperin is wrong to hold that the failure of
narration in the Symposium is an "unofficial" doctrine that refutes the
"official" doctrine of the dialogue, which holds that narration is always
successful.24 Failure in narration is rather a confirmation of the
"official" doctrine of Eros.

23Thus, Apollodorus in the prologue emphasizes that he is not
unpracticed (8oKw µoL. .. OVK aµEAETTJTOS ELVOL, 172a1-2; OUK
aµEAETIJTC.US exc.u, 173c1 ).
24ct Halperin, "Narrativity," 107, 113-114. To Halperin, the
problem of the narration of the dialogue is connected with the
question of Plato's beliefs about written philosophy. Thus, Halperin
points out the difficulties of narration in the Symposium in order to
show how difficult it is to interpret Plato since Plato is a
"deconstructionist avant la lettre," tor Plato "exhibits a series of
alternating doctrinal and counterdoctrinal pressures" which cannot be
resolved; Halperin, "Narrativity," 114.
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If narration often fails to communicate true knowledge, where
does that leave the reader of Plato's dialogues? Plato's dialogues,
after all, are narrations--Plato's narrations--whether or not they have
a narrative frame. Halperin argues that the failure of narration in the
Symposium is Plato's way of undermining his own work. Plato makes

philosophical statements and then disproves them--if not by logic,
then by drama. Thus the reader gains no direct instruction from the
dialogue nor even food for thought. For according to Halperin, the
dialogues do not offer theories for readers to debate or even an
occasional flash of insight that is all too quickly dimmed.25
Can we then, as Halperin implies, really learn nothing from the
Symposium? Perhaps we cannot learn a definite teaching about a

particular philosophical issue, but we are exposed to the process of
acquiring knowledge. As the dialogue makes clear, that process is
fraught with difficulties. Learning takes place when Eros-like--and
Eros-driven--men recognize a lack of wisdom in themselves and
pursue it through Beauty or the Good.

But Beauty is not easily

discerned; men are far more likely to confuse Absolute Beauty with its
kin, the beauty to be found in bodies or individual ideas. Absolute
Beauty--the only kind that can inspire true knowledge--must be
described primarily in negative terms: Absolute Beauty neither comes
to be nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes; it is not restricted to one
particular aspect of time; it is not a relative or partial beauty or one
recognized by only some observers; it does not take a physical form; it

25Halperin, "Narrativity," 115-117.
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cannot even be described as a word (A6yos) or piece of knowledge
(entaTf\µ11).26 Because Absolute Beauty, the source of all wisdom,
cannot be described directly, Socrates cannot explain to Agathon his
thoughts on the porch (175d3-7), nor can Plato teach any
philosophical insight derived from Beauty. In fact, Plato cannot even
describe in positive terms the sort of Beauty one ought to pursue to
acquire knowledge. Plato can only sketch an outline and speak to his
readers as uninitiated people (21 Oa1-2).

Thus, Plato through

Socrates can claim to know all about erotics (177d7-8) and still not be
able to communicate in his Symposium the definitive explanation of
Eros and Beauty.
By reading the Symposium, however, we do gain something:
not a positive doctrine, but a philosophical process, which is portrayed
more than it is explained. In Socrates' speech Plato outlines, to the
extent language can, the Ascent to Beauty. Then in the prologue's
and Alcibiades' depictions of Socrates, Plato shows how the ascent
looks to others. Lest the reader confuse the ascent with some inferior
manner of acquiring wisdom, Plato introduces men in the prologue
who ape Socrates, but fail to arrive at Absolute Beauty. Thus, by
examining the explicit teaching of Eros as outlined by Socrates, by
pondering the dramatic elements found in the prologue, and by

26symp. 210e2-b5. In this passage, the only positive
description of Absolute Beauty is that it is eternal (aEl ov, 211a1) and
marvelous (8avµaaT6v, 21 Oe4-5).
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evaluating our own attempt to ascend to Beauty, we can learn how
Plato says philosophers acquire knowledge.27
In all this discussion we {like Halperin) have assumed that
Socrates' views on Eros are close to those held by Plato. We have
assumed this, not because Socrates ought always to be taken as the
mouthpiece of Plato, but because in this dialogue Socrates offers the
most comprehensive explanation of Eros. Socrates' theory of Eros
can explain the behavior of all the guests, but the other speeches do
not explain the behavior of Socrates.

To Phaedrus, Pausanias,

Aristophanes, and Agathon, Eros is equated with desire for sex.
These four guests, to be sure, claim that Eros has positive side
effects. Phaedrus says Eros inspires heroic deeds (178e1-179b5).
Pausanias claims a noble Eros will educate youths (184b6-e4).
Aristophanes argues Eros releases mankind from feelings of
separation (191 a5-d5). Agathon emphasizes Eros' power in creating
poetry {196d6-197b3).

Yet the circle of lovers defined by these

guests is much smaller than that offered by Socrates (205b6-7). By
Phaedrus' definition, only Socrates is a true lover and Alcibiades a
true beloved, since these are the only men whose exploits in battle
are described at the symposium {219e5-221 c1 ).

Pausanias'

27Belfiore insightfully argues that the purpose of the dialogue is
to open up the words of Socrates (as Alcibiades attempts to do in the
epilogue) and examine their application in our lives. All the while,
Socrates refuses to become an authority, that is, to teach virtue by
expounding a doctrine. Instead, our own efforts at apprehending
Absolute Beauty (aided by a study of Plato's words) must direct us to
the truth. Elizabeth Belfiore, "Dialectic with the Reader in Plato's
Symposium," Maia 36 (1984): 149.
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definition is little better, for despite his emphasis on Eros' pedagogical
benefits, Pausanias is chiefly concerned with the gratification of the
lover. In Pausanias' analysis, Socrates must be an odd lover, for
Socrates sees education as an erotic experience rather than as a
means to one. Aristophanes, similarly, would reject Socrates' erotics
because it does not express itself in a physical longing for union with
another body. Of all the guests, Eryximachus, with his notion of Eros
as cosmic force (186a3-7), comes closest to Socrates' all-inclusive
theory. Yet Eryximachus related Eros to bodies and fields of learning
(TexvaL,

not ETILaTfjµaL as in Socrates' speech)--and then only to four

fields: medicine, music, prophecy, and astronomy. Thus, none of
these speeches comes close to explaining the erotic behavior of all
the guests, especially Socrates. To the degree that knowledge of
Eros and Beauty can be communicated, Socrates comes closest to
an all-inclusive explanation of "erotic" behavior.
At the same time as we affirm that Socrates gives the most
comprehensive speech and, thus, ostensibly the official viewpoint of
the dialogue, we ought not to limit Plato's philosophy to the
statements made by Socrates. To give primacy to Socrates' speech
does not require reducing the whole dialogue to that speech. First,
Socrates builds on the speeches of his predecessors; without them
Socrates' discussion would certainly be different.

For example, if

Pausanias had not distinguished between a base and noble Eros, or if
Eryximachus had not universalized Eros as a cosmic force, Socrates
would have had to spend more of his speech defending the notion
that Eros did not operate entirely on the physical level. Similarly, if
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Agathon had not confused Eros with what Eros desired and if
Aristophanes had not stated that love is finding one's other half,
Socrates would not have had to refute these beliefs (199d1-202e1,
205d10-206a1). Thus, the speeches of the other guests influence the
content of Socrates' speech.
Second--and more importantly--Socrates' speech presumes
that direct experience in the Ascent to Beauty is of greater value than
talk about it. By this principle, evaluation of people as they attempt to
ascend to Beauty is more helpful than merely reading an outline of the
Ascent.

Here is where the dramatic portions of the dialogue are

helpful. The prologue and the epilogue (Alcibiades' speech and the
breakup of the party) offer a different perspective of Socratic Eros:
the prologue shows Socratic Eros as seen by his fanatic pupils; the
epilogue, as seen by a disgruntled one.

These perspectives are

necessary for the reader to get the full picture of Socratic/Platonic
Eros as caricatured by his friend and mocked by his rivals. Thus,
although Socrates' speech may form the heart of the dialogue, the
rest of the dialogue is not without significance.
The prologue, then, offers another perspective on Socratic
Eros. All the characters in the narrative frame are in some sense
students and EpaaTat of Socrates. Their successes in pursuing
Beauty are instructive, while their failures in imitating Socrates portray
the pitfalls that one can encounter on the Ascent to Beauty. Of equal
importance for the reader is the historical setting of the narrative
frame, for two reasons. First, the setting of the narrative is a culturally
and politically more impoverished time than that of the body of the
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dialogue; the setting of the narrative dramatizes Socrates' point of
Eros as lack.

Second, the historical setting of 172a 1-174a2

influences the narration of the dialogue; then the reader ought to ask
whether such influences also affect him or her. Since these points
need explanation, the rest of this chapter will examine the
characters28 involved in the dialogue's narration and then the
historical setting of the narration, in order to determine how they
manifest Eros.
The Characters of the Narrative Frame
The chief character involved in the dialogue's narration is the
narrator Apollodorus. He has been a devoted pupil of Socrates for
three years (172c4-6).29 Naturally, he is acquainted with Socrates'
views on many subjects (172c5-6). Presumably, the symposium is
not the only conversation of Socrates that he has tried to memorize.
Apollodorus, moreover, stays with Socrates until the latter dies.30
Apollodorus' interest in philosophy seems genuine:

Unlike his

28As we evaluate the characters, we must be careful not to pit
the "imperfect pupils" such as Apollodorus against their "wise
teacher," Socrates; the characters in the prologue are too complex to
be simply foils for Socrates. Nor is it helpful to analyze the characters
as representatives of a particular vice. They are philosophers who
have some frailties, which any student of philosophy may share. Cf.
Plochmann's criticism of Rosen, 34, 38; Gallagher, 40-42.
29Socrates in the Apology (34a2; 38b7) names Apollodorus as
one of his followers at the time of the trial.
30This is attested by both Plato (Phd.
Xenophon (Ap. 28).

59a-b, 117d) and
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contemporaries mentioned in the Apology (23c2-7), he is not merely
interested in watching Socrates prove the learned men wrong, but
desires philosophy for its usefulness (Symposium 173c2-5).
Apollodorus, nonetheless, has two key weaknesses. First, he is
highly emotional, as is evident from his nickname µaAaK6s, "softy"31;
he not only bawls at Socrates' death (Phd. 117d3-4), but he also goes
on lengthy tirades against his friends.32 Second, in his zeal to honor
Socrates he distorts Socrates' philosophy.

Apollodorus ascribes

more bliss and knowledge to Socrates than Socrates himself would

311s the proper reading µaAaK6s, "softy," or µavtK6s, "mad
man"? For the textual evidence, see Georg Ferdinand Rettig,
platonis symposium in usum studiosae uventutis et scholarum cum
commentario critico (Halle: Libraria Orphanotrophei, 1875), 3. For
an evaluation of the evidence, see Bury, 6; Dover, Symposium, 79;
Friedlander 3:3, 431 fn. 5; Leonardo Paganelli, "Plat. Symp. 173d
(µaAaK6s/µav1K6s)," Museum Criticum 18 (1983): 193-196. Rettig
and Bury prefer µavtK6s, Dover and Paganelli, µaAaK6s. It is easier to
see why µaAaK6s would be emended by a later editor to µavtK6s than
vice versa: µaAaK6s, as Paganelli has documented, came to have an
obscene meaning in Byzantine Greek. Yet, though I prefer µaAaK6s,
either reading makes sense in the context of the passage. If µaAaK6s
is the preferred reading, the friend of Apollodorus is asking why he
got the nickname of "softy," when he rants and raves so much. If
µavtK6s is correct, the friend says that he does not know how he
acquired the nickname, but agrees that it is an apt one.
32Apollodorus, though a pupil of Socrates for approximately
eight years by the time of Socrates' death, still had not adopted a
more stoic attitude to death. On Apollodorus elsewhere in Plato, see
Guthrie, 366; Rosen, 11; Friedlander 3:2-3. Arieti, 96, sees the tirades
of Apollodorus as a parody of would-be followers of Socrates. More
insightfully, Allen, 5, notes that the narration of the dialogue through
. Apollodorus highlights the Symposium's connections with the
dialogues on death (the Apology and the Phaedo).
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admit. Although Socrates claims only to be a seeker after the truth
and to know nothing at all--or erotics at most (177d7-8)--Apollodorus
believes that Socrates has escaped the wretchedness of most
mortals.33 In a similar way, Apollodorus mistakes Socratic irony for
rudeness:

Apollodorus criticizes his non-philosophical friends

(173a 1-3, c5-d3), while Socrates bestows ironic praise upon Agathon
(175d7-e6).34 Apollodorus in effect congratulates himself, whereas
Socrates deprecates himself.35 Consequently, when Apollodorus
begins to boast of his happiness as a philosopher (173a 1-3), Glaucon
rightly tells him to stop jesting (173a3-4); Apollodorus is not so close
to the Socrates he adores as he believes himself to be.36

33Diotima remarks that the wise do not philosophize because
they already possess wisdom {204a1-4), but Apollodorus believes
that Socrates has escaped from the wretches of ignorance (173d4-5).
Socrates' self-deprecation is, admittedly, ironic; he always seems to
know more than he lets on. For example, Socrates claims that his
knowledge is inferior to Agathon's (175e1 -6; 198b1-c5) and then
upstages him with his own encomium. Yet Socrates would be the first
to admit that he has not achieved his goal as a philosopher (212b1-8).
34Cf. Rosen, 14, who notes that whereas Socrates in the
Republic uses irony with Polemarchus and Cephalus, Apollodorus is
actually rude to his friends. Warner, 161, notes that the best picture
we get of Socrates is not from his pupil Apollodorus, but from "the
unconverted Alcibiades"; similarly, in the prologue we are more apt to
identify with the unnamed "friends" than with "mad" Apollodorus.
35Apollodorus is willing to concede that he has not entered total
bliss and that he is probably KaKo8aiµwv (173d1-2). But his
statement that his friends are certainly KaKo8a iµovEs (173d2-3)
reflects a presumptuous attitude on his part.
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Apollodorus finds a counterpart to himself in Aristodemus.
Aristodemus, like Apollodorus, has several admirable qualities. He
follows Socrates closely, down to imitating such details as being
shoeless (173b2).37 He is so faithful to Socrates that he is even
called an epaaTfts (lover) of Socrates--even though Aristodemus, as
the junior of the two, should technically be called the epwµEvos.38 For
these reasons he evokes the reader's respect and admiration.
Yet Aristodemus is not without his faults. Like Apollodorus, he
appears to have acquired the demeanor of Socrates without his
wisdom. He is shoeless, for example, just as Socrates usually is, even
though Socrates knows enough to come well dressed for Agathon's

36Anderson, 11 O, insightfully notes that Apollodorus is "more
concerned with form than with understanding." Though he is a faithful
narrator of the events of the symposium, he does not seem to
comprehend their significance.
37Bury, xvi, sees Aristodemus as another "Boswell" in his
fascination with the smallest details of his teacher's life. Although
such a reading is a bit simplistic, it does account for one aspect of
Aristodemus' character.
38Although, as Bury, 4, notes, the word epaaTfJS can be used in
a broader sense, i.e., "admirer," almost as a synonym for eTa'lpos, the
epaaTiJS, properly speaking, is the active partner in the sexual
relationship; the epc.0µEvos, the passive one. That the younger man,
Aristodemus, is called the epaaTfJS in 173b3, shows that the more
aggressive individual in this relationship was Aristodemus, in spite of
the fact that Socrates was well known for his fondness for young lads.
Cf. Alcibiades' aggressive quest to be the passive partner in an
epaaTfis-epwµEvos relationship and Nussbaum's commentary on it,
188-189. As Alcibiades complains, Socrates forces his TTalOlKa (i.e.,
his EpWµEVOl) tO become his EpaaTat (222b3-4).
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symposium.39 Aristodemus, moreover, probably left the Socratic
circle by the time Apollodorus narrates the symposium.4 O
Aristodemus' credibility is further undermined by his inability to recall
all the speeches (178a 1-5) and by his falling asleep during part of the
symposium (223b8-c1 ). He may even have an ulterior motive for his
interest in narrating the symposium:

According to Xenophon,

39Allen, 6, observes that Aristodemus lacks all the qualities the
other self-invited guest--Alcibiades--possesses. As the first speaker,
by virtue of his being a narrator, he stands in fitting contrast to
Alcibiades, the last speaker. Allen, 105, adds that, while Aristodemus
will praise Eros by narrating the dialogue, Alcibiades will only praise
Socrates.
It is not necessary to allegorize Socrates' and Aristodemus'
shoelessness to make sense of it. Social norms and the roughness of
the physical terrain suggested that one ought to wear shoes, but on
most occasions Socrates was impervious to the world about him.
When he does put on shoes for the banquet, it is a sign that he can
conform to society's rules, when necessary. More importantly,
Socrates demonstrates that he can accommodate himself to society,
while Aristodemus cannot.
Nussbaum, 185-186, argues along these lines, but adds that
Socrates' shoelessness reflects how impervious he is to the world
when he analyzes Eros. Socrates analyzes Eros in the abstract, not
as it takes place among real people. Thus, he and his Ascent to
Beauty seems ridiculous to other people. Thus, he and his Ascent to
Beauty seems ridiculous to other people. Nussbaum, 184, argues:
"We are not allowed to have the cozy thought that the transformed
people will be just like us, only happier. Socrates is weird." Rosen, 17,
however, goes further. He claims that Aristodemus' shoelessness
shows "lack of prudence or a courting of danger" since unprotected
feet are more prone to injury. But Rosen is reading more into the text
than is there.
40His defection from Socrates is implied by the words epaoTfis
wv ev Toi's µaALoTa Twv TOTE (173b3-4). It can also be surmised
from the fact that he is not the narrator of this dialogue and is not
present at Socrates' death or in any other Platonic dialogue.
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Aristodemus was an atheist41; thus, he may have been as interested
in how men portray a god as he was in Socrates' philosophy. This
theory is supported by the absence of any speech by Aristodemus in
the dialogue. Although Aristodemus may have notionally delivered a
speech at the symposium and then excluded it from his narrative out
of modesty, it is more likely that he declined to praise a god in whom
he did not believe. After all, if Aristodemus was too modest to include
his speech in his narration, Apollodorus could have learned
Aristodemus' speech from Socrates.42 In any event, Aristodemus'
atheism makes his narration seem less trustworthy.
In short, the narrators have both positive and negative
attributes. They are Eros-like in that they are philosophers who strive
after the truth, but never quite attain it. Thus, we cannot judge them
either entirely positively or negatively. We cannot, for example, follow
Bury's wholly positive evaluation of the two, especially his assumption
that Apollodorus' fanaticism proves that his account of the dialogue is

41Xen. Mem. 1.4.2, 11.
42Cf. Rosen, 17-20, for a similar argument. Aristodemus'
account does not even hint that he gave a speech. He states that he
sat next to Eryximachus, although it is unclear whether he sat
between Aristophanes and Eryximachus or between Eryximachus
and Agathon. Mitchell, 48, argues on the basis of 193e1 -2 that
Aristodemus must be seated between Eryximachus and Agathon. But
Aristodemus claims that Eryximachus ought to have followed
immediately after Aristophanes (185c5-d2), suggesting that
Aristodemus would have been seated between Eryximachus and
Agathon. Thus, the evidence drawn from 185c5-d2 cancels out the
evidence of 193e1-2. It is as if Aristodemus had forgotten about not
only his speech, but even his presence at the symposium.
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trustworthy.43 For although a fanatic like Apollodorus may memorize
the words of his teacher verbatim, he may not understand what he
has memorized.44

Yet we cannot dismiss Apollodorus and

Aristodemus as two people who "gehoren zu jener leiderschaftlich
anhanglichen aber unproduktiven und etwas lacherlichen Art von
SchOlern, die im Gefolge keines groBen Mannes fehlt."4 5
Apollodorus and Aristodemus may have their faults, but they are not
mere "groupies" of Socrates.

They are, in fact, properly called

philosophers. As Diotima observes, philosophers do not possess
perfect knowledge, but pursue it. They stand between ignorance and
knowledge, but strive for knowledge (204a1-b2).46
Through Apollodorus and Aristodemus, Plato shows that
Socrates' Ascent to Beauty is no simple procedure with guaranteed
results. As Diotima warns Socrates (21Oa1-2), not all people who
hear the Ascent outlined are able to follow it. Even people intimately

43Bury, xvi.
44Rosen, 10-11.
45Friedlander, 3:3.
46Rosen, 14-15, observes that Apollodorus is an Eros-figure:
neither a true philosopher nor one far removed from philosophy. But
philosophers, according to Diotima, are Eros-figures (204a-b5).
Although Diotima does not directly state whether there are different
degrees among the oaiµovEs, such a view would seem to accord well
with her outline of the Ascent to Beauty and her distinction between
lovers of the body and lovers of the soul. If there are oaiµovEs on
different levels, then Apollodorus would be a oaiµc:.uv of a lower
degree than Socrates.
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associated with philosophy may not attain this goal. If Apollodorus
and Aristodemus, who knew the dialogue by heart, can err, casual
readers of Plato are even more likely to err.4 7

Furthermore, the

casual reader cannot assume that he knows how to engage in
dialectic merely because he has read some dialogues of Plato. After
all, Apollodorus, too, engages in dialectic, but his method of dialectic
does not contain the same nuanced irony that Socrates' does.48
Through

Apollodorus

and

Aristodemus,

therefore,

Plato

demonstrates that neither mere recitation of a teacher's words nor
unguided argument with friends leads to wisdom. Aristodemus and
Apollodorus portray to the reader how philosophers too easily
confuse Absolute Beauty with inferior forms of beauty.

Although

neither man is attracted to Socrates' body--the lowliest type of beauty

47The curious phenomenon of pupils memorizing a dialogue
and repeating it to other people appears in other dialogues: Euclides
relates the Theaetetus to Terpsion by having a slave read the
dialogue he had heard from Socrates, transcribed, and then changed
from a narrative to conversational form; Cephalus, the narrator of the
Parmenides, has also memorized Antiphon's account of that
dialogue. Cf. also Phaedrus' memorization of Lysias' speech in the
Phaedrus. This phenomenon is not necessarily all bad. At least these
men are paying attention to the words of Socrates, as Rosen, 11,
remarks. But since it is people like Aristodemus and Apollodorus who
are memorizing and repeating these dialogues, it is clear that mere
reading of a dialogue cannot take the place of dialectic.
4B1n the Apology Socrates says that many young men saw him
questioning their elders with the result that they were unable to
answer him. The youths, pleased with the results, took up dialectic,
not with a desire to find the truth, but to humiliate others (23c2-7). For
this reason Plato in the Republic (7.537c9-539d7) forbids. people
from studying dialectic until they are thirty years old and have had
extensive preparatory training. Cf. Rosen, 11.

70
in Diotima's scheme (21 Oa4-7)--they do desire the wisdom of his soul.
Thus, Aristodemus and Apollodorus are better philosophers/lovers
than most of the guests at the symposium, who think about beauty in
purely physical terms. Apollodorus, moreover, desires beautiful ideas
(bnT118evµaTa, µa8fiµaTa and v6µ01 in Diotima's scheme: 21 Oc3-4;

211 cS-6),49 which are certainly more noble than beautiful souls, but
still are not Absolute Beauty. Thus, setting out in search of Absolute
Beauty, even with the help of a good teacher (Socrates or the Platonic
dialogue), does not guarantee success.
If the narrators of the dialogue are not perfect people to transmit
the dialogue, their audience is no better. There are two audiences in
the prologue to whom Apollodorus recounts the dialogue: Glaucon
and some unnamed friends. The unnamed friends are the current
audience; Glaucon was Apollodorus' audience two days earlier.
Who is this Glaucon? Presumably, he is the same Glaucon as
in the Parmenides and the Republic,50 and so one of Plato's
brothers. He is a follower of Socrates and is somewhat interested in
philosophy, as his participation in the Republic and Parmenides and

49Apollodorus' fondness for ideas is found in his statement of
173c2-5: "Apart from considering any practical benefits of
philosophy, I really get excited, whenever I philosophize or hear
others doing so."
50Friedlander, 3:3-4, concurs with this judgment. One cannot
state with absolute certainty that the Symposium's Glaucon is the
same one as in the other two dialogues, but it is the most natural
explanation.
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his interest in the symposium indicate.

He may be less informed

concerning matters of culture.51
Glaucon has several motives for hearing this dialogue. First, he
is fond enough of philosophy and Socrates to want to hear any
conversations he can. Glaucon, thus, does not deserve Apollodorus'
insinuation that he is not a philosopher (173a2). But Glaucon does
have another reason for inquiring into that dialogue, as his calling the
dialogue the "symposium of Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades"
reveals. By that phrase Glaucon reveals that he is interested in the
political implications of the symposium and, more specifically, in the
relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates. Although the reader of
the Symposium knows that Alcibiades does not appear until late in the
dialogue, Glaucon does not. He, therefore, overemphasizes the role
Alcibiades plays in this dialogue. 52
Why is Glaucon so concerned about Alcibiades?

In all

likelihood, Glaucon sees the symposium as at least partly a political
gathering--a natural assumption for Glaucon to make.

Often

symposia were occasions for the formation and strengthening of

51 Nussbaum, 168, argues that Glaucon is uninterested in
philosophy and literature because he does not know that Agathon has
left town and Aristodemus has been a pupil of Socrates for only three
years. But Glaucon may not be quite so uninterested in those matters
as Nussbaum thinks. Apollodorus asks, "Don't you know that Agathon
has not lived here for many years and it has not yet been three years
since I began spending time with Socrates?" The ovK in the question
implies that Glaucon knows these facts, but in his excitement may
have forgotten them.
52Cf. Warner, 161.
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political alliances.53 Glaucon would naturally be curious about what
Alcibiades might have been doing at this symposium.

Since

Alcibiades espoused at different times oligarchy and democracy,54
fought for Athens, Sparta, and Persia,55 and was simultaneously
loved and hated by Athens,56 any Athenian would naturally be
curious about Alcibiades' plans for the future. Glaucon may be even
more concerned because he (mistakenly) believes that this
symposium took place recently during the turmoil that followed the
defeat of Athens.57

53Qn the political aspects of ancient symposia, see Oswyn
Murray, "The Affair of the Mysteries: Democracy and the Drinking
Group," in Sympotica, ed. Oswyn Murray, 157-160; George Paul,
"Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and in Other Historical
Writings," in Dining in a Classical Context, ed. William J. Slater (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991 ), 162-164. Murray,
159, observes that many symposia were composed of dissidents
who, like their counterparts in seventeenth and eighteenth century
England, came together for "secret political activity, extempore
poetry, sexual licence [sic], and exhibitionism under the influence of
alcohol."
54Although he was thought to be pro-oligarchy in his younger
days (Thucydides 6.60), he later was credited with bringing about the
fall of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred (Thucydides 8.86).
55Alcibiades claimed that he originally was fond of Sparta, but
felt rebuffed when the Spartans made the treaty through the agency
of Nicias, not himself. See Thucydides 5.43; 6.89.
56Aristophanes, Frogs, 1425.
evaluation of him in 6.15.

See Thucydides' overall

57Nussbaum, 170, assumes that Glaucon is oligarchical in
outlook and is interested in discovering if Alcibiades is plotting with the
democrats against the Thirty. But there is little evidence with which to
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Glaucon presumably believes that he may deduce Alcibiades'
plans, if he can determine how Socrates is influencing Alcibiades.
Hence Glaucon is interested in the E:pwTtKol :\6yot. Is Socrates' truly
Alcibiades' lover? If so, will Socrates' philosophy govern Alcibiades'
actions? Glaucon may hope to discover the answers by listening to
their speeches on Eros and by hearing how the two interacted at the
symposium.
Glaucon is a listener governed by both philosophical and
political interests. The same combination of philosophical and nonphilosophical interests exists in the other people who hear this
dialogue, the unnamed friends of Apollodorus in the prologue. Like
Glaucon, they love to dabble in philosophy even though they are
businessmen (xp11µaTLOTLKol, 173c6), not full-time followers of
Socrates. They protest as much as Glaucon did, when Apollodorus
claims that they are not serious enough about philosophy.
Presumably they are interested in the dialogue because of the
prospect of Alcibiades' return to Athens during the crisis of 404 B.C. or
because of his recent death58; they, like Glaucon, want to know how
ascertain Glaucon's politics. In Xenophon's Memorabilia (3.6) his
political program consists solely of a claim to be able to advise the
government well. Nor does his kinship with Critias imply anything.
Like his brother Plato, he may have been dissatisfied with the Thirty,
even though his uncle Critias was the head of that government. His
exact political affiliations, in any case, are somewhat irrelevant
because politicians of all persuasions would be interested in knowing
Alcibiades' plans.
581f Alcibiades is still alive at this time, Apollodorus' friends may
be interested in the prospect of Alcibiades' return. The narration must
take place around 404 B.C., as we will see later (pages 77-77,,
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Socrates may have influenced Alcibiades. Unlike Glaucon, however,
they seem to have fewer misunderstandings about the nature and
time of the symposium.59
Through these two audiences Plato rouses the interest of his
readers. This symposium has been of great interest to many people:
Aristodemus, Apollodorus, Phoenix, Glaucon and his friend and the
friends of Apollodorus. The reasons for their interest--philosophical,
theological, and political--may vary, but the dialogue speaks to all of
them.

Similarly, Plato's readers may have different reasons for

reading the dialogue, but the prologue nevertheless encourages
them all to read it. Apollodorus' statements challenge the readers to
examine their motives for reading the dialogue (173a1-3, c2-d3): Are
the readers serious philosophers or not? The presence of Glaucon
and Apollodorus' friends in the prologue shows that one need not be a
full-time philosopher to derive benefit from the dialogue. All one must
be is an Eros-like individual who yearns for wisdom. Indeed, Glaucon

especially fn. 68). Whether this takes place before or after the news of
Alcibiades' assassination arrives in Athens is difficult to say.
59Qne other character mentioned in the dialogue who has
heard and then passed on the dialogue is Phoenix. Rosen, 15,
footnote 39, suggests that since the phoenix was thought to
reproduce asexually, Phoenix represents "the possible rebirth of the
Socratic circle through the instrumentality of the publication of the
dialogue." Rosen's suggestion, however, is too fanciful. Perhaps
Phoenix was better known to Plato's contemporaries and his
presence in the dialogue was meaningful to them. Unfortunately, to
modern readers he has no significance; he is merely one more
Athenian interested in Socrates, although not a member of his
philosophical circle.

75
and Apollodorus' friends prevent the philosophers (such as even
Plato himself) from scaring off the reader. 60
Both the narrators and the audiences of the dialogue, then,
portray how philosophy is done in concreto. Although Socrates may
expound on Absolute Beauty, the characters of the narrative frame
reveal how difficult in practice it is to discern it. One can see beautiful
bodies, but Absolute Beauty is beyond the power of the human eye.
Even if one assents to the abstract nature of Absolute Beauty, the
temptation to see Absolute Beauty as a beautiful idea or thought
(A6yos or µa8nµa) remains. Absolute Beauty, as Diotima warns us,

may be beyond our comprehension (21 Oa1-2) and Plato's ability to
teach us (210a3-4).
The Setting of the Narrative Frame
As we have seen, Plato demonstrates the working of Eros
through the characters of the narrative frame. Through narrator and
audience, the reader is invited to see how Eros works upon the
reader, too. Yet Eros is seen at work not only in the characters of the
prologue, but also in its setting. For Plato uses the contrast between
the setting of the narration and the setting of the dialogue proper (i.e.,
the symposium) to underscore the effects of Eros.
60G.-J. de Vries, "Apollodore dans le 'banquet' de Platon,"
Revue des etudes grecques 48 (1935): 65-69, argues with great
insight that through the fanaticism of Apollodorus Plato intends to
mock his own devotion to Socrates and philosophy: Plato recognizes
that his obsession with philosophy makes him appear odd to his fellow
citizens and, therefore, makes fun of himself through the character of
Apollodorus.
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To understand this, we must first pinpoint the two settings of the
dialogue. The symposium is set in 416 B.C., on the second night after
the close of the Lenaea, as the reference to Agathon's first victory
makes clear (173a5-6). 61 No such clue establishes the date of the
dialogue's retelling by Apollodorus; that date, nonetheless, can be
deduced from the data given in the dialogue. Apollodorus' retelling
takes place long enough after the symposium for him to have grown
from childhood and to have become a student of Socrates for three
years. 62

It also takes place several years after Agathon left

Athens. 63 By these criteria a date much earlier than 405 B.C. is
unlikely. Nor can the retelling have occurred later than Socrates'
death in 399 B.C. because Apollodorus implies that Socrates is still
alive.64

61 The date of Agathon's first victory is given by Athenaeus
5.217a.
62Apollodorus states that he was a child when the symposium
occurred (173a5). This statement confirms his claim that this
dialogue took place before he began studying with Socrates three
years earlier (172c3-7). If Apollodorus were a young man of
approximately twenty years at the time of the retelling and a child of
ten years at the time of the dialogue, the retelling could take place
anytime after 406 B.C.
63The exact year of Agathon's departure is uncertain. Bury,
lxvi, places his departure around 408 B.C. In any case he had long
since left Athens when Aristophanes wrote his Frogs in 405 B.C.
64As Bury, lxvi, rightly notes, the present tense in the clause a<p'
OU S' eyw LUJKpclTEl avv8LaTpi[3w, "since I have started spending
time with Socrates," (172c5) indicates that Socrates is still alive.
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Most scholars conclude from this evidence that the retelling of
the dialogue took place around 401 or 400 B.C. Bury, in particular,
argues for such a late date in order to ensure that there is plenty of
time for Apollodorus to grow up.65 But Glaucon's belief that "the
meeting of Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades" (172a7-b1) was
recent implies that the three are alive at the time of the dramatic date
of the first prologue or that Alcibiades, who was the first of the three to
die, had only recently died.66 The retelling, then, must take place in
404 or 403 B.C. Any later date would imply that Glaucon's chronology
concerning Alcibiades is all wrong, which is unlikely. Glaucon may
have had little interest in Agathon (172c3-4) and the inner circle of
Socrates (172c4-6), but if Glaucon followed politics at a11,67 he must
have paid attention to Alcibiades' career. 68

65Bury, lxvi. See also Guthrie, 4:366; Rosen, 7; Friedlander,
3:2, 432 n. 4. Cf. also Allen, 4 (who dates the prologue around 402
B.C.), and Mitchell, 4-5 (who states that the prologue must be
sometime before 400 B.C.).
66Alcibiades died in 404 B.C. See Diod. Sic. 14.11; Plut. Vit. Ale.,
37-39.
67 Glaucon seems to have been interested in politics at least at
one point in his life; see Xen. Mem. 3.6.
68 Nussbaum agrees with this date, but also attempts to
pinpoint the exact day: Apollodorus narrates the symposium to his
friends the day after Alcibiades' death is announced in Athens. She
argues that Glaucon is interested in the symposium because he
thinks that Alcibiades is still alive and has recently come back into
town, whereas the unnamed friends in the prologue are interested in
the dialogue because they have heard of the assassination of
Alcibiades. See Nussbaum, 168-170. Nussbaum's argument
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The setting of the narration (404 or 403 B.C.) is in sharp contrast
to the setting of the symposium (416 B.C.). The symposium was held
when Athens was mightiest and all the characters were at the peaks
of their careers, but was retold when the glory of Athens and of the
symposiasts was all but gone. By late 404 B.C., the Athenians had
been starved into surrendering to Sparta. Athens was beleaguered
by enemies within and without: The Thirty ruled Athens tyrannically
while a Spartan garrison occupied Attica.

Alcibiades, a potential

threat to this constitution, had been assassinated.

Although

opposition to the Thirty had arisen, the Thirty and their enemies were
locked in stalemate.
The retelling of the dialogue took place, then, at the nadir of
Athens' power, while the symposium itself occurred at its zenith. The
symposium occurred when philosophy was popular and the
participants at the symposium were in political ascendancy.
Apollodorus' narration occurred when philosophy was unpopular, the
symposium's participants dead or disgraced, and the political
ambitions of Alcibiades permanently ended.69 The contrast between
suggests that the news of Alcibiades' death reached Athens
sometime in the two day interval between Apollodorus' conversation
with Glaucon and his talk with his unnamed friends. Although such a
chronology is not impossible, a far simpler solution is to assume that
both Glaucon and the unnamed friends ask about the symposium
shortly after hearing the news of Alcibiades' death. If Glaucon is
oligarchically inclined (as Nussbaum argues and Glaucon's kinship
with Critias suggests), it may not be fear of Alcibiades that motivates
his inquiry into the symposium, but his curiosity of what his teacher
Socrates had to say to him shortly before his death.
69Cf. Hoffman n's description of the anti-philosophical state of
mind in Athens in 401-400 B.C., which mutatis mutandis is also apt for
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the settings emphasizes how much philosophy depends upon the
cultural milieu.

The philosophers of 416 B.C. discuss Eros at a

banquet with great flair and originality, while the philosophers of 404
B.C. can only repeat the words of 416 B.C. The philosophers of 416
B.C. are grandiose in their treatment of love, even as they live in the
last of the Golden Age of Athens. No such creativity is possible in the
midst of defeat and tyranny.70
This poverty of philosophy in the setting of the narration is due
to the erotic nature of philosophers as outlined in Socrates' speech.
On occasion, philosophers, like other daemonic creatures, may attain
the beauty and truth they seek (203e2-5).

More often than not,

the turmoil of 404-403 B.C. Hoffmann, Ober Platons Symposion
(Heidelberg, 1947), 27. Of course, it is an over-simplification to say
that the Athens of Socrates' last days were uniquely antiphilosophical, since Aristotle nearly suffered the same fate as
Socrates a century later. Moreover, already in 423 B.C. Aristophanes'
Clouds and Ameipsias' Connus had lampooned Socrates as a
sophist. Yet though philosophy in general and Socrates in particular
never received universal acclaim in Athens, 416 B.C. was by far a
better year for Socrates than 404. Certainly, 416 B.C. was better than
404 B.C. for Eryximachus and Phaedrus, who had fled into exile the
year after the symposium. By 404 B.C. Pausanias had disappeared
from history and Agathon had left Athens. Only Aristophanes and
Socrates remained in Athens, and Socrates was soon to die.
70The seeming lack of inspiration that characterized Athens in
404 B.C. intensified in the fourth century B.C. The fourth century was
keenly interested in the fifth century, as can be seen in the revival of
fifth century tragedies and Athens' nostalgia for the prePeloponnesian War empire. A key piece of evidence for this nostalgia
is Plato's dialogues, which are nearly all set in the fifth century, even
though they were written in the fourth century.
Mitchell, 5, finds it significant that the "Best-of-the-People"
(Aristodemus) of 416 cannot offer a speech to the Athenians after
their defeat in 404 B.C.
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however, they do not possess it. So, too, the wretched, defeated
Athens longed to hear the beautiful words of philosophers and poets
spoken in a triumphal age.

The Athenians themselves cannot

produce wisdom any more than Eros himself possesses wisdom.
Instead the Athenians must turn to older and wiser sources, even as
Socrates consults Diotima.
Yet, as the prologue makes clear, seeking wisdom from older
sources is not without its difficulties. Apollodorus may rightly see that
he and his friends do not possess wisdom and cannot attain it by their
own power (173d1-3), but Apollodorus does not even make the effort.
Rather than venture out in search of wisdom, he repeats words of
wisdom spoken twelve years earlier--or whatever he is able to
remember of it. Consequently, Apollodorus does not find truths that
may fill in the gaps left by the speakers of the symposium, but his
account of the symposium disintegrates over time. The message of
the symposium becomes garbled and has no lasting effect on his
thought or behavior. Such is the effect of glorifying a past era and
giving up on the present. Plato thereby warns his readers not to take
the words of the late Socrates as the final answer to the questions
under discussion, but to pursue the investigation further.71
The setting of the narrative frame, then, challenges the reader
to evaluate the interplay between philosophy and external factors,

71 Socrates, of course, continues to philosophize in this gloomy
era. The Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo are set when
Athens is still suffering ill fortune and Socrates faces death. Even his
death sentence cannot lessen Socrates' attention to philosophy.
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especially nostalgia. As the narrative frame demonstrates, nostalgia
--especially nostalgia for a wiser era--can be an expression of Eros.
For nostalgia is a recognition that the current era lacks something.
Nostalgia attempts to reacquire what has been lost and to make it a
permanent possession (cf. 200d8-10; 205a6-7). At the same time,
nostalgia has hidden dangers.

It may prevent an individual from

engaging in philosophy and reduce him to citing past authorities. It
may emphasize the lack found in the present situation rather than
lead to any positive steps to fill the lack. Thus, nostalgia is daemonic:
It may lead to wisdom or reduce one to perpetual ignorance.
Conclusion
When we began this chapter, we asked how the narrative frame
fit in with the rest of the dialogue. In this chapter we have seen that
the characters and setting of the narrative frame, as well as the
process of narration, demonstrate the workings of Eros and, thus, are
an integral part of the dialogue. The characters are "erotic," i.e.,
philosophers. They love the beauty of speeches and noble ideas and
long to possess them forever. The narrators desire to procreate in
beauty and the audience wants to satisfy a longing. As erotic men,
the characters of the narrative frame have as much right to be
included in this dialogue about Eros as the guests at the symposium
do. In fact, Apollodorus and Aristodemus are arguably better lovers in
the Socratic sense than some of the guests assembled at the
symposium, since they do not equate Eros with sex or physical desire.
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Not only the characters but also the setting of the narrative
frame is erotic. The setting of the narrative frame lacks the glory of
the setting of the symposium (416 B.C.); nonetheless, the people who
retell and listen to the retelling of the symposium long for this past
golden age. In so doing, they exemplify in one more way how Eros
operates. Eros is a lack longing to be fulfilled--not only the longing for
sexual satisfaction, but also the longing to acquire wisdom and a
stable political situation. Thus, the contrast between the setting of the
symposium and that of the narrative frame underscores the
universality of the longing associated with Eros and applies this truth
to the political, cultural, and philosophical arenas.
The prologue, furthermore, demonstrates how the process of
narration is related to philosophy. Both are manifestations of Eros
who longs for and. procreates in beauty.

The physical beauty of

Agathon inspires the guests at the symposium to procreate beautiful
ideas, but the beauty of the ideas expressed at the symposium
inspires the dialogue's narration. Thus, the narration of philosophical
dialogue is akin to philosophical discourse inspired by physical
beauty. In light of the narrators of the Symposium, one can question
whether the philosophical dialogue in Plato's mind is as erotic as
philosophical discourse, but one cannot deny the essential eroticism
of narration. Narration, like philosophy, may fail, but its practitioners
exhibit the erotic longing found in all men.
When we see these literary and philosophical connections with
the rest of the dialogue, the first two Stephanus pages of the
Symposium are no longer an obstacle to our thesis that the prologue
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is organically connected to the entire dialogue, but rather a
confirmation of our thesis. For in the narrative frame Plato has shown
the power and limits of Eros as clearly as Socrates does in the body of
the dialogue.

CHAPTER THREE
EROS OF BEAUTY AND THE GOOD:
THE CHARACTERS AND DRAMA OF THE PROLOGUE
In the last chapter we saw that a seemingly unnecessary
element in the prologue--Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue--does
bear significant relation to the rest of the dialogue.

In fact, his

narration demonstrates the "official" doctrine about Eros in action: All
men strive to apprehend beauty and to procreate in beauty. Beauty
exists in handsome bodies, but a nobler beauty can be found by
pursuing truth and the good, especially by hearing such dialogues as
the Symposium. Because mankind in general and philosophers in
particular are daemonic beings, they rarely, if ever, arrive at Absolute
Beauty and cannot permanently possess it. Thus, Apollodorus and
his audience strive for Absolute Beauty, but encounter obstacles
before they can attain their goal. By both their successes and their
failures, Apollodorus and his friends demonstrate concretely what
Socrates theorizes about Eros in the abstract. Since some readers
may learn more by a story than by an abstract discussion, the
prologue dramatizes the effects of Eros. Through their behavior,
Apollodorus and company expound Socrates' view of Eros as clearly
as Socrates does in his speech.
We ought not, then, underestimate the importance of the
characters and drama of the prologue. For if the seemingly most
84
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unnecessary element of the prologue--the narration of Apollodorus-tu rns out to be integrally connected with the main theme of the
dialogue, then the other elements of the prologue deserve to be
analyzed in terms of the dialogue's philosophy.

In this chapter,

therefore, we will examine how the characters, drama, and words of
the second half of the prologue (174b3-178a5) exemplify the
dialogue's philosophy of Eros as process.1 Specifically, we will see
how each guest's behavior in the prologue exemplifies his own
portrayal of Eros while vindicating Socrates' explanation of Eros as
the most comprehensive theory.

Moreover, we will see that the

ascent to Athens in the prologue illustrates the Ascent to Beauty
outlined by Socrates in the body of the dialogue. Thus, even among
the actions that are not at first glance erotic, Eros is at work.
Beauty as Defined by the Characters in the Prologue
As Socrates observes, each guest at the symposium believes
that he is an expert on Eros (177d6-e2}. Phaedrus and Eryximachus,
by suggesting Eros as a subject for encomium, demonstrate
confidence in their expertise. Pausanias, Agathon, and Aristophanes
also claim expertise in this field, since drama is the province of
Aphrodite and Dionysus (177d8-e2). Socrates himself claims that
Eros is the only subject on which he is an expert (177d7-8). So many

1The prologue of the Symposium can be divided into two parts:
The first half, namely, Apollodorus' narration (172a1-174a2), and the
second half, namely, Aristodemus' description of the setting of the
symposium (174a3-178a5).
·
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experts have assembled at the symposium that Socrates fears that
the first speakers will say all that can be said about Eros, leaving no
material for the later speakers (177e3-5).
The multitude of self-appointed experts on Eros validates
Socrates' claim that all men are under Eros' sway (205a5-8; 206c1 -2).
As Socrates observes and all the guests prove, all people strive for
the Beautiful (To KaA6v) and the Good (To aya06v).2 Most of the
guests are moved by the beauty of bodies: Pausanias loves Agathon,

21n 204d3-205a4 Diotima outlines the ultimate goal: happiness
that comes about by possession of the Good. F.C. White, "Love and
Beauty in Plato's Symposium," Journal of Hellenic Studies 109
(1989): 149-157, has questioned, however, whether Diotima means
to identify the Good with the Beautiful; he argues that Diotima
substitutes the Good for the Beautiful, so that Socrates can better
answer her question why people seek Beauty, but does not equate
the two. Similarly, Soble argues that beauty is an instrumental, not an
intrinsic goal; see Alan Soble, "Love is not Beautiful: Symposium
200e-201 c," Apeiron 19 (1985), 43. Mitchell, 130-132, also raises the
question of the relationship between Good and Beauty.
There are good reasons, however, to assume that Beauty and
the Good, while not identical, ought not to be separated. The ancient
Greeks associated the two with one another; the ideal was to be
KaAos Kaya06s. Plato himself underscores this association when he
calls Agathon KaA6v (174a9), while emphasizing the etymology of
Agathon's name (174b4); thus, in Agathon he associates Beauty with
the Good. Moreover, as Allen, 54, observes, Socrates links Good with
Beauty in 201 c, where "lack of beautiful things implies lack of good
things." Moreover, if we separate the two, we run into difficulties. As
Anderson, 82, notes, if Good is a higher value than Beauty, the
Ascent should have the Good, not Absolute Beauty, as its goal. If
Beauty and the Good are disassociated in 204d3-205a4, the question
of why men desire Beauty is never answered. Perhaps it is best to say
with Allen, 45, that "beauty is the sensuous aspect of goodness, what
is good to look at or good to hear, and, by an easy extension,
goodness in thought or discourse."
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Eryximachus loves Phaedrus, and Socrates cannot keep his hands
off handsome young men (213c3-5; 216d2-3).3 The beauty of words
also moves a number of the guests--Phaedrus, Pausanias,
Aristophanes, Agathon, and even Socrates. Nor is it words in general
that impress them, but rather the tales of the deeds of Eros (as
expressed through Dionysus and Aphrodite--177e1-3). The guests
are lovers of Beauty, indeed.
Since, however, each guest has a different understanding of
what Beauty is, not all of these "experts" agree about Eros and its
goal.

Although each guest builds on the speeches of his

predecessors, some of the guests openly criticize previous
speakers.4

This difference among the guests, however, is not

surprising, as Diotima's description of the Ascent to Beauty
demonstrates: There are several possible objects of beauty, some
nobler, some less so.5 All who pursue beauty of any kind are to be

3Qn the relationship between Phaedrus and Agathon, see
Georg Wissowa, Wilhelm Kroll, and Kurt Witte, eds., Paulys
Rea/encycylopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (hereafter
PW) s.v. "Agathon" 1:761; for the relationship between Eryximachus
and Phaedrus, see PW s.v. "Phaedrus" 38:1556.
4Pausanias criticizes Phaedrus for assuming there is only one
Eros (180c4-d1 ); Agathon criticizes Phaedrus for saying that Eros is
an ancient deity ( 195a8); and Socrates refutes a point made by
Aristophanes (205d10-206a 1) and Agathon's entire argument
(199c3-201 c9).
5Nehemas rightly observes that it is the Ascent to Beauty that
radically differentiates Socrates' speech from the others. The rest of
his speech is typical for an encomium, but when Diotima speaking
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counted lovers, whether or not they pursue beautiful bodies. Their
contemporaries may not apply the label of epaaTiJS to them because
the semantic field of epO:v and epaaTfis has been narrowed to exclude
certain forms of desire (especially the "higher," more abstract forms
of Eros or desire).

Nonetheless, lovers of all objects of beauty,

Socrates avers, deserve the name epaaTfis, "lover."6
Not surprisingly, each expert maintains a view about Eros and
Beauty that accords well with his lifestyle. It is appropriate, therefore,
to examine how Plato characterizes each of the guests in the
prologue, in order to determine how each guest's claim to expertise is
influenced by his own personality. We must examine for what object
of desire each guest seeks, and we must ask how Plato evaluates
those objects, even as we examined in the last chapter the implicit
theories of Eros that govern the behavior of Apollodorus and
Aristodemus. 7
through Socrates comes to the Ascent, she states that all that
preceded was preliminary to the real knowledge of Eros. See Plato,
Symposium, tr. Alexander Nehemas and Paul Woodruff, with an
introduction by Alexander Nehemas (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1989), xx-xxi. Thus, it is appropriate for us to keep the
Ascent to Beauty foremost in our mind, as we examine the characters
of the prologue and, later, the physical ascent mentioned in the
prologue.
6Socrates cites TTOtTJats, "poetry," as a parallel example (205a9d8). Originally, it meant any "creation" or "production", but it has
come to refer to only a limited range of artistic creations. LSJ, 1429.
71n examining the characters we will avoid type-casting the
speakers as representatives of different professions or schools of
philosophy, as Plochmann, 34, 38, criticizes Rosen for doing.
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Before looking at Plato's depiction of the guests, however, we
ought to note that Plato is selective in introducing the characters of
the prologue.

Plato does not have

all the guests who were

supposedly at this banquet speak in the prologue, but only the most
notable lovers--those who gave the most memorable speeches in
honor of Eros (178a 1-3). Thus, only those guests whose speeches
are narrated by Aristodemus have a speaking part in the prologue. 8
The guests who sit between Phaedrus and Pausanias (180c1 -2) are
silent not only in the body of the dialogue, but also in the prologue, so
that Plato may introduce the erotic character of those individuals who
best portray Eros. It is as if only those who give noteworthy encomia
of Eros are worthy of having their behavior portrayed in the prologue.

(Compare the typecasting done by Edmund L. Erde, "Comedy and
Tragedy and Philosophy in the Symposium: An Ethical Vision,"
Southwest Journal of Philosophy? (1976), 161-167, who discusses
Aristophanes and Agathon exclusively as representatives of their
profession.) Instead, we will focus on the objects of their desire and
will endeavor to draw a well rounded picture of the individuals. In
particular, we will take to hear Gallagher's remarks concerning the
dialectical nature of the characters. See Gallagher, 40-42.
Moreover, it ought to be clear that there are several fruitful ways
in which the relationship between the speakers and the order of their
speeches can be analyzed. See Bury, lii-lvi; Duncan, 277-288; Miller,
19-25. The intent of the scheme proposed in this chapter is not so
much to deny the legitimacy of opposing arrangements of the
speakers as to analyze the speakers in terms of Socrates' speech.
8Plato does mention in the prologue, in addition to the guests,
some servants: the cooks (175b5-c1) and the servant who greeted
Aristodemus (174e2; 175a3, 6). One other servant speaks briefly,
after having discovered Socrates on the neighbor's porch (175a7-9).
These individuals are the only exceptions to the rule stated above.
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The 'EpaaTai of Pleasure: Pausanias and Aristophanes
In modern parlance "Platonic love" means a love that finds no
physical expression. 9 This definition at first glance seems not entirely
unjustified, since Diotima in the Ascent to Beauty prefers an abstract,
incorporeal Beauty to the beauty found in human bodies. Diotima,
however, never denies a proper place for physical beauty in her
scheme.

In fact, she recognizes desire for beautiful bodies as a

legitimate form of Eros (206b7-c5; 21 Oa5-b6).

Furthermore, she

maintains that love of physical beauty is a prerequisite for the desire
for Absolute Beauty. Before a lover can progress to higher objects of
love, he must pursue beautiful bodies (Ta KaAa awµaTa, 21 Oa6).
Even promiscuity, the love of many beautiful bodies, has a proper,
albeit limited, place in the Ascent to Beauty: It teaches a young man
to discover beauty as a universal phenomenon.
Thus, the love of physical beauty is truly called Eros and
gratifying oneself with physical beauty is not necessarily wrong.
Although not the highest possible expression of Eros, it is a form of it.
Yet there are a number of dangers associated with this type of Eros:
Because of its emphasis on physical beauty, the love equated with
sex can be reduced to one of several sensual pleasures. From this

9 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), s.v. 'Platonic,' 11 :1006: "2a. Applied to love or affection
for one of the opposite sex of a purely spiritual character, and free
from sensual desire. Also of affection for one of the same sex."
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perspective, Eros is synonymous with wine and sex (Dionysus and
Aphrodite}, as Socrates intimates (177d7-e3).1 O
Two guests are present whose speeches emphasize the
physical side of Eros: Pausanias and Aristophanes.11 Although in
their speeches they touch on other purposes of desire--including its
social value (Pausanias) and its psychological and theological
implications (Aristophanes)--they see Eros as primarily love of the
body. For Pausanias, the question is ultimately whether or not a

10Anderson, 11, observes that in effect Dionysus has already
passed judgment on them (as Agathon had requested)--and the
judgment is not favorable.
11To an extent Phaedrus and Agathon assume that the goal of
Eros is sex. Yet by the showmanship of their speeches, they
demonstrate that a true epaoTfis is as concerned with the beauty of
words as with the beauty of bodies. See the discussion on pages 99101.
Duncan, 277-286, has set up a different paradigm of the
speeches. According to him, Phaedrus and Eryximachus emphasize
the human ("horizontal") aspects of love, while Pausanias and
Agathon emphasize its virtuous ("vertical") aspects. Aristophanes
modifies the arguments of Phaedrus and Eryximachus to make a
more cogent system of the "horizontal" view, while Socrates develops
Pausanias' and Eryximachus' ''vertical" view, purging it of sophistic
errors. In Duncan's scheme, Aristophanes' speech counterbalances
Socrates'.
Duncan's division of the speakers into those influenced by the
naturalistic school of Hippias (Phaedrus and Eryximachus) and those
influenced by the ethically and rhetorically minded school of Prodicus
(Pausanias and Agathon) is insightful, but ignores some facts.
Though Eryximachus may believe in "reciprocity" among lovers, his
speech does not allude to sex, but has made it an abstract endeavor.
In contrast, despite Pausanias' evaluation of Eros in ethical terms, his
idea of gratification is more earthy than that of the al_legedly
"horizontalist" Eryximachus.
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beloved ought to gratify (xapii;Ea8at) his lover.12

Although the

beloved must attempt to improve himself morally by his choice of
lover (184a5-b3; 185a5-b5}, 13 the lover himself learns nothing in the
experience but merely has his sexual urges gratified.14
Similarly, Aristophanes views Eros primarily as the joining of two
halves. Although such a joining ameliorates man's psychological
state and makes his punishment from the gods easier to bear,
Aristophanes does not envision a higher goal than intercourse
(191 b5-c8).15

To be sure, Aristophanes' speech is not without

12Mitchell, 42, rightly notes that in the end Pausanias forgets
his distinction between uranian and pandemic love; moreover, he
makes the beloved, not the lover, responsible for distinguishing
between the two types of love, since the lover is too blinded by love to
make the distinction. See Bury, xxvi, for a similar judgment: "The
nakedness of this proposition is cloked [sic] by the device of
distinguishing between a noble and a base Eros, and by the addition
of the saving clause apETflS evEKa. Nonetheless, it would seem that
the speaker's main interest is in xapil;Ea8at, rather than in accruing
apETi}, and that fundamentally he is a sensualist.. .. " In this light, it is
significant that we know absolutely nothing about Pausanias except
his love affair with Agathon. See Allen, 14; Mitchell, 29.
13 Finding a lover who will improve the beloved morally is
difficult, as Alcibiades' speech demonstrates. Thus, Wolz, 329, notes
that although Alcibiades searched for a lover who would improve him
morally and intellectually, Socrates declined to be that lover, since he
could not communicate his wisdom to Alcibiades.
14Warner, 169, criticizes Pausanias also for not explaining the
commonality between base and noble love and for not integrating
physical love (sex) with other aspects of desire.
1Soover argues that Plato intended Aristophanes' speech as a
parody of Aristophanes, much as Aristophanes' Clouds parodied
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philosophical merit. As Duncan observes, Aristophanes presents the
clearest argument of the "horizontal" notion of love, since he "purifies
the horizontal view of love of its materialism, Hippias' materialism,"
since the Hippian school (represented by Phaedrus and
Eryximachus) "tends to reduce the human to the non-human."
Duncan also observes that contra

Socrates the striving for the

''vertical" is what got mankind in trouble in the first place.16 Moreover,
as Hani observes, his discussion of an androgynous sex is not entirely
his own comic creation, but draws from earlier Greek mythology-from Hesiod's Chaos to the god Hermaphroditus of the fourth century
B.C.--as attested to in text and art (e.g., the Stockholm

Hermaphroditus and Berlin Hermaphroditus).

Furthermore,

Aristophanes uses the myth of original androgynous beings to
describe the origin of Eros, not of humanity. Hani argues that by
describing how Eros' existence is due to human weakness that longs
for something greater than mere self, Aristophanes is not far from

Socrates. Plato had Aristophanes draw on elements from folklore
(e.g., the etiologic myth cast in an Aesopic style), so that
Aristophanes' speech would differ from all the rest in emphasizing the
individual over the abstract. Since Plato believed that "the individual,
the particular, and the familiar"--the stock of comedy--were
antithetical to the pursuit of philosophy, he sets up this contrast
between Aristophanes and the other speakers. See K.J. Dover,
"Aristophanes' Speech in Plato's Symposium," (hereafter, Dover,
"Aristophanes") Journal of Hellenic Studies 86 (1966) 41-50. Cf. K.J.
Dover, Symposium , 113.
16Duncan, 283-284.
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Diotima's position, viz., that Eros exists because humans strive for
immortality.17
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Aristophanes emphasizes
primarily the physical aspect of Eros. Although the welding together
that a couple desires involves more than sex, 18 the union of lover and
beloved is expressed solely in physical terms in Aristophanes'
speech.
By not discussing the moral implications of Eros for the lover,
Pausanias and Aristophanes differ markedly from Diotima.

Her

Ascent to Beauty is chiefly concerned with the moral education of the
lover, not the beloved.19 The Ascent is described primarily from the
lover's point of view, not from that of the beloved: The lover, not the
beloved, progresses through the various stages of seeking beauty.
To the extent that any of her theory about the Ascent applies to the

17See Jean Hani, "Le Mythe de l'Androgyne dans le Banquet
de Platon," Euphrosyne 11 (1981/1982): 94-101.
18Cf. Anderson, 44.
19As Nehemas, xix, observes, the ancient Greeks presumed
that the lover possessed wisdom which he then imparted to the
beloved. Socrates, however, "has turned the lover from a purveyor
into a pursuer of wisdom." Similarly, Phaedrus alludes to the power of
Eros to improve not only the behavior of the young, impressionable
beloveds, but also that of their lovers. Since lovers would not want
their beloveds to see them in a bad light, lovers are inspired to act
more courageously than if they were merely fighting before their
peers (178d4-e1 ). Thus, an army of lovers and beloveds (178e3179a2) would not only train the beloveds in heroic action, but would
incite the lovers to uphold the heroic code themselves.

95
beloved, it is that the search for Beauty can be undertaken as a lover
(To 6p8ws brl Ta epwTlKa ieval, 211 b7-c1) or as a beloved (fi

vTT·

&A.A.ov &yea8al, 211 c1 ). In all of this Diotima differs from Pausanias

who is ultimately unconcerned about the moral formation of the lover,
and Aristophanes, for whom Eros provides relief, not education.
Aristophanes' and Pausanias' views about Eros are determined
in large part by who they are.

Aristophanes, who cudgeled his

opponents with sexual lampoon in his comedies, recognized, as did
the comedians before him, that men are often made vulnerable by
sex. To charge that a man is effeminate can be more effective in
humiliating an opponent than bringing charges of political
misconduct.20 One would expect, therefore, that Aristophanes would
emphasize the fragility of the human condition in his encomium of
Eros. Pausanias, in contrast, equates Eros with sex because of his

20Kaibel notes in PW s.v. Aristophanes (13:985): Der
Komodiendichter jener Zeit war ein privilegierter Censor nicht nur des
qffentlichen Lebens, sondern auch des privaten, soweit es in der
Offentlichkeit erkennbar wurde. Er war an sich ein einzelner
Privatmann, aber sobald er, vom Staate gewissermassen im Auftrage
des Gottes bestellt, die Buhne des Staates betrat, war er der Vertreter
eines durch den Schutz der Religion geheiligten Princips. Alles, was
Anstoss gab, fiel seiner Kritik zu, das µeµcpea8al, das Aufdecken einer
v6aos, und, wenigstens idell, auch die Heilung derselben war sein
Element: was tadellos schien, ging ihn nichts an.
Erde, 165, adds that "comedy denies the cosmic order and
suggests paying any price to get along"--as Socrates refuses to do in
the Apology. Thus, it is "cruel jesting at the expense of humanity."
Hence Socrates' rebuttal of comedy in 223d3-6. Erde perhaps
overstates the case, but one cannot deny the comedian's interest in
sexuality as a means to exploit his opponents' weaknesses.
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own vices. As Gallagher has observed, Pausanias desires to be
taken seriously as a philosopher, but is addicted to vice. Although he
wishes to treat the topic in all philosophical earnest, his personality
dictates that he attempt to modify existing v6µoL concerning erotic
desire to suit his own purposes. Pausanias distinguishes between
base and noble love--a philosophical advancement over Phaedrus'
presentation--but in the end says that anything done in the name of
love is justifiable, if only the lover or beloved claims to have a noble
goal.21

Thus, Pausanias appears in the end to be a scoundrel

cloaking his vice with virtue.22
Not surprisingly, then, Pausanias and Aristophanes are
portrayed in the prologue as revelers in sensual pleasures. They,
along with Agathon, have overindulged themselves in alcohol the
previous night. In fact, the only time Pausanias and Aristophanes
speak in the prologue is to complain about their hangovers (176a5b4). Pausanias complains that he is really (Tct'J ovTL) in a very (TTavv)
bad way and needs a rest before (presumably) overindulging in wine

21 Gallagher, 40, 52; see also Rosen, 88; Bury, xxvi. Nola, 6872, argues for a more positive interpretation of Pausanias' speech,
but without the counterbalancing of philosophy and vice that
Gallagher sees in Pausanias. To the degree that Nola does not take
the vice-ridden nature of Pausanias into consideration, his
interpretation of Pausanias' speech is flawed.
22As Rosen, 63, puts it: "Pausanias, however, is seriously
concerned with neither logic nor morality. He is engaged in an
intricate and sophistic attempt to secure his own erotic advantage."
For an analysis of the sophistic style of Pausanias, see Bury, xxviixxviii.
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again (176a6-8).

Aristophanes numbers himself among the

{3E{3aTTTLaµevoL (176b4); like Pausanias, he eagerly seeks relief from
drinking that night in whatever way he can (TTavTl Tp6TT~, 176b3).23
Judged by the criterion of drunkenness, Agathon would have to
be numbered among the lovers of sensual pleasure.

After all,

Agathon professes that he is not strong enough to survive another
round of drinking (176b8).

Agathon, however, does not belong

among the lovers of mere sensual beauty, since other, nobler aspects
of his character are revealed in the prologue, as we will see.

What

marks Pausanias and Aristophanes in the prologue as lovers of a
particularly base beauty is that they speak only of their overindulgence in wine the previous night.
The prologue, then, introduces Pausanias and Aristophanes as
the lowest form of the sophist and poet, respectively.

The base

Pausanias finds a more noble counterpart in Eryximachus; while
Pausanias complains in the prologue about his hangovers,
Eryximachus proposes an intellectual exercise. Similarly, Phaedrus
and Agathon are better representatives of poetry and rhetoric than
Aristophanes.

Phaedrus, by his intellectual interest in Eros and

encomia, is ultimately the person responsible for the symposium's
23As Hani, 89, notes: "La bouffonnerie dans l'expose du mythe
est en harmonie avec I' attitude de son 'auteur'. C'est sous les traits
d'un ivrogne qu'il se presente lui-meme, en disant qu'il est un de ceux
qui, la veille, ont bu le plus copieusement Kal yap avT6s ElµL Twv
xees {3E{3aTTTLOµEVUJV 176 B, ce qui l'afflige, au milieu des discours
serieux sur l'amour, d'un hoquet rebelle dont ii ne vient a bout qu'en
se chatouillant les narine (189 A)."
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choice of topic.

Agathon is as much concerned with great ideas

(175c7-d2) as he is with adulation and wine. Thus, the prologue
establishes a hierarchy among the guests. Phaedrus, Eryximachus,
and even Agathon are greater than Pausanias and Aristophanes.24
Although all of the other guests may have speeches inferior to that of
Socrates,25 they are not all equal to one another.
The prologue is Plato's evaluation of the lovers of sensual
Beauty and sensual pleasure, demonstrating the folly of equating
Eros exclusively with the desire for physical Beauty. Those who
pursue base pleasure will find the consequences unpleasant, as the
overindulgent Aristophanes and Pausanias discover. Nonetheless,
the prologue reveals that the two are true lovers, even as all men are.
Even if their view of Eros is a baser one than that held by Socrates,
they are still under Eros' sway. Aristophanes and Pausanias are
concerned solely with Dionysus and Aphrodite, which makes
Socrates attribute to them the title EpaaTa[ (177e1 -2).

24This does not imply that Phaedrus' and Agathon's speeches
succeed in their attempt to speak more intelligently about Eros.
Agathon's speech, after all, turns out to be filled more with Gorgianic
rhetoric than serious content, as Socrates' interrogation of him
reveals. Nonetheless, Phaedrus and Agathon are more concerned
with the abstract side of Eros than Pausanias and Aristophanes are.
25The customary interpretation of the dialogue is that Socrates'
speech is the climax of the dialogue. See, for example, Krischer, 5153. As we have seen (pages 59-61 ), this point is well taken, so long
as we understand that Socrates' speech is not the whole dialogue or
the philosophically perfect description of Eros. By their natures, Eros
and Absolute Beauty cannot be explained perfectly.
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The 'EpaaTa[ of Rhetoric and Sophistry:
Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Agathon
Not all the guests, however, view Eros solely as the desire for
beautiful bodies or pleasure. Most of the guests, in fact, use the term
Eros to denote any intense longing, including the longings for nonsensual beauty. Socrates, of course, prefers a non-sensual beauty,
or rather a sensual beauty that leads to a transcendent Beauty. In
Diotima's scheme, as outlined by Socrates, Eros leads ultimately to
an incorporeal Absolute Beauty.

In between sensual beauty and

Absolute Beauty, however, there are several objects of beauty: souls
(\Vvxai, 21 Ob7), intellectual pursuits (bnTfJOEvµaTa, 21 Oc3), laws
(v6µot, 21 Oc4), pieces of knowledge (bnaTf)µat, 21 Oc6), and the

thought of beauty (bnaTfiµnv µ[av TotavTf)v,

fl

EaTtv Ka.Aov TotouoE,

21 Od7-e1 ). These objects of beauty vary in scope, but are all in some
sense abstract or incorporeal. While none of them--including the
thought of beauty--is Absolute Beauty, the desire for these objects is
a nobler manifestation of Eros than desire for the body is.
Although all the guests aver that Eros involves more than sex,
only three guests besides Socrates emphasize a non-physical beauty
and its Eros: Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Agathon. At first glance,
Pausanias and Aristophanes seem worthy to be on the list, since
Pausanias was a pupil of Prodicus, and Aristophanes was a comic
poet well known for his treatment of contemporary intellectual
debates. Yet Pausanias and Aristophanes differ greatly from the
other guests in the emphasis that they put on sex. As we saw in the
last section, Pausanias and Aristophanes view copulation as the
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ultimate goal of Eros. In contrast, Phaedrus and Agathon are more
rhetorical in their analysis of Eros, while Eryximachus avoids entirely
any discussion of intercourse in his description of Eros.
To some degree, these three guests emphasize beauty
because of their situation in life. Eryximachus is a physician, whose
profession demands that he treat the human body in a detached
manner.26 Thus, he treats sexual attraction as merely one of several
drives in man. Sexual attraction becomes merely a paradigm for all
forces of attraction; Eros then becomes a cosmic, not a bodily, force.
Agathon and Phaedrus, meanwhile, are afforded a unique
perspective on Eros because they are epwµEvoL (beloveds). Since
they cannot, properly speaking, love their lovers, they must find a
different object of desire.27 Thus, they more than their lovers turn to

26Allen notes, 30, that Eryximachus practiced a profession that
was remarkably advanced by modern standards--a profession of
which he was rightfully proud. Anderson, 11, adds that as a physician
Eryximachus would fall under the aegis of Apollo, the rival of Dionysus
(and hence Eros, since for Anderson Eros is a mask worn by
Dionysus). Although Anderson puts more emphasis on the tension
between the Apollonian and Dionysian in the dialogue, thus betraying
his interest in Nietzsche, it is fitting to distinguish the more orderly
concept of Eros held by Eryximachus from that held by Pausanias and
Aristophanes.
27 As Warner, 165, notes, Phaedrus' speech does not indicate
''first-hand experience of love," since he looks at it through the eyes of
a beloved. Not surprisingly, then, Phaedrus praises the effects of the
love relationship more than the relationship itself, as Anderson, 2426, observes; moreover, to the extent that Phaedrus praises the
beloved, he is praising himself. With his emphasis on the beloved,
Phaedrus nearly arrives at a reciprocal relationship of love, although
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incorporeal beauty and express their desire in a non-physical or
abstract way. Primarily, their Eros has as its object beautiful words-especially the words about Eros. Phaedrus' constant desire is to
praise Eros in an encomium (177a5-b1 ), while Agathon speaks
"beautifully" (KaAws; 201 c1) about Eros, employing every Gorgianic
device he can muster in his peroration (197c1 -e5). Because they
long to have the command of beautiful words, their speeches are not
only about Eros but are themselves expressions of Eros, EpwTtKol

.A6yot (172b2).28
The interest of these three guests in incorporeal beauty is
manifest already in the prologue. Nowhere is this more easily seen
than in the case of Phaedrus.

The prologue demonstrates that

Phaedrus is essentially a man of books and learning,29 an aspect of
his personality that would not be manifest, if one judged solely by the
content of his speech. In his speech Phaedrus praises Eros' effect on
Achilles (179e1-180a4) and Alcestis (179b5-d2) and treats the bard
Orpheus with contempt (179d2-7).

Nonetheless, the prologue

reveals that Phaedrus is more akin to the Orpheus he despises than
this is expressed in the traditional terms of EpaaTfis-Epc.0µevos. See
Nola, 59-63.
28As Allen, 8-11, notes, the main characters (except for
Aristophanes) were present also at the Protagoras, which is
essentially concerned with the value of sophistic education; hence the
emphasis some of the guests in the Symposium place on rhetoric.
29Rosen, 40-44, has traced the influence of the polymath
Hippias on Phaedrus. This judgment is drawn from the Protagoras.
See PWs.v. Phaedrus (38:1556).
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to a Homeric hero like Achilles. Phaedrus is a talker and reader, not a
doer. He has read a number of books containing encomia and is well
aware of the sophists' habit of praising trivial items (177b5-c1 ). He is
familiar with the sophist Prodicus (177b4).

In the speech of his

narrated by Eryximachus in the prologue, he demonstrates a
fascination with rhetoric (177a5-c4): He employs alliteration of 7t's
with assonance of omegas (.II.ai~vas Elvat v.II.o T~v .II.OLTJTC:>v,
177a7), then alliteration of 't's

(T:rlAtKovT~ ovTt Kal ToaovT~

!iec;:>,

177a8), as well as polyptoton (11otT)TC:>v 11otnµevovs, 177a7;
1TOLT)TC:>v 1TE1TOLT)KEVat, 177b1 ).30

Since the prologue shows a different--a literary--side to
Phaedrus, it offers the reader a different perspective from which to
interpret Phaedrus' speech. By portraying Phaedrus as a man fond of
reading and making fine speeches, the prologue alerts the reader to
focus as much attention on the rhetorical style of the speech as on its
contents.31

Indeed, from the prologue's characterization of

Phaedrus, the reader ought to expect to see his theory of Eros not so
much in his explicit statements about Eros but in his use of fine
oratory on behalf of Eros.
30To some degree, Phaedrus shows the same rhetorical flair in
his speech in the body of the dialogue. As Bury, xxv-xxvi, observes,
the speech of Phaedrus is filled with mythological allusions, chiasms,
paronomasia, special compound verbs, and anacolutha.
31 Interestingly, Phaedrus is a man of the same character in the
dialogue named for him. His chief preoccupation in that dialogue, as
well as that of the Phaedrus, is not so much Eros, but speeches about
Eros.
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The prologue likewise prepares the reader to expect Agathon to
be a man who will honor Eros not so much by expounding well
thought out theories about him, but by crafting a speech full of
beautiful words, thereby revealing the power of Eros. To be sure, the
name Agathon evokes in the reader, whether modern or ancient, the
image of a man more concerned about style than substance. The
modern reader is likely to think of Aristophanes' characterization of
him in the Thesmophoriazusae as an effete poet.32

Plato's

contemporaries would have had a somewhat similar image of
Agathon, which would have reinforced by first-hand acquaintance
with his plays. 33

32See especially lines 39-265. Cf. Socrates' comment in the
Symposium {194b1 }, where he states that Agathon's manliness
{avopeiav} in the theater surprised him and makes him fearful that he
will be unable to give a speech after Agathon. From these sources we
learn of Agathon's effeminate appearance. From Prt. 315d and
Symp. 193b6-7 and Xen. Symp. 8.32 we learn that he was the beloved
of Pausanias. Cf. .PW, s.v. Agathon {1 :761 }.
Apparently, he earned some respect as a playwright: The
character Dionysus in Aristophanes' Frogs {84} calls him a good poet
{aya8os TIOLTJTiJs}, much missed by his friends. To be sure,
Aristophanes alludes to Agathon so that he can make a pun on his
name {'Aya8c.uv is aya86s). Yet Aristophanes' treatment of him in the
Thesmophoriazusae implies that he was noteworthy enough to be the
butt of Aristophanes' satire. The judgment of antiquity was that his
style was KaAAtETITJS {Aristophanes, Thesm. 49, 60). Moreover, he
was known as an innovator of plots; see Mitchell, 91. The only source
for the particulars of his style is Plato, who portrays him as heavily
influenced by Prodicus (Prt. 31 Sd) and Gorgias {Symposium 198c}.
For an analysis of his style, see Bury, xxv-xxvi.
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The prologue portrays to some degree those unflattering
qualities often ascribed to him. He is a dashing young man, whose
handsomeness demands that even the ugly and habitually dirty
Socrates must attempt to pretty himself.

He is a man who

overindulges himself in the manner of Pausanias and Aristophanes
(176a-b). And he derives his self-worth from the acclaim of crowds;
he has spent one night indulging with the

ox.hos

(174a7) and intends

to spend another being fawned over by learned men. Because of his
love for acclamation, he presents himself as a liberal master who is
loved and respected by his slaves (175b5-c1}. For the same reason,
he is impatient with Socrates' tardiness (175a10-11, c3-4}, since it
makes Socrates, not him, the object of attention.
Nonetheless, a positive picture of Agathon also emerges in the
prologue. Agathon is a serious enough poet to be able to invite a
number of intellectuals to an intimate party. Agathon desires to know
the thoughts of Socrates, since Agathon is as interested in acquiring
33The people of Athens may have respected Agathon more
than we are inclined to believe. The evidence from comedy (primarily
from Ar. Thesm.) is naturally hostile to Agathon, since comedy must
make sport of contemporary figures. To conclude on the basis of
Aristophanes' portrayal of Agathon that Agathon was not a talented
tragedian or was largely detested by his contemporaries is to go
beyond the evidence. Although it is likely that Agathon, like Euripides
a few years later, withdrew to Macedonia because he felt
unappreciated at Athens, we cannot be certain this is the case.
Aristophanes gives no reason for Agathon's departure (Ran. 83-85),
but simply states the fact. Furthermore, Agathon did have some
success in Athens: He won first place in 416 B.C. Like Euripides, he
may not have been popular enough always to win first place, but he
was often granted a right to be one of the three tragedians to offer his
plays.
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greater knowledge as he is in indulging himself at a party. Even
Aristodemus, a devotee of Socrates, calls Agathon a aocpos avftp
(174c7) and is glad to finagle an invitation to his party.

In fact,

Aristodemus doubts that he would be a fit guest for Agathon.
Aristodemus calls himself cpavAos when compared with the wise
Agathon (174c7).

Socrates, of course, makes similar comments

about Agathon: Socrates' thoughts are trivial when compared to the
dignified wisdom that impressed over thirty thousand people;
Socrates' wisdom is dream-like, while Agathon's is brilliant; Socrates
wishes he could obtain the wisdom of Agathon through osmosis;
Socrates is an empty vessel that needs filling with Agathon's wisdom
(175d3-e7).
Of course, these statements praising Agathon's wisdom are full
of irony. Yet the irony in these statements does not negate the fact
that Agathon is viewed by his contemporaries and by himself to be a
learned man, indeed, an intellectual celebrity. Agathon recognizes
the irony in Socrates' flattery and chides Socrates for treating him
insolently. Agathon will not tolerate Socrates questioning his wisdom
or talents; Agathon expects that he will defeat Socrates outright in a
battle of wits to be conducted later that evening (175e7-9). Thus, the
irony in Socrates' remarks only underscores Agathon's esteemed
status among his peers.
Even Socrates--however ironic he intends his words to be-recognizes Agathon's stature as an intellectual. In fact, the irony in his
words actually supports Agathon's standing. Ironic flattery would not
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be effective if there were no basis for that flattery. Socrates must
recognize some intellectual capacity in Agathon--overestimated
though it may be by most Athenians--if Socrates is to deprecate it.
Far from assuming that Socrates' interlocutors are dunces, the irony
used by the character Socrates throughout Plato's dialogues
assumes that the interlocutors Socrates encounters are the most
knowledgeable in their fields. The highest dramatic effect is achieved
when an uneducated, self-professed ignoramus upstages all the
experts.
The ironic praise of Agathon, then, is in line with the character
Socrates' treatment of his interlocutors in Plato's earlier dialogues. As
Plato has Socrates explain in the Apology (21 b-23c), Socrates always
searches for those whom he believes to be experts in their fields.
After conversing with them, he always discovers that the experts are
never able to prove fully the tenets of their science or art. Nor can
they give an adequate definition of one of the most elementary
objects in their profession.

Accordingly, the reader of Plato's

dialogues may come to believe that Socrates is wholly insincere in his
flattery of the abilities of his interlocutors: Socrates already knows
more than his interlocutors and uses them as foils to demonstrate his
superior wisdom. 34 Such a conclusion, however, is unwarranted. In
his search for wisdom, Socrates looks only to those people who are
likely to be able to help him, since he cannot produce any ideas of his

34For example, Ap. 21c-23b; Meno aoa-b.
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own. His process of eAeyxos can only test and refine ideas, not
produce them. Hence without the beauty of some other noble soul,
he cannot beget any ideas of his own ( Theaetetus 149a-151 d), since
he--an Eros-like 8a[µc:uv--does not possess in himself the beauty that
could generate such ideas.35 The problem is that no other person
can beget truly beautiful ideas. In the end, Socrates is shown to have
greater knowledge because he is aware of his ignorance, while the
self-professed experts are shown to have no knowledge.

Hence

Socrates' praise of his interlocutors becomes ironical.
Thus, Socrates does appreciate Agathon's wisdom, even if the
dialogue ultimately refutes it.36 Agathon's speech, after all, merely
expounds a belief Socrates himself naively holds in the prologue,
namely, that the beautiful seek the beautiful (174a9). Consequently,
if we fault Agathon for thoughtlessly assuming that Eros works only in
the beautiful (195a7-8; 196a8-b3) and for confusing the object of Eros
with the people in whom Eros works, we must also censure Socrates
for the same error.37

It is better, therefore, to grant Agathon a

35Cf. Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1941 ), 7-20, on the purposes and
difficulties typically associated with Socratic elenchus.
36Agathon is Socrates• main opponent, as 194a1-4 and 198a17 reveal. Thus, when Socrates says in the prologue that he fears for
those who will speak last (177e3-5), he really means that he fears for
himself who must speak after Agathon.
37Cf. Lowenstam, "Parodoxes," 86.
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measure of intelligence and to take his encomium seriously, despite
the irony in Socrates' praise.
Ironic praise, moreover, is a tool used not only by Socrates
against Agathon, but one used by Agathon against Socrates.
Agathon seats Socrates next to himself; this move seemingly honors
Socrates by placing him next to the host, but it also reinforces
Agathon's status: Agathon is brilliant enough to have Socrates as his
honored guest and to sit next to so esteemed an intellectual. 3 8
Although Agathon's interest in Socrates' thoughts is to a large degree
genuine, Agathon does assume that he can defeat Socrates in a
battle of wits (175e7-10); whatever thoughts have come to Socrates
on the road are, in Agathon's mind, inferior to his own.39 Thus, both
Agathon and Socrates belittle one another with flattery to a degree
done by no other set of characters in the prologue.40

Not

surprisingly, then, Socrates will later use Agathon's speech as a foil

38Von Blanckenhagen, 55, notes that single occupancy of a
couch is more common in Attic red-figure vases, unless the pair on a
couch are lovers (i.e., an older man and a youth or woman). Thus,
Agathon by placing Socrates next to him is stating that Socrates is his
lover.
39Not surprisingly, then, Agathon in his speech berates
Socrates by describing Eros as a supple youth with great beauty--the
exact opposite of Socrates. See Anderson, 47.
40Phaedrus flatters Eryximachus (176d5-e3) and Eryximachus
praises the suggestion of Phaedrus (177a2-d5), as is only fitting for a
lover and a beloved to act towards one another. But this does not
match Socrates' and Agathon's somewhat ironic flattery of each
other, that occupies 175c6-e6.
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for his own. In so doing, he is continuing the argument he had with
Agathon in the prologue (175d3-e10) and is taking up Agathon's
challenge for a battle of wits (175c6-10).

By implication, then,

Agathon must be an interlocutor worthy of Socrates. If Agathon's
speech fails to measure up fully to Socrates' or our standards, it
nonetheless exemplifies a system of education and thought that was
popular with the intellectuals of the late fifth century B.C. Athens.
If Agathon has grounds for claiming to be an intellectual whose
speech is worth consideration, Eryximachus has an even greater
claim. For although Agathon was among those who had overindulged
the previous night, Eryximachus clearly excludes himself from oi
ouvaTwTaToL 11[vELv (176c2-3). His sobriety hints that his speech will

have less rhetoric and more content than Agathon's.

Thus,

Eryximachus deserves a place among the lovers of ideas and, to be
more specific, among those who do not mistake showy rhetoric for
beautiful ideas.41
These qualities of Eryximachus are most apparent in his selfclassification in the prologue. He distinguishes himself from those
who constantly overdrink and force others to do so, too (176c2-3). He
does, however, find some allies in his plea for moderation or
abstinence in drinking: Phaedrus, Aristodemus, and some unnamed
guests.

Phaedrus, naturally, is an ally of Eryximachus; he is

41 As PW (11 :607) indicates, all that we know about
Eryximachus is drawn from the Platonic corpus, namely the Prt., the
Symposium, and the Phaedrus.
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Eryximachus' epwµevos and, as we have already seen, a man fonder
of books than the sensual life.

Aristodemus, too, shares with

Eryximachus a devotion to learning; Aristodemus is devoted to
Socratic philosophy, while Eryximachus is a man of medicine and
science.

But the most interesting allies of Eryximachus are the

unnamed To'laoe {176c1). Without doubt, these men are the guests
whose speeches Aristodemus was unable to recall at a later time.
Apparently, they were men of moderation, but also men whose
speeches were not memorable.42
By choosing these anonymous guests as his allies,
Eryximachus demonstrates a weakness of his: though a man of
ideas, he presents them in a pedantic fashion. 43 As brilliant as his

42Mitchell, 15, wrongly understands the unnamed speakers to
be the heavy drinkers. But the vµe'ls oi OUVOTWTOTOl lTlVElV of 176c23 are Pausanias, Aristophanes, and Agathon, since Eryximachus is
replying to their statements in 176a5-b1 and 176b2-4, and 176b8,
respectively. If the unnamed speakers were the heavy drinkers, there
would be no referent for the word To'laoe (176c2), since all the known
guests are accounted for elsewhere in 172c. Thus, the To'la8e must
be the unknown guests, which means they cannot be the o i
8uvaTWTOTOl lTlVElV.
43Mitchell, 63, notes that " 'pedant' is often just a jealous way of
referring to someone who knows something. That's the case here.
Eryximachus knows something." Allen, 27-28, also defends
Eryximachus by arguing that he anticipates Socrates' notion of Eros
as a universal force. Konstan and Young-Bruehl argue further that
Eryximachus' speech is second in sophistication only to that of
Socrates. Eryximachus distinguishes between two loves: eTit8uµia,
which can be either good or bad, and <ptAia, which is always good,
since it creates a harmony out of opposing forces. Moreover,

111
universalizing of Eros may be, Eryximachus' speech fails to inspire
the reader since it is overly technical and ignores sexual passion as
an expression of Eros.44 He takes a quotation from Heraclitus on
harmony and through some leaps in logic uses it to prove that
harmony consists of being in unison, not in having two
complementary tones (187a5-c1 ). This misunderstanding reveals
the serious flaw in his personality:

Eryximachus prefers a bland

unison over a well-tensioned harmony. Furthermore, he begins his
speech by drawing on his medical expertise--to describe not sexual
passion, but the healthy and unhealthy urges of the body (186b3-7).
Regulation of bodily urges, he maintains, is something that belongs to
medicine (186c5-e3). Thus, love is removed from the realm of the
Konstan and Young-Bruehl, 40-46, clear Eryximachus of the charge
of misinterpretation of Heraclitus commonly leveled against him.
In reply, we must grant that Eryximachus' pedantry has its
positive elements: it demonstrates that he has a fair amount of
knowledge. But a pedant does not know as much as the person who
is able to communicate his ideas in a more interesting fashion. Thus,
Socrates must be held in higher esteem than Eryximachus, since the
farmer's speech, though learned, communicates a more compelling
vision of Eros. By comparison, few readers would name the latter's
speech as the most memorable one of the dialogue. In large part, this
is due to Eryximachus' refusal to discuss Eros in terms of sex and his
use of physics and other TexvaL to explain Eros. As Duncan argues,
278-281, Eryximachus stresses a "vertical view of Eros," which sees
Eros as a manifestation of abstract concepts rather than as a
relationship between human beings. As a student of Hippias,
Eryximachus prefers the simplicity found in nature rather than the
complexity found in human society.
44Cf. Wolz, 333. Dover, Symposium, 105, posits that
Eryximachus exemplifies the habit of ancient scientists to overgeneralize to the point of absurdity.
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lover; instead, erotic forces are directed by an expert: the physician
(186e4-187a1), musician (187c2-5), or prophet (188b6-d3}.
Eryximachus' pedantry is demonstrated already in the prologue.
He is overjoyed to lecture the guests about the dangers of
drunkenness (176c7-8); he smirks, as he sees a group of men who
must concede that his medical advice is correct. As the expert in this
field, he holds such sway over the crowd that none of the guests
dares to chafe at his lecture or object when he dismisses the flute-girl,
sets the terms of drinking, and establishes the agenda for the
evening. It is his medical expertise alone that sways the crowd, since
he can muster no moral arguments, only medical ones, against
overdrinking.

His vision of life is narrowed by his devotion to

medicine. 45
Eryximachus' pedantry is in marked contrast to Socrates'
attitude. Although both men pursue the intellectual life, Socrates
neither specializes in a narrow field of learning nor withdraws from
sensual pleasure, as Eryximachus does.46 Socrates never adopts

45Bury, xxviii, comments that Eryximachus "seizes every
possible occasion to air his medical lore," not only concerning
drunkenness but also hiccoughs. Bury, xxix, adds that there is little
literary adornment in Eryximachus' speech, as befits such a pedant.
46Cf. Warner's judgment, 167: "Great pains are taken to
distance Socrates from Eryximachus; the latter is presented as
pompous and insensitive, with no apparent first-hand experience of
love, and without a clear grasp of the issues in question." Though
Warner overstates the case--Eryximachus has had first-hand
experience in love with Phaedrus--he is correct in observing
Eryximachus' pedantry.
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the jargon of a specialized profession: In other dialogues of Plato,
Socrates speaks with generals about courage, with teachers about
wisdom, and with statesmen about justice4 7; in this dialogue
Alcibiades accuses Socrates of talking about non-technical matters
("pack mules and certain bronze smiths, cobblers, and tanners,"
221 e4-5). Nor does Socrates equate the intellectual life with flight
from pleasure, as Eryximachus does. Socrates can drink with the
best or he can forego drink altogether (176c3-5). Socrates can enjoy
sensual pleasure without being seduced by it, but Eryximachus is as
easily influenced by alcohol as the overindulgent are. Eryximachus
avoids being seduced by sensual pleasure only by avoiding all
contact with sensual pleasure.
Eryximachus, then, is a caricature of Socrates. He seems to
have Socrates' moderation and learning, but the appearance is
deceptive. For true appreciation of Beauty comes not by embracing
intellectual beauty alone and ignoring physical beauty, but by using
physical beauty to lead oneself to the beauty of ideas--and beyond. In
fact, all three lovers of rhetoric and sophistry are caricatures of
Socrates. Like Socrates, they are Eros-like in their longing for a nonsensual beauty, but unlike Socrates, they have confused the beauty

47For example, in the Laches, Socrates argues with two
generals, Nicias and Laches. In the Gorgias, Socrates discusses
issues of morality with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, all of whom claim
to know and teach where true happiness lies. In the Protagoras,
Socrates discusses the relation between knowledge and virtue with
the sophist Protagoras and other assembled intellectuals.
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of words or pieces of information with Absolute Beauty. Their love is
nobler than that of Pausanias and Aristophanes, but they fail to
discern as lofty a goal of love as Socrates does.
The 'Epacr-nls of Absolute Beauty: Socrates
As we observed in the last section, Socrates is unique among
the guests. He neither allows himself to be overcome by drink (as do
Pausanias and Aristophanes) nor does he retreat from pleasures into
his own specialized world (as does Eryximachus). No matter how
much he is surrounded by drink or by beautiful bodies, his mind is
never overcome by them. He can drink without letting the alcohol
govern his head; he can enjoy the beautiful young men around him in
a non-sexual manner. He is prevented from being seduced by the
pleasures of sensuous beauty because his first desire is for Absolute
Beauty. The beauty observed by the senses, as far as Socrates is
concerned, serves only to lead to a higher beauty; to perceive beauty
only with the senses or to gratify oneself with that beauty is to rob
oneself of enjoyment of the greater beauty.
Socrates' preference for Absolute Beauty over the beauty of the
body can be seen as merely a defense of Socrates' character against
those who slandered him for seducing the youth of Athens. One
cannot deny that Alcibiades' speech portrays Socrates in a positive
light; the "scandal" of Socrates, according to Alcibiades, is that there is
no scandal to be found, despite Alcibiades' persistent attempts to
seduce him (219c7-d2).

Although Alcibiades attempts to_ portray
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Socrates as hybristic, the reader soon discovers that Socrates'
mistreatment of Alcibiades lies in Socrates' refusal to seduce
Alcibiades rather than in any wanton seduction of Alcibiades.
Socrates' good behavior can be nothing but offensive to men like
Alcibiades who are of rather offensive moral character.48
Socrates' character, however, also serves a deeper purpose:
Socrates dramatizes Plato's conception of the perfect Eros, who
seeks Absolute Beauty. The notion of a perfect Eros may at first
glance seem somewhat contradictory, since Eros by nature is
imperfect, but calling Socrates a perfect Eros figure does not imply
that Socrates is perfect. Rather, it means that he best dramatizes the
quest for perfection, illustrating for the reader

Eros' quest for

Absolute Beauty. 49
This quest begins with the appreciation of beautiful bodies.
Thus, when Socrates first appears in the dialogue, he is preoccupied
with the prospect of seeing the beautiful Agathon.

Agathon has

invited him to a banquet and Socrates has accepted the invitation, on
the provision that he can attend the less crowded of the two parties.
The more intimate setting of the second party will allow Socrates

48Similarly, the dialogue portrays Socrates as being on more
cordial terms with his critic Aristophanes than history--or
Aristophanes' comedies--would have us believe.
49This phenomenon is not surprising, since of all the guests
Socrates has the most comprehensive theory of Eros. See pages 5961.
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more of an opportunity to enjoy, among other things, Agathon's
beauty.
The prospect of encountering sensuous beauty changes
Socrates' demeanor.

No longer can Socrates neglect his own

appearance, running around barefoot and unwashed (174a4). Now
he must beautify himself so that he can attend the party of handsome
Agathon.

He must go KaAos TTapa KaA6v (174a9).

Socrates

demonstrates thereby the beautifying and ennobling force of
sensuous beauty, a truth observed by Phaedrus and Agathon. Eros,
in awe of Beauty, even the beauty of the body, must make itself
equally beautiful. As Phaedrus notes, a lover shirks the ugliness of
cowardice and strives to be as beautiful in performing heroic deeds as
his beloved is beautiful ( 178d4-e1; 179a3-b5}, and, as Agathon
notes, Eros transforms lovers to be more musical and graceful
(196d6-e3). By beautifying his appearance, Socrates demonstrates
that beauty, even of the sensuous kind, has a transforming power.
If beauty ennobles the lover, however, he must not have been
noble and beautiful previously. This is a truth that escapes all the
other guests in the dialogue, but especially Agathon.

Although

Agathon believes that Eros can make an unmusical man brim with
poetry, Agathon does not think Eros can influence old, ugly, or harsh
men (195b1-4, e5-196a4). Thus, when Agathon speaks of the great
benefits Eros brings to lovers, he assumes that the lovers already
possess these qualities, but must have them nurtured and developed.
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As Socrates argues in his encomium, however, only those who lack
beauty desire beauty.
Learning this truth is a crucial step on the Ascent to Beauty
because it redefines the goal of Eros and redirects the search for
Absolute Beauty. Eros becomes a search for acquisition of beauty
rather than mere enjoyment of the sensuous beauty of others. Eros
ultimately leads to Absolute Beauty, which alone can give enduring
beauty to a lover. The beauty of the body is all too fleeting for a lover
to rely upon.

The beauty of ideas, though more enduring than

sensuous beauty, cannot compare to the Absolute Beauty that gives
them their beauty. Thus, the best lover must recognize his need for
beauty in its most permanent form, if he is not merely to deceive
himself with imitations of Beauty.
Crucial as this insight is for one to be a perfect lover, only
Socrates understands this truth--and he learns or relearns this truth in
the prologue.SO Instinctively, Socrates knows he is not beautiful but

50Whether Socrates learns or relearns it depends on what we
make of Socrates' use of Diotima. Does Plato intend the reader to
understand that Socrates is inventing a conversation with Diotima,
since the conversation seems tailor-made for the symposium? Or
does Plato intend the conversation with Diotima to represent a "fact"
in the fictional world he has created in the Symposium? In either
case, the Symposium and all its events are fictional; the question is
whether the speech of Diotima is a fictional fiction or a fictional fact. If
it is a fictional fiction, the character Socrates (not the Socrates of
history) has learned a truth on the way to the banquet, which he is
presenting to the symposiasts. If it is a fictional fact, the character
Socrates has relearned a truth he was taught fifteen years ago, but
which he had forgotten until he meditated on the way to see Agathon.
Since Diotima's speech builds on items discussed previously, it is best
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must become so {yEyEvvn µEvos, 174a5; cf. the factitive verb

KaAAc.urrtaaµnv in 174a8-9). Yet, at first, Socrates is somewhat
oblivious to the lack of beauty in himself apart from the beauty in the
objects of his desire. He includes himself among the aya8oi who
naturally go to the feast of the good51 and playfully chides those like
Homer who have a <pav.Aos man go to the home of a good man. By
the time Socrates delivers his encomium to Eros, however, he has
changed his mind. He realizes that it is not the good and the beautiful
who seek Good and Beauty, but rather people who recognize they
lack such qualities. By recognizing this truth, Socrates has become
the perfect lover of Beauty.
What gives Socrates this insight? The most natural answer is
that Socrates contemplates on this matter as he goes to Agathon's
house. He has already begun thinking on this topic before he meets
Aristodemus, as is indicated by his giving a thoughtful reason for
beautifying himself {174a8-9). When Aristodemus comes, Socrates
to see her as a fictional fiction, as Anderson, 51, and Warner, 170,
argue.
Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 86, argues for a similar
understanding of Diotima. He adds that in Socrates' speech "Plato
presents a unique opportunity for us to see how Socrates, whether it
be the historical one or not, came to conclusions. We see Socrates
flippantly choose one view-point, change views after some thought,
and then explain for us the process by which he arrived at his
conclusion." Thus, the character Socrates uses Diotima as a means
to expound a conclusion that he himself had reached only a few hours
earlier.
51 There is a pun involved here, but Socrates has the proverb in
this fashion in mind. See Renehan, 120-121.
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begins contemplating critically about the ideas behind a particular
incident in Homer. Socrates, thus, starts with the prospect of seeing

KaA6s Agathon and progresses higher on the ladder of beauty by
contemplating beautiful ideas. But the central thought on Socrates'
mind is the precise nature of Beauty and its lovers: Who loves Beauty
and what effect does Beauty have on its lovers?

Because this

question is Socrates' object of thought, he is quickly led to
contemplate Absolute Beauty--more quickly than if he had been
thinking of some other matter. Physical beauty has spurred Socrates
on to question who truly possesses beauty. In turn, pondering this
question has led him to see a vision of Absolute Beauty. Thus, it is
contemplation on the nature of beauty that leads ultimately to a
glimpse of Absolute Beauty.
Although Socrates is the only guest to be so moved by Beauty
so as to attain this goal and although insights from the contemplation
of Absolute Beauty are not readily shared, he nonetheless attempts to
lead one of his beloveds, Aristodemus, up with him on the Ascent to
Beauty. In this way, he follows the outline of Diotima, who sees the
Ascent as usually involving a lover who guides his beloved, as is
implied by 210a4-8, b4-6.52 The lover (Socrates in this case) begins
52These passages imply that a young man pursues Beauty by
acting as a lover; cf. Sta To 6p6ws TiatSepaaTel'v eTiavtwv (211 b5-6)
and ETTL Tel epc.uTlKCx leval (211 b7-c1 ). Other passages, however,
suggest that a beloved, too, can ascend to Absolute Beauty: One can
be a lover himself or be led by another (vTI' aAAov ayea6at, 211 c1 ).
To confuse matters even further, the lover often needs the guidance
of someone else, the i}yovµevos (21 Oa6-7), who is perhaps a lover.
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with one beloved (Agathon) but soon realizes the beauty to be found
in many bodies (Aristodemus and Agathon).53 Next, the lover looks
for the beauty in the soul and discusses beautiful ideas with the
beloved.

Socrates performs this task in 174b3-d4, where he

discusses whether the good or the bad go to the banquets of the
good. But at a particular stage, Socrates acquires a vision of Absolute
Beauty, which he cannot impart to his beloved, for Absolute Beauty is
not an idea that can be expressed or a vision that can be described
with words. He stands in deep thought on the porch, entranced by
Absolute Beauty (174d4-175c6). If the beauty of gold, clothes, and
lads can leave one speechless and unable to eat or drink, but only
able to stare, Absolute Beauty renders one even more incapable of
expression (211 d3-e4). Thus, Socrates lets Aristodemus go ahead to
the party and does not answer Agathon's questions, since he cannot
communicate to either of them his glimpse of Absolute Beauty. Since
Thus, the person ascending to Beauty may be involved in several
relationships: He may be an epc.0µevos being led by his lover. Or he
may be a lover who, on the one hand, is being taught by a i]yovµevos
how to pursue beauty properly, while, on the other hand, having an
epc.0µevos whom he attempts to raise to a higher awareness of
beauty, as he himself ascends higher. Anderson's remarks, 61, offer
help in understanding this: "[G]uidance comes from beauty," not from
the lover or beloved; "since this is an active pursuit of the beauty, both
[epaaTfis and epc.0µevos ] are in that sense lovers."
53To be sure, Aristodemus is not as beautiful as Agathon, since
the former is called aµtKp6s and maintains Socrates' unkempt
appearance (173b2). Nonetheless, since the beauty in all bodies
(21 Ob3) is akin, a true lover will find beauty even in less beautiful
bodies. Thus, Socrates deems even Aristodemus as a man capable
of begetting beautiful ideas with himself.
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Socrates cannot describe in words his vision of Absolute Beauty, he
wishes that he could impart his knowledge by osmosis (175d3-7).54
Socrates demonstrates that, although the quest for Absolute
Beauty must begin with social intercourse, it must be completed in
isolation. This isolation caused by the pursuit of Absolute Beauty is
seen in the prologue as Socrates stands apart from the rest of the
guests on the porch during half of the meal (175a7-c6). Although
Socrates had earlier been eager to dine with handsome Agathon, his
pursuit of Absolute Beauty sidetracked him. As soon as Socrates got
a glimpse of Absolute Beauty, he preferred it to the charm of Agathon.

54Qne should not conclude from the difficulties of imparting
philosophical truth that philosophy must be solipsistic or nihilistic.
Roochnik, 127, aptly describes Platonic philosophy in this way:
"Philosophical discourse never reaches its desired terminus. It is
forever the love, and not the possession, of wisdom. To formulate
this, and much of the above, succinctly, philosophical discourse is
fundamentally interrogative. Its paradigmatic sentence is the
question, and not the assertion. This is not to say that all philosophers
do is ask questions: that would be absurd. They ask questions,
entertain possible answers, review such answers, and then proceed
forward once again. To describe philosophical discourse as
interrogative is thus very close to calling it dialectical or, more
precisely, dialogical." Roochnik adds, 126, that the philosopher
differs from the sophist in that the latter disowns reason and objective
knowledge, while the philosopher is always pursuing objective truth.
Although Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 87, sees a similar outline
between the journey to Agathon's house and the Ascent to Beauty, he
argues that Socrates plays the role of Eros, guiding the philosopher
(Aristodemus) along the path to the Good, then at the last moment
abandoning him so that he can discover the Good (Agathon) on his
own. But surely Socrates is the philosopher (who by definition is also
an Eros-figure), who guides his beloved along the path to the good.
Moreover, nowhere does Diotima mention that Eros disappears
during a stage of the Ascent to Beauty.
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Yet despite the higher nature of Absolute Beauty, it is difficult to
pursue because it is so ephemeral. The beauty of a body or even an
idea or speech is readily manifest to the observer, as often as he
cares to observe it. Absolute Beauty, however, does not readily
appear, but can be glimpsed only after much labor and then for a brief
time only. For this reason, Socrates calls his wisdom cpavA.n (175e3).
Although it is really life that becomes cpaOA.ov (211 e4-212a2), when
compared to Absolute Beauty, those who pursue Absolute Beauty
must feel frustrated since they cannot possess it permanently. It may
seem better to enjoy a more down-to-earth beauty and wisdom (as
Agathon does) rather than to pursue an ephemeral Absolute
Beauty.55

55Scholars have observed flaws in Socrates' concept of Eros
and Beauty. In particular, Nussbaum, 166-167, and Vlastos, Platonic
Studies 2d. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 ), 31,
have argued that Socratic love ignores the reality of inter-personal
relationships in favor of an ethereal, non-altruistic love. Defenders of
Socrates include Nye, ''The Subject of Love: Diotima and her Critics,"
(hereafter Nye, "Love") Journal of Value Inquiry 24 (1990) 133-153,
who argues that Diotima is not urging a lover to leave the beloved as
he or she progresses toward Absolute Beauty, but rather to
understand that love involves more than just love of a beloved, but
love of his or her friends, ideas, and politics. In a slightly different vein,
Wolz, 347, argues that just as "the absolutely asocial state in the
Protagoras and the absolutely perfect city in the Republic are merely
devices which Plato employs to block all possible escape from reality
and to induce men resolutely to face the human condition," so the
Ascent to Beauty in the Symposium forces the reader away from an
other-worldly ascent back into human relationships.
To be sure, the dialogue, including Alcibiades' speech, does
show an ethereal form of love is unable to lead others to virtue;
moreover, Socrates calls his wisdom cpavATJ for the reasons states
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Thus, as I have argued earlier, Socrates' praise of Agathon in
175d3-e6 must be taken both in an ironic and in a straightforward
manner.

Socrates does believe that his knowledge of Absolute

Beauty makes Agathon's wisdom appear shallow and we, like
Agathon, are correct in finding irony in Socrates' words. To the
extent, however, that Socrates cannot communicate his insight into
Absolute Beauty and cannot maintain his glimpse of it, Socrates'
wisdom is indeed cpavATJ. It demonstrates that Socrates remains a
perfect lover, not a perfect possessor, of Beauty.
The Ascent to Beauty Itself Dramatized
To some degree, each of the characters has demonstrated the
proper way to pursue Eros. In particular, Socrates has personified the
quest for Absolute Beauty, as we saw on pages 115-122. To the
above. However, these elements do not demonstrate the error of
Socrates as much as the tension in the human condition between the
longing for the absolute and its rare fulfillment. A better explanation,
then, is that the dialogue urges the search for an abstract Beauty
while demonstrating the difficulties in putting such a search into
practice. Thus, Duncan, 287-289, argues that the Symposium is an
aporetic dialogue, in that it offers two views of love, one stressing the
horizontal or human aspect, the other the vertical aspect or the
striving for virtue. If Aristophanes deprives lovers of growth in
knowledge and virtue because he overemphasizes the physical
aspects of love, Socrates treats his beloveds hubristically because he
denies the physical side of love.
The difficulty of the Socratic concept of Eros lies in human
nature itself, as Roochnik, 128, aptly notes. Eros "is not an object but
a capacity to enter into relationships with objects .... Socrates
understands how various objects satisfy different kinds of human
beings. He understands how logos is the principle motor of
satisfaction for those moving beyond the first stage of_ human
development."
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degree that the Ascent has been dramatized in this fashion, there is
no need to reiterate the notion of Socrates as Eros (or for that matter
any of the other characters as lesser Erotes).
Plato, however, also hints in a more indirect manner at how to
pursue Beauty. He does so by making an allusion to the Ascent to
Beauty: the ascent of Apollodorus and Glaucon into town. The
behavior of the prologue's characters alludes to the Ascent, not in so
much as they themselves are participating in the Ascent or are
objects of true Beauty, but rather in so far as Plato endows their
purely mundane actions with philosophical, almost allegorical,
significance. Thus, in this section we will not be looking at how the
characters act qua characters or how the plot is overtly erotic, as we
did earlier in the chapter. Rather, we will examine how even utterly
unerotic men can manifest the longings of Eros and how even men
dispossessed of true Beauty can nonetheless serve as examples of it,
if only in word.
Such an example can be seen in the geography of the
Apollodoran prologue (172a1-174a2).

As the dialogue begins,

Apollodorus is on his way up into town, coming from the deme
Phalerum.56 His journey into town requires that he physically ascend
from the sea level to a higher elevation; hence cx.vicov, "ascending," is
an appropriate description. As he is on his way up into town, Glaucon
greets him from behind (chncr8ev, 172a3) and from quite a distance
56oover, Symposium, 77: "Phalerum lies on the coas~ east of
Piraeus and two miles southwest of the city perimeter."
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(n6ppc.u6ev, 172a3}. This necessarily places him closer to the sea,

further from Athens, and on a lower level than Apollodorus.
Nonetheless, Glaucon seems to have intended to go into town; he
must have been heading in the same direction as Apollodorus in
order for him to espy Apollodorus.

Furthermore, he raises no

objections when Apollodorus suggests that Glaucon accompany him
into town so that Apollodorus may relate the speeches of Eros along
the way (173b7-c1).
This ascent of two characters into Athens would seem
insignificant, were it not for the emphasis on the Ascent to Beauty in
the climax of Socrates' speech. Since, however, Plato emphasizes
the concept of ascent in the body of the dialogue, the literal ascent of
Apollodorus and Glaucon gains new meaning, even if Apollodorus
and Glaucon are not perfect embodiments of Eros.

Apollodorus'

ascent into town thus exemplifies the attempt to ascend to Beauty as
carried out by those entranced by Socratic dialogue. Since Glaucon is
ignorant of this particular dialogue, he must stand on a lower plane
and, thus, behind Apollodorus.

Since he is a pupil of Socrates,

however, it is only right that he also should be en route to the city.
Then, as Apollodorus relates the story, the two walk to town and
arrive there at the same time, for when Apollodorus has told Glaucon
all that he knows about the symposium, the two are on the same
plane. Furthermore, by hearing a dialogue about Eros, they both
have ascended, at least to some degree, on the Ladder of Beauty, as
is exemplified by their ascending to Athens.
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This interpretation of geography as indicative of philosophical
process would seem overly subtle, were it not for a couple of factors.
Firstly, Plato rarely sets any dialogue outside Athens.57 Thus, when
the prologue of the Symposium portrays two people outside Athens,
it is already worth noting. Secondly, and more importantly, Plato uses
the geography of the Symposium in the same way he uses that of the

Republic. As we observed in the first chapter,58 Plato uses the
descent in the prologue of the Republic to dramatize the descent into
the cave. Socrates and Glaucon attempt to go up to the city, but are
dragged down once again to the Piraeus by Polemarchus. The body
of the Republic then portrays Socrates descending into ordinary
human society (the cave) to persuade his interlocutors that their
concept of justice is a mere shadow of the truth. The Symposium, in
contrast, portrays Socrates leading men upward in the pursuit of
beauty. The reader ought not to be surprised, then, that in a dialogue
devoted to the Ascent to Beauty, the prologue would describe a
geographical ascent.
The use of geography as metaphor for philosophical process is
underscored by the verbal parallels between the two prologues, as

57The only dialogues in which he does are the Republic, which
is set in the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens; the Phaedrus, which is set
in the countryside; the Phaedo, whose narration takes place in Phlius
(after Socrates is dead); and the Laws, which is set in Crete.
58See pages 21-23.
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seen in the similarities between the second sentence of the
Symposium and the first sentence of the Republic.

Kal yap ETvyxavov TTP~flV ELS aaTv OlK06Ev CxVlWV
<PaAnp66Ev (Symp. 172a2-3)
KaTe(3nv xees ELS nEtpaTa µETCx rAaVKUJVOS TOV 'ApiaTUJVOS
(Resp. 1.327a1)
In both cases there is a verb which either by itself (KaTe(3nv) or with a
supplementary participle (eTvyxavov ... avtwv) denotes travel,
followed by an adverb of time

(np~nv,

xees), followed by a

prepositional phrase indicating destination (Eis aaTU, ELS nEtpaTa). In
the Symposium Glaucon espies Apollodorus from afar (KaTtowv µE

n6ppw6Ev, 172a3), while in the Republic Polemarchus espies
Glaucon and Socrates (KaTtowv ovv n6ppw6Ev i]µO:s, 1.327b2). In
both cases the participle of KaTtCEtv and the adverb n6ppw6Ev are
used. In both dialogues the interlocutor hails the narrator from behind

(onta6Ev; Symp. 172a3, Resp. 327b4) and asks him to nEptµevat
(Symp. 172a5, Resp. 1.327b3).59

59Qther similarities exist. Glaucon is present in both dialogues.
In the Symposium he accosts Apollodorus, but in the Republic he is
accosted along with Socrates by Polemarchus. (Indeed, the parallel
between the Republic and the Symposium may be the joke [172a4]
that eludes modern commentators: Glaucon is treating Apollodorus
as Glaucon was treated by Polemarchus in the Republic. Certainly,
Dover's explanation [Symposium, 77], that the joke lies in Glaucon's
"feigned urgency," is inadequate.) Furthermore, both dialogues are
set shortly after a sacrifice has been made: In the Republic Socrates
is on his way back to Athens after making sacrifice to the goddess
(1.327a2); in the Symposium Socrates attends Agathon's party after
Agathon made the victory sacrifices (173a6-7). Although Allen, 9,
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In both dialogues, then, a character briefly stops and for a
moment the reader does not know whether the character will continue
his upward journey or change course; in the Symposium, Apollodorus
continues his ascent to Athens, while in the Republic Socrates is
forced to return to the Piraeus. Since both dialogues portray learning
as an ascent from the material world to the immaterial, 60 each
prologue's description of a physical ascent reflects the metaphysical
ascent taking place in the dialogue.
One could argue that the literal journeys of the prologues add
nothing to the dialogues, since the reader must rely on the
"philosophical" portions of the dialogue to explicate these journeys
and even then the interpretation is more allegorical than a direct
application of philosophical principles to a concrete situation. Yet the
interpreter's reliance on the body of the dialogue for interpretation of
the prologue does not undermine this way of looking at Apollodorus'
journey. The "philosophical" portion of the dialogue turns us away
from the "philosophical": The philosophy of the dialogue reveals that
Eros is not a force solely apprehended by philosophy.

Even in

Socrates' scheme, Eros remains an irrational force that affects not
only men, but animals (207a8-c1 ).

Thus, while the body of the

dialogue may explain Eros with intellectual arguments, the prologue
admits that the Symposium bears an affinity with the Phaedo, "Its
main philosophical filiation is with the Republic: the account of Beauty
itself at 21 Oa-212a anticipates the account of the Good in Resp. 6
(506b-509b).
60symp. 210a4-212b7; Resp. 7.514a1-517a6.
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illustrates the work of Eros. It does so not only by showing men acting
under the sway of Eros, but also by portraying in a more abstract way
man's desire to ascend to Beauty.
Moreover, interpreting the ascent to Athens in both dialogues
as symbolic of the philosophical ascent is the best way of "preserving
the data." Plato has set the prologue of both dialogues in specific
geographical circumstances. Since there is no other ostensible way
to explain the necessity of these geographical details--which are not
simply made in passing--and since the motif of ascent and descent
appears in crucial passages of these dialogues, the simplest solution
is to understand that the geography of the prologues reflects the
content of the dialogue. It underscores the allusions in the prologue
to the Ascent to Beauty already noted.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that the behavior of the characters
in the prologue illustrates their attitudes toward Beauty and, thus, the
way in which Eros works in them. We have seen that each character
in the prologue prepares the reader for the way in which he will
describe Eros; moreover, the prologue alerts the reader to certain
nuances in those speeches that would have escaped the reader's
attention, if the prologue were omitted.
The prologue allows us to see these nuances, since the guests
speak without the restraints imposed upon them later, as they follow
the rules of giving an encomium. The reader gets more of a glimpse
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into their personalities and can see how the personalities of the
guests color their understanding of Eros.

More importantly, the

reader sees in the prologue actions motivated by Eros. If the reader
adopts the broad definition of Eros held by Socrates, he is able to
observe a wide range of behavior that can be called erotic. In line with
the Socratic definition, the reader can then discern a hierarchy among
the guests, with the lovers of the sensual on the bottom and the lover
of Absolute Beauty on the top.
Since Socrates invites the other guests to attempt to ascend to
Absolute Beauty, it is fitting that the prologue make two allusions to
the ascent. First, there is the allusion to the ascent in the Apollodorus'
journey up to Athens in the first half of the prologue. Second, and
more importantly, there is a demonstration of the ascent by Socrates,
who begins with the prospect of physical beauty and then gets a
glimpse of Absolute Beauty. In both instances, Plato is inviting the
reader to examine what the Ascent entails and how it appears to the
external observer.
Thus, the character and dramas of the prologue are examples
of individuals searching for Beauty and the Good. Although the body
of the dialogue will give detailed and rational explanations of the
search, the characters and drama of the prologue demonstrate the
importance and universality of the search.

CHAPTER FOUR
EROS OF BEAUTY AND THE GOOD:
EROS IN THE DICTION OF THE PROLOGUE
So far we have argued that each of the characters manifests
Eros in a unique way. The behavior of each character in the prologue
either foreshadows his theory of Eros or reveals a dimension to his
speech that would have perhaps gone unnoticed had there been no
dramatic prologue to the encomia.

Not only, however, does the

characterization of the dramatis personae manifest Eros, but so do
many of the words in the prologue. Through his choice of diction,
Plato constantly interweaves allusions to Eros and his work with the
drama of the dialogue.
In his use of words, Plato can be so subtle that many of his
allusions to Eros may escape the reader. In large part, the subtlety of
the allusions arises from Plato's lack of a technical vocabulary. Unlike
Aristotle and later philosophers, Plato does not have a set vocabulary
that he employs only for philosophical matters; even some of his
technical vocabulary, such as

o6~a,

he uses in a non-technical

sense.1 Instead, he draws on common words to describe intricate
1 For example, Guthrie has observed that Plato does not
consistently use the word eloos to refer to the Forms or Ideas. Indeed,
if one takes the e'lon of Republic 3.402b-c to refer to the Forms, then
Socrates' statement would contradict with his arguments elsewhere in
the dialogue. As Guthrie demonstrates, however non-technical
131

132
philosophical concepts and processes.

As Alcibiades puts it,

Socrates' words--that is, the words of Plato's Socrates--are full of
"pack mules and certain bronze smiths, cobblers, and tanners"
(221 e4-5), which, however, point to a larger reality. Thus, the words
Plato employs to describe his most important philosophical concepts
are frequently ordinary terms that derive a weightier philosophical
sense from the context. Even Plato's most technical term--e1oos or
iOea--at its heart merely denotes something that is seen.2
Not surprisingly, then, the Symposium contains many words
that are used to describe both erotic and ordinary human activity.

occurrences of e1oos abound in this dialogue noted for its use of e1oos
in its t~chnical sense. See Guthrie, 4:459-460, 498, 509.
Eduoard Des Places, S.J., ed. Lexique de la langue
philosophique et re}igieuse de Platon (hereafter Lexique de Platon)
(Paris: Societe d' Edition "Les belles lettres," 1970), s.v. "doos ," pp.
159-160, demonstrates the range of meaning for that word: (1) form,
aspect, (2) geometrical figure, {3) image, (4) category or class (as in
Symposium 205b4), (5) general category, and (6) Idea. Cf. Mitchell,
xii, on Platonic vocabulary.
2e18os can merely mean the exterior appearance of an object,
as in Chrm. 154d4: ovTc.us To e1oos TiayKaA6s EoTtv. The
interchangeability of technical and non-technical senses of words in
Plato should not surprise the astute reader, since Plato can be
horribly imprecise, even when he is using technical vocabulary. In
202a2-9, Diotima sets forth the distinction between ignorance and
knowledge, and posits an intermediate state between the two,
namely, right opinion. As she puts forth this theory, she uses different
words for knowledge and right opinion:
passage ignorance right opinion
knowledge
202a3:
aµa0(a
not mentioned oocp(a
202a5-8: aµa0(a TO 6p0a oo~al;ElV E1TLOTao0at/ ElTlOTTJµT}
202a9:
aµa0ia
iJ 6p0a o6~a
cpp6vT}otS
-
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Furthermore, since Plato argues throughout the dialogue that the
presence of Eros is not confined only to one branch of human activity,
it is not inappropriate to see the "ordinary'' uses of a word as having
an erotic overtone. There can be no hard and fast line of demarcation
between a word's technical and ordinary senses.
Of course, one may object that it is not Plato's use of allusion
that is subtle, but rather the interpreter's discovery of it. The reader,
nonetheless, ought not to be deterred from attempting to discover
erotic overtones to ordinary words in the dialogue, especially in light
of the hermeneutical arguments set forth in the first chapter of this
dissertation. This hermeneutic is confirmed by Plato's use of word
play, which indicates that Plato is well aware of a word's several
senses.

For example, Plato has Socrates "abuse" the common

proverb, aya6wv ETTL 8atTas '(aaLV avT6µaTOl aya6o( (174b4-5). In
place of aya6wv Socrates substitutes ·Aya6c.0vc.uv. 3 Plato is aware

3This is the most credible explanation of the passage. Dover,
Symposium, 81-82, completely misunderstands the proverb
(TTapoLµia), believing that Socrates has substituted ayaewv for
8eLAwv. Bury, 8-9, makes the same error. He notes that the proverb
existed in antiquity in both forms, but argues that the original proverb
had aya6wv, which was parodied by Cratinus and Eupolis to read
8eLAwv; nonetheless, says Bury, Socrates assumes that 8eLAwv is the
older form of the proverb and parodies it by changing 8eLAwv to
ayaewv. Bury's explanation, however, does not hold up under
scrutiny. What would be Socrates' purpose in corrupting the proverb
by changing 8eLAwv to aya6wv? The example that Socrates cites,
that of Menelaus going to Agamemnon's banquet, assumes that the
proverb has the good, not the cowardly, going to the feast of the
good, with the incident in Homer being a violation of the rule.

134
that Agathon's name sounds like the word for "good" in Greek. Since
he will connect Beauty and Good later in the dialogue (204e1 -2),
Plato uses Agathon's name to allude to the quest for the Good that is
inherent in the quest for Beauty.
For the sake of the pun we must forget certain aspects of
Agathon's nature. As far as the pun is concerned, Agathon is no
longer to be thought of as the overindulgent poetaster whose beauty
is only skin deep. Rather he is a manifestation of the Absolute Beauty,
from which all beauty is derived. Through the pun, Agathon has
become aya86s. Thus, although Plato portrays Agathon elsewhere
as a less than ideal lover of Beauty, Plato here treats him as if he were
Absolute Beauty personified.
Agathon, nonetheless, remains Agathon, despite Socrates' pun.
Therefore, we must distinguish between word play or allusion from
allegory.

When Plato makes a pun or an allusion, he makes a

tangential connection between an ordinary person or object and
another person, object, or a philosophical idea. If Plato's word-plays
Nonetheless, Socrates has changed the proverb in some
fashion. But how? The most common explanation is that he has
substituted the dative · Ay6:8wv' (i.e., · Ay6:8wvt} for the expected
genitive aya8wv. Yet, as Renehan, 120-121, has observed, it is not
good Greek grammar to use the dative to state a person's destination.
Therefore, Renehan suggests that Plato originally wrote 'Aya8wvwv, ·
which later by haplology was reduced to 'Ay6:8wv.
As Anderson, 67, notes, this is not the only occasion when Plato
makes a pun on Agathon's name. Agathon boasts in his speech that
"Eros 'cared for the good [bnµe:Afis aya8wv]." Later, Socrates
compels Agathon "to admit that Eros lacks the good (aya8wv
evoefis)."
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were to lead the reader to allegorize the people and objects in the
dialogue, they would become mere ciphers for philosophical ideas or
phenomena. This would lead the reader to face countless difficulties
of interpretation.

It is possible, for example, to see a tangential

connection between Agathon and the Good, but it is impossible to see
Agathon as the embodiment of the Good in the dialogue. Every deed
that Agathon performs is not an example of the sort of behavior
expected from the Good. Rather, Plato continues to endow Agathon
with those traits that a fourth century BC reader would have expected
to find in Agathon. Thus, we cannot allegorize Agathon to stand for
the Good throughout the dialogue, but we can recognize that in one
particular instance (174b4-5) Agathon's name has become
something greater than Agathon himself.
Thus, we must distinguish sometimes between what is
happening in re and what is happening in verbo. Agathon's name
alludes to the good, but Socrates in going to his house is not
ascending to the good, but to a man who is µaA8aK6s (174c1). Hence
the complexity of interpretation: Plato hints at a deeper meaning
behind some of the names and events, but the history of the
characters intrudes often enough to prevent the reader from reading
the story as mere allegory. Is Agathon an ideal picture of the Good?
Or is he a man utterly devoid of true Beauty? Plato answers "yes" to
both questions. To the degree that he is effeminate and his speech
sophistic, he resembles Socrates' portrait of Menelaus4 and,
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consequently, is not truly good. Yet to the degree that his name
alludes to the Good, Agathon represents the Good. Agathon's house
is Socrates' destination, even as the Good is the destination of all
lovers.5
Plato's word play, therefore, ought to open the readers' eyes to
possible erotic overtones in the ordinary phrases of the prologue. But
as readers pursue these overtones, they ought not to allegorize the
text, i.e., to turn the possible erotic overtones into the chief aim of
exegesis of the text. The overtones, to shift the metaphor slightly, are
4Socrates' cites Apollo's rebuke of Menelaus in Iliad 17 as
proof that Menelaus was an inferior warrior, even though the rest of
the Iliad and the context of Apollo's speech does not support that
evaluation. Dover, Symposium, 82, aptly notes: "A Greek citing
poetry seldom takes notice of the context in which the words were
uttered, by whom, to whom, or (most important of all) for what
purpose."
5Here I assume that the Good is either to be identified with
Beauty or, though distinct from Beauty, to be closely associated with
it. White, 149-157, has challenged those who assume that Plato
identifies Beauty with the Good. White notes that Diotima does not
equate the two in 204e1-3, but substitutes the Good for Beauty to
make it easier to get an answer from Socrates. As I argued on page
86, fn. 2, however, White is not entirely on the mark with his criticism.
The exchange of Beauty for the Good can be used to argue their
identity as well as their distinction. Furthermore, one must grant that
Plato is playing on the close connection between Beauty and the
Good; if the two terms are not identical, they are at least closely
related. The affinity of the two notions was already inherent in the
classical idiom of Ka:hos Kaya86s, the goal of nobility. What Plato
intends with that phrase is, to be sure, different from the aristocratic
ideal, even as the Platonic Socrates' concept of the pursuit of Beauty
differs from that of his contemporary society. Nonetheless, Plato
begins with the current idiom and finds it useful to discover in one
man, Agathon, both beauty (as is his attribute) and goodness (as is
derived from his name).
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like a faint harmony that is not meant to obscure the melody, but
rather to supplement and support it.
Thus, one ought not to expect an erotic overtone in every word
of the prologue that may be used to describe Eros later in the
dialogue. Sometimes the ordinary meaning of a word is so strong in a
particular context that it is difficult to let the word have any erotic
overtones without doing an injustice to the passage. Even when a
word does have an erotic overtone, we must remember that it is
merely an overtone, not the full melody of the dialogue.
In the rest of this chapter, we will examine individual words in
the prologue that have erotic overtones, especially in the light of the
rest of the dialogue. We will divide the discussion into two parts: First,
we will examine adjectives associated with Eros, as well as nouns that
describe the attributes of Eros; then, we will examine the verbs (and
deverbative nouns) which describe the actions of Eros. I have chosen
to divide the words into these two groups since it follows the pattern
laid down by Socrates and Agathon of first stating the qualities of Eros
(as best seen in adjectives) and of then stating the actions and
benefits of Eros (as can be best seen in the verbs). I have selected
the words below after examining those words in the prologue which
appear later in the dialogue. 6 Then, I removed from consideration
such words as

Tip~nv

(172a2, 175e6, 213e4),

Tiai~c.uv

(172a4 and

216e4), and aµa (172a4, 173b9 and seventeen times in the rest of

61 was aided in this endeavor by the Thesaurus Linguae
Graecae.
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the dialogue) that have at best a tangential connection to the
dialogue's central theme, 7 so that the words discussed below will be
the clearest examples of words with philosophical or erotic overtones.
The six adjectives we will examine are KaA6s, cpavAos, µtKp6s,

&8.Atos, veos, and µa.AaK6s. All of them describe attributes that Eros
seeks to possess or to avoid. Then we will examine thirteen verbs.
Five of the verbs ((3ovAEa6at, sflTELV, 11vveavEa8at, Sta11vveavEa6at,
and ayEtv) refer to Eros' longing and search for Beauty. Two verbs
?some words which I have omitted, most notably o(Katos, may
have some significance for the dialogue's exposition of Eros, but are
too tangential or insubstantial to justify inclusion in this study.
Nonetheless, a case can be made for understanding the word
8tKa t6TaTos in 172b5ras a word that echoes ideas raised elsewhere
in the dialogue, since the dialogue does concern itself to a fair degree
with issues of justice. Eryximachus argues that Eros accomplishes
the good with sobriety and justice (8tKatoavvns, 188d6). Agathon
avers that Eros makes the laws just (196c3). Socrates, meanwhile,
states that the most beautiful of thoughts that Eros can beget is the
concern for the matters of the state, which is called sobriety and
justice (209a8). He also argues that by seeking Absolute Beauty, one
discovers the beauty of laws, which is a greater beauty than that of
bodies (21 Oc2-6).
Given the dialogue's preoccupation with justice, the word
8tKat6TaTos in 172b5 gains new importance. There Glaucon tells
Apollodorus, "It would be most fair for you to report the words of your
friend." (otKOLOTOTOS yap ET TOVS TOU ETa(pov .A6yovs a11ayyeAELV.
On the idiomatic use of otKat6TaTos, see Dover, Symposium, 78.)
Because Socrates' speech can assist Glaucon in the pursuit of
Beauty, Apollodorus is duty-bound to narrate it. Although Apollodorus
may not technically be the most proper man (8tKat6TaTos) to narrate
the symposium to Glaucon--he was not present when the dialogue
was first told and is relating it years after the event--his acquaintance
with Socrates and his circle makes it incumbent upon him to narrate
the dialogue. To the degree that he is an erotic being moved by
Beauty, he is the proper Oust) man to narrate the dialogue.
·
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(ooKe'i'v, o'lea8at) explain the middle state of Eros, while three describe

his ultimate goal (eioevat, Ka8opav, avve'lvat). Finally, three verbs
describe the way in which Eros-driven men reach their goal
(TVyxavetv, xap(l;ea8at, and otacpevyetv).

Allusions to Eros and Erotic Processes
in Adjectives. Adverbs. and Nouns Derived from Adjectives
Adjectives of Beauty and its Antonyms
KaA6s and its cognates. If Eros is associated with one adjective

above all others, it is the word KaA6s. Whether the guests state that
Eros is himself KaA6s or makes things KaAa or seeks after KaA6v,
they always associate Eros with To KaA6v or To KaAAos. Phaedrus
argues that the goal of life is to live beautifully or nobly (KaA&s
(3tc.0aea8at, 178c6), which Eros more than any other force leads one

to do (178c7). Pausanias, however, states that nothing is KaA6v in
itself, but the manner in which something is done determines if it is
KaA6v or not (181 a2). Thus, Pausanias endeavors in his speech to

find the Eros that is truly KaA6s (181 a5). Agathon says that Eros is
KaAAtaTos (195a7-b3), while Socrates states that Eros seeks To
KaA6v but does not himself possess To KaAAos (200e2-201 c5).

How are we to translate KaA6s? When KaA6s describes a visible
object or person, it usually means "beautiful"; in other contexts,
however, KaA6s can mean "honorable" or "noble."

Because the

encomiasts of Eros are largely concerned with human bodies, the
most common translation of KaA6s in the dialogue will be "beautiful."
The other nuances of the word, however, are not to be forgotten. As
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Warner aptly notes, "the usual translation, 'beautiful' is too narrow; for
the beauty in question can not only be physical but also moral, where
a word like 'noble' or 'fine' would be more in place; indeed, the word,
can be used in certain contexts even more generally to mean
'admirable' or even 'good'."8

Moreover, as Dover notes, KaA6s

"expresses a favorable reaction" to a person, object, or idea. "This
word, when applied to a person, means 'beautiful', 'pretty',
'handsome', 'attractive', and its antonym is aicrxp6s, 'ugly'. The words
are also applied to objects, sights, and sounds and whatever can be
heard about and thought about, such as an institution, an
achievement or:Aailure, or a virtuous or vicious action." Here KaA6s
means "'admirable', 'creditable', 'honorable"' and its antonym

aicrxp6s means "'disgraceful', 'repulsive', 'contemptible'."9 Since the
ancient Greeks did not differentiate between the grandeur of beauty,
honor, and nobility, the possessor of any of the three was KaA6s. If we
use "beautiful" to describe what the Greeks called KaA6s, we must
remember that a Greek could use aesthetic terms to describe ethical
decisions. 1O

Swarner, 164.
9Dover, Symposium, 2. Cf. Nehemas, xxvii.
1OLexique de Platon, s.v. KaA6s (277), gives the range of
meanings: As an adjective, KaA6s means "beautiful," whether
physically or morally. As a substantive, it can mean "physical beauty,"
"honor," "moral good or duty," or "the Idea of beauty." Similarly,
KaAAos, as Lexique de Pia ton, 276, notes, can be taken in a physical,
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Not surprisingly, the prologue shows as much preoccupation
with beauty as the body of the dialogue does. Socrates has become
beautiful (ouTcu Ka.hos yeyevnµevos, 174a5) so that he may go as a
handsome man (Ka.A6s) to a handsome man (KaA6v, 174a9). By
having Socrates beautify himself and use the vocabulary of beauty,
Plato has already hinted at what a major topic of the dialogue will be,
namely, beauty. This is especially made apparent to the reader when
Plato states that Socrates rarely preoccupied himself with becoming
beautiful, at least not as far as physical hygiene was concerned
(174a4).11
It is not, however, solely physical beauty with which the

prologue concerns itself: Wisdom, too, is characterized as beautiful.
Socrates is the first to hint at this truth, when he with some irony calls
Agathon's wisdom KaAfi (175e2).

Although Socrates can be

moral, or metaphysical sense. H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, eds. A Greek
English Lexicon, 9d ed., rev. H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), , s. v. KaA6s, 870, includes the
following definitions:
"beautiful, of outward form, freq. of
persons; ... .freq. of parts of the body, fair, shapely, ... with ref. to use,
good, of fine qua/ity, ... of sacrifices, auspicious; .. .in a moral sense,
beautiful, noble, honorable." Hence "To Ka.A6v, moral beauty, virtue,
honor." The adverb Ka.Aws is usually translated "well," not
"beautifully," even though the adjectival form Ka.A6s can be translated
"good" or "beautiful." The affinity between the two concepts
expressed by KaA6s can be seen in colloquial English, where
"beautiful" can substitute for "good."
11 Friedlander, 3:5, notes that the narration of the symposium
begins with a discussion of beauty, much as the Hippias Major, which
also is concerned with beauty, begins with the words, "Hippias the
beautiful."
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understood merely to be referring to Agathon's ability to craft beautiful
words, this is not Socrates' point, since he argues in his encomium
that ideas themselves can possess Ka.A.hos (21 Ob6-c6). By praising
the wisdom of Agathon, Socrates has introduced into the dialogue the
notion that wisdom may be judged by the criterion of

To Ka.A.hos.

This notion that wisdom (and thus ethics and discourse) can be
judged by the criterion of beauty is carried forth in two other instances
in the prologue. Eryximachus, when hearing that the crowd will not
overdrink, says that Pausanias has spoken Ka.Aws (176b2). Later,
Socrates states that the goal of the evening's discourse will be to
speak sufficiently and beautifully (iKavws Ka\ Ka.Aws; 177e4).
Although both occurrences of Ka.Aws are idiomatic and almost
formulaic, they do allude to the beauty desired by Eros: In both cases
an act of speaking is judged to be beautiful because of its contents.
Pausanias has spoken beautifully because he has urged the virtue of
moderation. Similarly, Socrates describes a beautiful encomium as
one that covers the material sufficiently.
Although all of these uses of Ka.A6s and its cognates can be
understood apart from Socrates' theory of beauty, they receive their
full import when understood in the light of the Ascent to Beauty
outlined by Socrates. The search for beauty takes place everywhere;
even the most unerotic men are always searching for beauty.
Although beauty can be found in many items, the beauty discovered
by the mind (e.g., wisdom, good laws) is superior to that observed by
the senses.
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Thus, even the most ordinary uses of KaA6s in the prologue
remind the reader of the quest for Absolute Beauty. Aristodemus, by
choosing to come to the symposium, is told that he has acted
beautifully (KaA&s ... not&v; 174e12). Although that phrase can be
understood to mean simply "I'm glad you came," it does express a
philosophical truth: By coming to the symposium, Aristodemus has
been guided by and to Beauty: Aristodemus, moved by the same
beauty which moved Socrates (cf 174c7}, has been led to undertake
a noble task, namely, coming to the house where Beauty will be
seen .12 It is not Aristodemus' crashing of the party in itself that is
beautiful, but rather his intention to get a glimpse of Beauty. Though
Agathon believes that he is the beauty which moves all his guests to
come to the party, Socrates will reveal that there is a higher Beauty.
Thus, Agathon's words mean more than he realizes.

In a similar

fashion, Agathon's words els KaAov flKets, ''you have come at a
beautiful time"(174e5), ring truer than Agathon realizes. Given the
evening's discussion, Aristodemus has come at a more beautiful time
than Agathon can know at the time he utters those words.

q>avAos and its synonyms. To appreciate the Beauty revealed in
the dialogue, one must by implication avoid what is "base" or "ugly".
Thus, <pavAos and its synonyms contrast with the Beauty yearned for
by Eros. As Pausanias argues, there are two ways of loving: there is
an Eros that loves KaA&s (181a3) and there is a love which base men
12LSJ, s.v. KaA&s 5 (p 870) translates the idiom KaA.ro~ 7toirov
as "rightly, deservedly."
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(q>avAot, 181b2) employ. Socrates adopts the distinction, but for a
different purpose: Whenever Eros finds Absolute Beauty, everything
else appears q>avAov (211 e4).13
Since the lover seeks to possess Beauty, he is forced to
confront whether or not there is any ugliness in himself .14 In the

13Dover, Symposium, 2, notes that the opposite of KaA6s is
generally aiaxp6s. Cf. LSJ, s.v. KaA6s Ill 2 (p 870), which cites
Symposium 183d, where Pausanias distinguishes between KaA6v
and aiaxp6v actions. q>avAos, in contrast, means "mediocre" or
"undistinguished" (Dover, Symposium, 82) and can also mean
"'useless,' 'bad'." As such, q>avAos is the opposite of "any favorable
evaluative term." LSJ, s.v. q>avAos (1919-1920) includes the following
definitions: "cheap, easy, slight, paltry, ... simple, ordinary... but freq.
with sense poor indifferent, ... mean, common;... inefficient, bad.
Lexique de Platon (553) defines q>avAos in the following way: "a)
(choses) 'mediocre, futile' (adj. et subst. n.); b) (personnes) mauvais
mechant (adj. et subst. m.)." Lexique de Platon adds that q>avAos can
be used as an antonym for aya86s: "ev µ6vov e~etv TovTo aya86v,
TclAAa exwv ... q>avAa H[ippias] m[inor] 372b2" and 1TOAAclKlS µev
aya8ou OVAfJTOU q>aUAOS av Cx1TE[3f), lTOAAclKlS 8' av q>avAov aya86s
Pr. 327c2-3."
11

14Throughout the dialogue, but especially in Socrates' speech,
the notion of possessing (exetv) beauty is ill-defined. Sometimes it
refers to the enjoyment of a beauty outside oneself (sense A), while
other times it refers to possession of beauty by one's own self (sense
B). By ignoring the ambiguity of that phrase, Socrates can assert that
only those who do not possess beauty seek beauty. Socrates ignores.
that one could have beauty oneself (sense B) while seeking to enjoy
the beauty of another person (sense A). Cf. Anderson, 66.
Nussbaum, 177-179, explains the ambiguity by noting that Plato is
stating that the lover does not have a particular instance of beauty
(i.e., the beloved). Since Plato assumes that "all beauty, qua beauty,
is uniform" (Nussbaum, 179), then lack of a beloved's beauty implies
that the lover lacks all beauty. Cf. Allen, 100; Dover, Symposium, 136.
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prologue, therefore, we discover two men pondering that question.
Aristodemus thinks of himself as cpavAos, resembling Menelaus who
went to the banquet of his superior brother, Agamemnon (174c7).
Likewise, Socrates claims that his wisdom is cpavATJ (175e3) and,
therefore, he has gone to the house of the brilliant Agathon. Both
occurrences of the word cpavAos can be understood in a nontechnical sense, but the word also explains the status of both men as
erotic beings, that is, people who are cpavAot but long to be KaAoL
Both Socrates and Aristodemus recognize that they do not possess
Beauty; thus they call themselves cpavAot, even though they know of a
greater beauty than Agathon does.15
To recognize one's ugliness is a wretched experience, but the
truly wretched (&6Atot), according to the prologue, are those who do
not recognize their lack of beauty. Hence the adjective &6Atos is
applied to those people who have not yet undertaken the Ascent to
Beauty--first to Apollodorus in his pre-philosophical stage of life
(173a2) and then to his friends who pursue business rather than
philosophy (173d6).

Such people live uninterested in the

philosophical life and, consequently, are still in the wretched state in
which Eros begins but does not intend to stay. Thus, the reader must

15Cf. Mitchell, 169: "If greatness is to be measured in
monuments of stone, law, thought--which is what all our instincts
guide us to take for greatness, or beauty, itself--then 'paltry' is the last
word on Socrates. And if, in spite of that, we insist on finding some
greatness in Socrates, then we must leave aside forever the 'Socratic
enigma' and busy ourselves with writing books on 'the philosophy of
Socrates'."
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distinguish between being cpavAos, where one is far removed from

To

KaAAos, and being a6ALos, a state in which one does not recognize

that he is cpavAos .16
In light of the derogatory adjectives applied to those who lack
beauty, the adjective aµLKp6s, which describes Aristodemus (173b2),
carries new weight.17 It is not merely a description of his height, but
of his intellectual stature and progress on the Ascent to Beauty. For
as Socrates portrays the objects of beauty, each new object makes
the previous one appear aµLKp6v (21 Ob-c).18 Thus, it is significant
that the only physical description given of Aristodemus--besides his
shoelessness--is that he is aµLKp6s. It indicates to the reader that
Aristodemus, though a pupil of Socrates as his shoelessness
indicates, is inferior to his teacher in discerning the greater objects of
beauty. Thus, the smallness of Aristodemus' stature becomes a
metaphor for his philosophical stature.

16LSJ, s.v. a SA Los, 32, defines the word as "struggling,
wretched, miserable," in both a moral and non-moral sense. Cf.
Lexique de Platon s.v. a6ALOS, 14.
17LSJ s.v. µLKp6s (1133) observes that µLKp6s can refer to the
size, quantity, or amount of importance given to an object or person.
When µLKp6s is applied to people it can be derogatory, as in Ar. Ran.
709 and Pl. Prt. 323d.
1BAs Dover, Symposium, 155, aptly translates aµLKp6v:
"'trivial', 'of no account'."
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Other Adjectives
veo~.

The seemingly innocent remark in the prologue about the

recentness (vewaT(, 172c1) of the symposium alludes to the
questions of youth and age that dominate the dialogue. Glaucon
assumes that the symposium must have taken place recently
(vewaT(, 172c1 ), even as Agathon in his speech assumes that Eros
must be young (veos, 195a8-c7).19 Glaucon and Agathon make
these assumptions because they do not believe that something old
would be of much interest, as the symposium and Eros are. Agathon
argues that, since Eros is beautiful, he must be one of the youngest of
the gods (195a8-196a1 ).

Likewise, Glaucon assumes that the

symposium must have been recent and Apollodorus must be an
eyewitness of the symposium if his account is to have any validity; for
this reason, Glaucon's first question about the symposium is whether
or not Apollodorus was present at it (172b7).
Not every person in the dialogue agrees with the emphasis on
youth. Phaedrus states that Eros must be one of the oldest of the
gods, because the antiquity of Eros gives him greater honor. His
greater age makes him more responsible for all the benefits that
befall mankind (178c2). Meanwhile, Socrates steers a middle course
between Phaedrus and Agathon. Since Eros is neither beautiful nor
ugly, he is neither immortal nor mortal. On the same day he can die
and reinvigorate himself (203d8-e3). Thus, he is neither young nor
19As LSJ s.v. veos observes, the word can have not only the
sense of ''young," but also that of ''youthful."
·
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old, but both. Since he longs for the beautiful, he is old while seeking
to be young. Like all lovers, Eros is inspired by the beauty of youth, for
only by gazing at beautiful young bodies can a person beget
offspring, whether literally or mentally (209b1; 210a5). Pregnancy (of
both kinds) is the chief way in which a person is made new again since
children and ideas carry on the names of their creators forever.
Through begetting (207d3) and regeneration (207d7) Eros makes
new what was old (208b1 ).20
It is this Socratic concept of youth that explains why Glaucon is
pleased with Apollodorus' narration, even though the symposium is
not a recent event (i.e., one that had taken place vewaT[, 172c1) and
its narrator is not an eyewitness.

The symposium has not

deteriorated with age because narration has kept it alive and young.
Even as all pieces of knowledge are kept eternally alive and retain
their youthful vigor through practice (208a4-7), so the symposium is
kept alive and young through its continued transmission by narration.
Each time the symposium is narrated it replaces the old narration with
a newer, fresher one (208a7-b2). Thus, the dialogue is truly "new" or
20Since Socrates places the conception of Eros at Aphrodite's
birthday party, his mythology of the origins of Eros reflects a middle
stance between Agathon and Phaedrus. On the one hand, Socrates
agrees with Agathon that Eros is not one of the oldest of the gods. His
conception takes place after the revolt against Uranus and the
ascension of either Cronus or Zeus to the throne of the deities
(depending upon whether Socrates is following the Hesiodic or
Homeric account of the origin of Aphrodite). On the other hand,
Aphrodite is not one of the more recent gods, e.g., Dionysus; thus,
Eros cannot be a very recent god, either. Thus, Eros is neither a
primeval deity nor one of the more recent gods.
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"young," in the sense that Socrates understands the term. Since
regeneration is an erotic process, the narration is necessarily a
manifestation of Eros.21
uaAaK6s.

In a similar way, a "Socratic" understanding of

softness explains in what sense Apollodorus can deserve the
nickname "softy" (µa Aa Kos, 173d8)22 and in what sense this
appellation makes Apollodorus a truly erotic character.

As

Apollodorus' friends observe, the nickname does not fit his habit of
railing against everyone (173d8-10); Apollodorus is usually not a
"softy." In Agathon's way of looking at Eros, this would indicate an
anti-erotic tendency in Apollodorus: Eros and those possessed by
him must be soft, since Eros dwells only in the softest regions of the
body and in the softest of people (195e3, 195e7-8). In the Socratic
understanding, however, Eros and his followers do not possess
"softness" or any of the qualities ascribed to Beauty, but rather long
for them or possess them intermittently (203c6-e5):

Eros is not

supple (anaA6s) and beautiful (KaA6s), but hard (aKAfJp6s), squalid

21 By examining this one word, we have confirmed the
conclusion reached in the second chapter, namely, that narration is a
process whereby Eros works in men to obtain a glimpse of Absolute
Beauty.
22The reading µaAaK6s is to be preferred to µavLKOS, since the
former is the lectio difficilior. As Paganelli, 195-196, notes, µaAaK6s
acquired a vulgar meaning in Byzantine Greek and was, accordingly,
amended. When applied to persons, µaAaK6s can mean "soft" in the
sense of "mild" or "gentle" or in the sense of "cowardly," "morally
weak," "lacking in self control," as LSJ, 1077, notes.
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(avxµnp6s), shoeless (avvTI68nTos), and homeless (aotKos); when
he finds good fortune, he flourishes; other times, he dies, but always
to come back alive. To the degree that Apollodorus has a softer and a
harsher side, he illustrates the position of the lover, not the
possessor, of beauty.
Allusions to Eros and Erotic Processes
in Verbs and Deverbative Nouns
Eros' Quest
§ouAEa8at. Since Eros implies desire, the dialogue often uses
[3ouAEa8at as a synonym for Epav. This interchange of terms is most
strikingly illustrated by Socrates in 199e6-200e6, where ETit8uµEtv
and [3ovAEa8at are used as synonyms for the verb Epav, to avoid
using the definiendum in the definition.23 The three verbs differ from
one another, to be sure, but in quantity or intensity, not quality:
[3ovAEa8at and ETit8vµEtv denote less intense longings than Epav.24
Thus, [3ovAEa8at ought to be treated as a loose equivalent to
Epav, even when it occurs in the prologue. Significantly, the four times
that this word is used in the prologue it establishes a choice among

23Similarly, Aristophanes in defining Eros says that the split.
halves always desire ([3ovAovTat) to spend time with one another
(192c4) and want ([3ovAEa8E) to be united or forged together (192d4).
24LSJ, 325, translates [3ovAoµat inter alia as "will," "wish," "like"
and eTit8vµec.u (p 634) "'set one's heart upon a thing, long for, covet,
desire." Dover, Symposium, 135, cites Lysis 207de as evidence for
the interchangeability of [3ovAEa8at and ETit8uµEl'v. See also Allen, 56.
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various objects of desire. The men who want to indulge in drink are
allowed to do so (176e5) and the flute girl can play to whomever she
wants (176e7); but the desires of neither group will influence the
behavior of the rest of the assembly. They, instead, will be willing, i.e.,
will desire, to pass the time through words about Eros {176e9; 177a1).

CnTetv. Because Eros does not possess what he desires, he
must constantly seek it. Thus, i;11Tetv (seeking)25 is an important
erotic action, even if the guests at the symposium do not agree on the
object of Eros' search. According to Aristophanes, Eros makes one
seek one's other half, both when people were first split in half (191 b3)
and now (191d5). Diotima, however, avers that men do not seek their
other halves {205e1 ), but Eros makes men seek KaTa To ovvaTov

ae( Te eTvat Kal a86:vaTos (207d1 ). Therefore, men seek beauty in
order that they might beget in beauty (209b2). If a lover is noble
enough to love the beauty of the soul, he will be content to seek
beautiful words, ideas, and souls rather than beautiful bodies (21 Oc2).
Since Eros seeks Absolute Beauty above all, Socrates' Ascent to
Beauty is aptly described as his standing still while seeking (i;11Twv,
210c5).
In the prologue the verb l;11Tetv occurs twice: Glaucon seeks
Apollodorus {172a7) and Agathon has sought Aristodemus the
previous day (174e7). In the first case, Glaucon seeks Apollodorus

25"Seeking" is the root meaning of the word, but it can bear a
number of connotations: "search after, search out," "inquire into,
investigate," "seek after, desire," as LSJ s.v. SllTEc.u, 756, notes.
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not because Apollodorus is beautiful but because he knows words
that lead to Beauty.

Agathon, meanwhile, in searching for

Aristodemus, is seeking his object of beauty, namely, the flattery of a
crowd. In both instances the search is an erotic one, since both men
are looking for the object they desire most.
Jivv8avea8at and 5taJivv8avea8at. Apollodorus' interlocutor
(172a1 ), as well as Glaucon (172a7) inquires about the dialogue
(Tivv8avea8e and 5taJiv8Ea8at,26 respectively). In 204e2, the only
other place in the dialogue that Tivv8avea8at occurs, Plato uses it to
refer to a philosophical inquiry; the question Socrates asks there
pertains directly to Eros--namely, what the goal of Eros is. Like all
philosophical questions, it is erotic, that is, a form of seeking after the
beauty of truth.

Likewise, the queries in the prologue are asked

because of Eros' influence on the questioners. They long for the
beauty of the dialogue and the Absolute Beauty portrayed therein.
The force of Eros behind the inquiry is especially underscored by
Glaucon's use of three verbs together, all of which are associated with
Eros: ef;fjTOVV (3ou.A6µevos 5taJiv8Ea8at (172a7). Glaucon wants
((3ou.A6µevos) something, which made him inquire (5taJiv8Ea8at) and
to search (el;f]Touv) for the person who could answer those queries.
ayetv. In Diotima's Ascent to Beauty, the pursuit of Absolute
Beauty is sometimes seen as an activity performed in isolation and

26oover, Symposium, 77, observes that the thoroughness of
the inquiry is seen not only in the Sta- prefix but in the aorist tense as
well. He translates the verb ''to get the whole story."
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other times as an endeavor undertaken with the help of another
person. Thus, the Ascent to Beauty is sometimes described as if the
individual progressed to Absolute Beauty in isolation (ievat brl TovTo
To Tipayµa, 210a5-6), other times as if he must be led by another to
Beauty {Tipos TCx epc.uTlKcl 1Tatoayc.uyn8ij, 210 e2; eav 6p8ws i]yiiTaL
6 i]yovµevos, 210a6-7), and still other times as if he can reach Beauty
only by leading another person to it (i.e., by adopting a beloved and
discussing beautiful matters With him: evos avTov awµaTOS epav Kat
evTavea yevvav A6yovs KaAovs, 210a7-8). As 210a6-8 reveals, a
lover can apparently have both an i]yovµevos and epwµevos. The
i]yovµevos instructs him in matters of Eros, which he puts into practice
with his epwµevos.27 Thus, the Ascent to Beauty can be undertaken
in isolation or with the help of another: TovTo yap of) eaTt To 6p8ws
ElTt Tel epc.uTlKcl ievat

Ti UTT' aAAov ayea8at (211 b7-c1 ).

Both possibilities are demonstrated in the prologue. Socrates
leads Aristodemus to Agathon, who with his good looks exemplifies
an aspect of Beauty (174c8). The prologue also shows Socrates
pursuing Absolute Beauty by standing alone in contemplation on a
nearby porch. He forgets that he was leading Aristodemus; in fact,

27oover, Symposium, 155, resolves the tension between the
seeker of Beauty as lover and beloved by implying that at the
beginning of the ascent the man is the epwµevos, but in the later
stages of the ascent, the epaaTTJS. This is not entirely an adequate
explanation, since even the young man is a lover, who pursues
beautiful bodies (210a6-7). See Anderson, 61, and the discussion in
the previous chapter, 119, fn. 52.
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Socrates himself must be led into Agathon's house by Aristodemus
(174e8) and a servant (175a3).
Hence the prologue reveals to us that, no matter how erotic a
process leading another to beauty is, the final steps to Absolute
Beauty must be taken in isolation. The prologue, thus, confirms two
impressions Diotima gives in her outline of the Ascent to Beauty.
First, Diotima's doubt that Socrates would be able to grasp Ta TEAea
Kal eTioTITtKa (21Oa1) is not meant to insult his intelligence--even

though she has reproved him throughout her discourse for holding
erroneous ideas. Rather, she recognizes that she can instruct him
only so far in Eros and Beauty. He must discern for himself the Beauty
beyond the beauty of bodies, laws, and thoughts. Whether or not he
will succeed is beyond her ability to predict. Second, the prologue
confirms the impression that Diotima has intentionally omitted any
mention of another person's presence at the sight of Absolute Beauty.
Although a man may discuss beautiful ideas with his beloved or use
the beauty of his beloved to spur himself to a higher beauty, the vision
of Absolute Beauty cannot be shared since it cannot be described as
the beauty of gold or clothes can {211 d3-5). Leading another person
to Beauty is an erotic activity, but the true lover of Beauty cannot lead
a pupil or beloved to the last stage of his quest.
Eros' Middle State
8oKelv.

To illustrate the middle state in which Eros exists,

Diotima uses the analogy of

86~a

in the realm of knowledge.

A6~a

or
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TO 6p8a 8o~ai;ELV Kal aveu TOV EXELV A6yov 8ovvaL (202a5) is not

the same as ignorance or knowledge. Knowledge requires that a
person be able to give an account of how he knows what he knows.
Yet a person who knows something that is true, but cannot explain
why it is true, still knows something. He cannot be described as
ignorant. Thus, the realm of seeming and supposing

(86~a)

is a

middle state between ignorance (aµa8(a) and wisdom (ao<p(a or
ETILaTfiµTJ). Like all people in the middle state, a possessor of 86~a

can be spurred on to attain the higher level, in this case, to proceed
from a right opinion to knowledge.28
To the experienced reader of the Symposium, then, the
opening sentence, LloKc:0 µoL lTEpl WV 1Tvv8avea8e OUK aµEAETTJTOS
eTvaL (172a1-2) is pregnant with meaning. As we have already seen,

making an inquiry is a process associated with Eros, since it is
through a search inspired by Beauty that one can raise an item of the
middle state

(86~a)

to the higher level (eTILCJTfiµTJ). Likewise, practice

(µeAeTav, reflected in the adjective aµeAETTJTOS in 172a1) is an act of

Eros, since it is through practice that one retains knowledge (208a45). Only through practice does a daemonic person, that is, a person

28As LSJ s.v. 8oKec.u, 442, notes, the root meaning of 8oKec.u is
"expect," as its etymology reveals. It is the iterative of 8eKoµaL (cf.
8exoµa L). From this it derives two primary meanings: "think,
suppose, imagine" and "seem." Similarly, 86~a has the primary
meaning of "expectation," from which "notion, opinion, judgment"
(LSJ, 444) is derived. Cf. Lexique de Platon, s.v. 8oKel'v and 86~a,
143-146.
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in the middle state, ascend to the higher realm, since the force of
forgetfulness drives out knowledge almost as quickly as he has
acquired it.

To add to the erotic overtones of Tivv8avea8e and

aµeAETTJTOS, the sentence begins with 8oKw. Specifically, this word

reminds the reader of the intermediate character of the dialogue: The
dialogue may lead to knowledge, since it describes how one is to
pursue Beauty, but the dialogue is not itself Beauty. Thus, Plato
shows the intermediate nature of the dialogue by casting aspersions
upon its narrator: Apollodorus seems to be a competent narrator, but
we cannot be certain that he actually is.29
This doubt raised in the prologue's first sentence is
underscored by its last sentence. There Apollodorus states that he
will narrate those items that seem most memorable to him (& 8E
µaALaTa Kal WV e8o~E µoL a~LOµVT)µOVEVTOV, 178a3); whether or not

in fact they are cannot be determined. Though one could argue on
this basis that the dialogue is untrustworthy, the reader ought to be
encouraged by the fact that an opinion

(86~a)

is by definition correct,

even though the holder of it can give no explanation for its
correctness. Thus, Aristodemus may indeed have chosen the most
noteworthy speeches, but may not understand why that is the case. 30
29Lexique de Platon, 143, defines 8oKe'i'v in this sense as
"'paraitre' (par opposition a 'etre')."
30There are other times 8oKetv appears in the prologue (173b4,
174d5, 175b4, 176g5, 176e5, 177g4, 177g7, 177d1 [avv8oKet],
177d2), but the word does not allude to the more philosophical sense
as found in these two passages. As we examine the philosophical or
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oteaea t. Closely related to the notion of opinion and
appearance

(56~a)

is that of supposing (o'lea6at). Suppositions are

not necessarily false. They can serve as the point of departure for
acquiring knowledge (207a6). They can be the source for
thus, the impetus to turn the

56~a

56~a

and,

into knowledge. Sometimes men

are absolutely correct in their suppositions. The supposition that one
has a lack, for example, leads one (rightly) to seek to fill that lack
(204a6-7). Moreover, men beget children on the supposition that
they are creating for themselves immortality, eternal memory, and
happiness (208e5); in truth, they are, according to Diotima. In this
vein, Diotima asks Socrates to speculate on the bliss of seeing
Absolute Beauty; since Socrates has not yet seen Absolute Beauty,
she asks if Socrates supposes that her description is true, (211 d8;
e4).

Since the dialogue as a whole presumes that Diotima's

description is correct, Socrates would be right to make the
supposition Diotima asks him to make.
Nonetheless, a few of the suppositions made by the characters
in the body of the dialogue and all of the suppositions in the prologue
are wrong; in this respect, a supposition is lower than a true opinion
(o6~a),

which by definition is true. When Socrates is ignorant about

the middle state, he supposes that Eros must be beautiful since the
erotic uses of common words, we are not arguing that every
occurrence of a word sometimes used philosophically must have a
philosophical or erotic meaning in the prologue. Rather, we are
arguing that there are several words and phrases that have
overtones of the philosophical and erotic when they are read in light of
the entire dialogue.
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only two possibilities are for Eros to be beautiful or ugly (201 e1 O); his
supposition is wrong.

Mere supposition lies behind the

misconceptions of Socrates and others, like Agathon, who believe
that Eros is supple and beautiful (203c7) and loves beauty rather than
begets in beauty (206e3). In the prologue, Apollodorus supposed
that he was doing too many important activities to be bothered by
philosophy, but he has since learned that he was mistaken (173a1-2).
His friends make the same suppositions about Apollodorus that he
once wrongly made about philosophy, namely, that philosophy makes
one a wretch (173d2). Yet, though Apollodorus supposes (o'loµat)
that his friends are correct in their criticism of him, he knows (o1oa)
that he is correct in his criticism of them (173d2-3). Thus, although
suppositions are sometimes true in the body of the dialogue, they are
always false in the prologue.
Why is this the case? If a supposition can be a form of opining
and opining can lead to knowledge, why does the prologue view all its
suppositions in a negative light? The answer is that a supposition can
be a manifestation of ignorance rather than an intuitive apprehension
of knowledge. If one is to make any progress in ascending to Beauty,
one must not equate any and every supposition (o'lea0at) with right
opinion

(o6~a).

For, as Socrates has discovered with the help of

Diotima, there are many suppositions about Eros that are wrong.
Nonetheless, since supposition and opinion characterize
people in a daemonic (middle) state, the suppositions and opinions of
the characters of the prologue demonstrate how akin to Eros they are.
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Apollodorus, for example, states that he supposed that he ought to
pursue everything but philosophy (173a1-2). Apollodorus was wrong
in supposing that philosophy had nothing to offer him, but
Apollodorus' search for something that would bring meaning to his life
was not wrong. Indeed, it demonstrated to him a truth, namely, that
he had to pursue something. His supposition erred only in that it
excluded philosophy as a worthy pursuit.
Eros' Goal

e\oeva L. As we have observed, a person who has acquired
knowledge (bnaTi]µn) has arrived at the goal sought by Eros and all
daemonic beings; a person who has a mere opinion

(o6~a)

is still in

the state between ignorance and knowledge. Therefore, the reader
would do well to consider which characters in the prologue are said to
know something and what sort of knowledge they possess. 31 The
reader would also do well to consider the truth of anyone's claim to
knowledge. In this way, the reader will determine how to pursue the
knowledge that is associated with Absolute Beauty.
Apollodorus is presented as the expert in the prologue.
Glaucon says that, while his friend was unable to say anything clear
about the dialogue (ovoev ETxe aacpes AeyeLv, 172b4-5), Apollodorus

31 Strictly speaking, Plato does not use e\oevaL to describe the
knowledge of Absolute Beauty. Plato does use, however, a wide
variety of synonyms rather than any one particular word: aocp(a (202
a3), eTI(aTaa8aL (202a6), ETILaTi]µn (202a7), cpp6vnaLs (202a_9), and
µa8nµa (211 c7). See fn. 2 in this chapter.
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knows (aE ei8evat, 172b4) the contents of the dialogue. To the extent
that Apollodorus has mastered the dialogue, he has apprehended
Beauty.

Glaucon turns to him to acquire knowledge about the

dialogue because he is searching for Beauty, whether or not he is
conscious of this desire.
In turn, Apollodorus' goal is to know (ei8evat) everything that
Socrates does (172c6). Since Socrates is the perfect manifestation of
the erotic life, knowing Socrates leads to knowledge of Absolute
Beauty. That perception of true Beauty leads one to understand the
worth of various pursuits. Hence, Apollodorus knows for a fact (o18a)
that his friends are KaKa8a[µoves (1723d3-4). His friends may think

(fiyeTaee, 173d1) that he is wretched--as people who have not yet
ascended to Absolute Beauty they cannot know his condition for
certain--but Apollodorus knows for a fact the wretchedness of his
friends.
Ka8o~av.

Although Absolute Beauty is not the sort that can be

seen through human eyes, the metaphor of sight is most appropriate,
nonetheless, since it is through the eyes that most knowledge is
apprehended.32

It is also a fitting metaphor because beauty is

commonly thought of in physical terms. Thus, Socrates states that
the true lover's goal is to catch sight of (KaTt8ij) the one entaTi)µn .
which is of Beauty (210d7). Once a lover has glimpsed Absolute
Beauty, he does not wish to observe anything else (211 b6; e4).
32As LSJ s.v. e'l8c:.u, 483, notes, o18a is the perfect of the aorist
e18ov, the present e'l8c:.u being defective and replaced by 6pac:.u.
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The observation of Beauty, however, must be more than mere
sight of it. As Anderson has noted, the Eleusinian Mysteries required
the initiate to do more than view the ear of grain and the other
ETIOTITtKa.

He had to understand the significance of each object that

was shown. In the same way, the initiates into the mysteries of Eros
must not only view Absolute Beauty but be able to comprehend it. 33
The metaphor of sight for apprehension of Beauty clarifies the
beginning of the prologue when Glaucon catches sight of Apollodorus
(172a3). Even as the lover is overjoyed to catch sight of Absolute
Beauty, so Glaucon delights in catching a glimpse of Apollodorus.
Since Apollodorus will narrate the dialogue to him, Glaucon has in

33Anderson, 59. Anderson adds that Diotima works herself into
a corner with her argument. Although she has distinguished 86~a
from eTitaTiJµTJ by saying that the latter is the former with an
explanation, she herself cannot explain the Ascent to Beauty to
Socrates (210a1-2). Socrates, in turn, is convinced of the truth of the
argument (212b2: TIETIEtaµevos), but does not argue why it must be
so. Thus, argues Anderson, Socrates espouses a view of Eros and
Beauty that may be correct but cannot be proved with the certainty
demanded of eTitaTiJµTJ. Anderson's point is well taken, but he
overlooks how rarely in Plato's dialogues the character Socrates puts
the formula of ETitaTiJµTJ = 86~a +To exetv .A6yov 8ovvat into
practice. It is a convenient formula to trip up opponents, but not
always one he attempts to use for himself. Moreover, Socrates
recognizes the slipperiness of his own knowledge. He tells Agathon in
the prologue (175e2-4) that his own wisdom is fleeting and mediocre.
Though Socrates understands the value of the sight of Absolute
Beauty, he also knows that mortals are permitted only a passing
glance at it. Although sight of such beauty--even with understanding-is as great an apprehension of knowledge as mankind is permitted, it
certainly fails to measure up to the absolute knowledge implied by
Socrates' formula for eTitaTiJµTJ.
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effect caught a glimpse of Absolute Beauty itself when he espies
Apollodorus. For through Apollodorus, Glaucon--and the reader--is
instructed how to pursue Absolute Beauty.
avve\vat and its cognate avvova(a. Apollodorus and Glaucon

regularly refer to the symposium as a "gathering" (avvova(a): 172a7,
b7, c1; 173a4, b3. Eryximachus, likewise, uses avvova(a (176e2) and
i)µas OE OlCx .A6yc:uv a.A.Afi.Aots avvelvat TO Tf)µepov (176e8-9) to

describe the symposium. Ironically, the term avµTI6atov does not
appear in the dialogue, except in the title.
The word avvova(a, however, can refer to sex as well as to a
gathering of people, much as the English "intercourse" can refer
either to sex or to conversation.34 In fact, in the body of the dialogue
avvova(a is used several times to refer to sexual intercourse: 191 c7

and 192c5 (i} T&v acppoota(c:uv avvova(a) in Aristophanes' speech;
206c6 (i} yap avopos Kat yvvatKOS avvova(a TOKOS EOTLV} in
Socrates' speech. In this light, avve\vat and avvova(a in the prologue
receive new meaning. These words refer to an "intercourse" that is
erotic in nature, albeit not in a physical way. The erotic tone of these
words reinforces the Socratic notion that the search for noble ideas

34Cf. LSJ s.v. avvova(a I 1 and I 4 (p 1723) and s.v. avvetµt II 2
and 113 {p 1705). Cf. also Lexique de P/aton s.v. avvova(a 3c (p. 486)
and s.v. avve\vat 3 (p 481). The Oxford English Dictionary, 7:1094,
defines intercourse in its primary meanings as "communication to and
fro between countries" and "social communication between
individuals; frequent and habitual contact in conversation and· action."
Under the latter definition is included "sexual connexion."
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and, above all, Absolute Beauty is one undertaken by Eros and by
those under his sway.
Eros' Method

Tvyxavetv and its cognate EvTvyxavetv. The goal of Eros is
ultimately to obtain what he desires. Thus, the verbs Tvyxavetv and

EvTvyxavetv are often used in the dialogue to refer to the completion
of the erotic process. Eryximachus argues that the seasons change
because warm and cold acquire a longing for each other (npos

aAAf)Aa TOV Koaµiov TVXlJ EpC:.UTOS, 188a2-3). Agathon speaks of
Eros encountering (EvTVXlJ, 195e6) souls of all kinds, but then
withdrawing from the unlovely ones.35 Aristophanes argues that
Eros leads mankind to obtain (n'.rxc:.uµev, 193b1) the good things men
desire most. In particular, this means searching for and encountering
a person of the same gender as one's other half used to be (191 b4,
c5; 193c5, c7). Those who end their erotic quest by meeting (Evn'.rxlJ)
their other half are particularly fortunate (192b5-c2; cf. 192e5; 193c1 ).
Although Socrates denies Eros leads one to strive to meet one's other
half (TvyxavlJ; 205e2), he does believe that Eros attempts to meet
the object of its desire: A lover who encounters (Evn'.rxlJ) a noble soul
soon begets noble ideas with him (209b6-c2).36 Because Socrates
35Socrates picks up on this statement of Agathon, when he
speaks of Agathon meeting sensible men and the senseless crowd
(194c2-6).
36Similarly, 86~a in a sense stumbles upon (Tvyxavov) the
truth and so avoids the charge of ignorance (202a8).
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so exemplifies this pursuit of Absolute Beauty, he is like no other man
that Alcibiades has ever met (evTETVXTJK6Ta

eyw OUK &v

~µT)V

c'xv6pc~:nry:>

TotovTy:>

o'(y:>

TTOT' EVTVXEtv; 219d5-6).

Tvyxavetv and evTvyxavetv are derived from the noun TVXTJ,
i.e., "fortune," "fate," or "chance." Hence Tvyxavetv has as its root
meaning "happen to be"; from this arises the secondary meaning of
"gain one's end or purpose, succeed." Even the latter often has the
connotation of chance, being translated, "hit upon, light upon."37
Similarly, evTvyxavetv has the root meaning "light upon."38 At first
glance, then, these words seem inappropriate to describe the lover's
actualization of Beauty. Since the lover intentionally pursues Beauty,
he can hardly be said to obtain it or come across it by accident.
Nonetheless, there is something "accidental" about the acquisition of
beauty, especially Absolute Beauty. One can pursue it, but it does not
always manifest itself it to the beholder. One can be misled in his
pursuit into thinking that true beauty is found in one's other half (as
Aristophanes believes) or in youth (as Agathon believes). Even if one
avoids these pitfalls, there is no guarantee of success.

Diotima

doubts that Socrates will be able to reach the goal of the Ascent to
Beauty (21Oa1-2). Although she has described Eros' nature and
origin, his role in procreation, and his relationship to the Good and

37The definitions are taken from LSJ s.v. TVYXavc.u, 1832-1833.
38LSJ s. v. EVTVYXclVC.U, 578.
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immortality, she treats these matters as mere preface to the real truth
about Eros.
The ephemeral nature of the encounter with Absolute Beauty is
illustrated by Socrates' behavior in the prologue. He stands in deep
thought on the porch of Agathon's neighbor because he has gained a
glimpse of Absolute Beauty. Although this glimpse interferes with his
previous commitment to attend the banquet, Socrates cannot help
pursuing this glimpse of Absolute Beauty for as long as it reveals itself
to him. Aristodemus describes this process from an outsider's point of
view: Socrates stands alone wherever he chances to stand (evioTE

CxlTOOTCxS OlTOl av TVXlJ EOTT]KEV, 175b2) when he goes into deep
thought. In reality, it is the sight of Absolute Beauty, not Socrates,
which is erratic in appearing and disappearing at will; Socrates, as a
pursuer of this Beauty, is no more erratic in standing alone in deep
thought than Absolute Beauty is in revealing itself.
If Absolute Beauty is all too often perceived for a brief moment,
as chance dictates, lower forms of beauty are even more fleeting.
Thus, Apollodorus describes his life before his conversion to
philosophy as one of wandering aimlessly, wherever he chanced to
go (nEptTpExc.uv oTilJ wxotµt, 173a1).39 He had no specific direction
to life, since he had a poor understanding of the proper object of
desire. When he met Socrates, however, he at least had the benefit

39Cf. Pausanias' statement about Pandemic Eros in 181a7-b1:
'O µev o\'iv TTJS Tiav8i)µov 'Acppo8iTT]S ws aA.news n6:v8nµ6s EOTl
KOL E~Epyai;ETOl OTl av TVXlJ·
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of direction in his search for beauty. He may not have apprehended
Absolute Beauty, but at least he had begun to understand where it
was to be found.
Eros, then, does not always possess Beauty, but if it is
fortunate, it may chance upon it. This truth is reinforced by two other
incidents in the prologue where the terminology of "encounter'' refers
to a lover's acquisition of beauty. Aristodemus meets (evTvxe'lv)
Socrates washed up and wearing shoes (174a3). Aristodemus, the
chief lover {epaaTTJs, 173b3) of Socrates, chances upon the object of
his desire--one exhibiting a beauty he has rarely seen before.
Phaedrus, too, encounters (eveTuxov, 177b5) the object of his desire,
namely, a book of a wise man.40 Thus, in the prologue, too, the verbs

-rvyxaveLv and evTVYXaveLv allude to the fulfillment of erotic desire.41
xapi,ea8aL and its antonym BlacpevyeLv. The verb xapif;ea8aL
can refer to the way in which Eros arrives at his goal: He receives
some sort of gratification, where he receives the fulfillment of his
desire. Xapif;ea8aL can refer to any kind of gratification, whether
sexual, physical, emotional, or intellectual.42 Eryximachus uses the
word always in a non-sexual sense (186b9, c3-4; 187d6; 188c4),

40see pages 94-96.
41The occurrences of eTvyxavov in 172a1, 175c6, 195a3,
199b5, 206b3, 218d8, and 221a1 are outside our consideration,
since they are used with supplementary participles in an idiomatic
meaning.
42LSJ s.v. xapif;w, 1978.
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while Pausanias (e.g., 183d7; 184d3-4, e4; 185a1 -6; 185b5) and
Alcibiades (217a4; 218c1 O, d4-5) always use the word to refer to
sexual gratification only.
In his speech, Pausanias distinguishes between a base Eros
and a noble Eros (180c4-e1 ). It is shameful to gratify (xapisea6aL)
the lover moved by the former, but not the lover moved by the latter
(183e6-184a1). Therefore, the wise epwµevos will gratify the noble
lover and flee from the base lover.

To assist the epwµevos in

discerning whom to gratify, Pausanias examines the laws of various
states on gratification (182a7-184a2) and gives criteria to distinguish
noble and base lovers.43

Socrates accepts and elaborates on

Pausanias' distinction, without using the terminology of Pausanias
(i.e., xapisea6aL and oLacpevyeLv). He enumerates several objects of
desire, some nobler, some baser (208c1-209e4; 211 c1-d1 ). Though
he grants that the lovers of beautiful bodies are true lovers (205d1-8),
he urges the true lover to pursue the Beauty far above bodies,
clothes, and other objects (211d3-e4). Thus, Socrates, without using
the word "gratify," distinguishes between the objects of beauty to be
indulged in and those to be avoided.
The prologue underscores the true type of desire that is to be
gratified. The verb gratify (xapiaaa6aL) occurs only once there, but in
a significant place:

Eryximachus states that he wants to gratify

Phaedrus by having the guests offer encomia to Eros (177c6). The
43To be specific, Pausanias uses xapisea6aL in 182a3, b3, d1;
183d7, 184d3-4, e4; 185a 1-6, b5.
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speeches of the dialogue are erotic gratification. Indeed, they are the
only sort of gratification that Eryximachus finds acceptable; he has
already dismissed the flute girl and put restrictions on the
consumption of wine. Socrates, of course, consents to Eryximachus'
suggestion and thereby suggests that gratification, contra
Pausanias, need not be sexual.
The opposite of xap(l;Ecr8aL in Pausanias' speech is oLacpEvyELv
(184a2). Thus, when Socrates fled

(ou~cpvyov,

174a7) the crowd at

the victory party the day before, he was fleeing from the false desire
that enthralled Agathon.

Even as noble Eros or desire pursues

beauty through encomia, so base desire pursues it through
drunkenness and indulgence, as took place at Agathon's first party.
And this, above all else, must be avoided by the true lover.
Conclusion
It should not be surprising that in a dialogue devoted to Beauty
and its acquisition there will be words in its introduction that hint at the
themes to follow.

The presence of these words in the prologue

affirms Socrates' thesis that Eros is a universal force. Even if we grant
that each allusion to Eros in the prologue may be somewhat
insignificant in itself, it gains in significance, when it is considered with
other allusions to Eros. The whole of the vocabulary becomes greater
than the sum of its parts.
Each word with erotic overtones further supports the notion that
the drama of the prologue is philosophical and erotic. The drama is
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not meant merely as material to charm the non-philosophically
minded reader into reading the dialogue.

Instead, the prologue

demonstrates that the discourse about Eros is not far removed from
the affairs of ordinary life. Even as Socrates avers that Eros is to be
found in different forms throughout human experience, the prologue
demonstrates that Eros is a universal force. Eros' work is seen as the
characters in the prologue talk about beauty and ugliness, about
searching, inquiring, opining, gratifying, and a host of other activities.
Although not everything called beautiful in the prologue is truly
beautiful and not every activity associated with Eros is a fit pursuit of
Absolute Beauty, the pervasive vocabulary of Eros in the prologue
affirms that all men are lovers. Therefore, the dialogue is of interest to
all readers; all can benefit from analyzing their definitions of erotic
terms, as they compare their terminology of Eros with that of the
characters of the dialogue.

CHAPTER FIVE
EROS AT THE SYMPOSIUM:
THE PROLOGUE AND THE EPILOGUE
In the previous three chapters we examined how certain
elements of the prologue dramatize or hint at the influence of Eros: In
the second chapter we saw that Apollodorus' narration of the dialogue
is an Eros-driven activity, which despite all the weaknesses inherent
in Eros leads the reader to Beauty; in the third chapter we saw that
each of the characters in the prologue act erotically; in the fourth
chapter we saw that the prologue is filled with words that resonate
with the vocabulary of Eros. By now the reader of Plato's Symposium
ought to have come to expect that even the most seemingly ordinary
events and characters of the dialogue are influenced by Eros.
We ought not to be surprised, therefore, to find that the
symposium itself, that is, Agathon's banquet, is an exercise in erotics.
Ancient symposia by their nature were erotic events, where flute-girls
charmed the guests and homosexual love was rampant.1 Moreover,
if we adopt the broader definitions of Eros employed by Socrates,

1Walter Burkert, "Oriental Symposia: Contrasts and Parallels,"
(hereafter Burkert, "Symposia") in Dining in a Classical Context, ed.
William J. Slater (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991 ), 7,
12-13.
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even Agathon's symposium, where there is little indulgence in
sensual pleasure, is erotic.
Its eroticism is best seen by analyzing the prologue in light of the
epilogue, since these two parts of the dialogue contain the most
information about the setting of the symposium. The epilogue is the
last portion of the dialogue, comprising 212c4-223d12. (The term
epilogue, like prologue, is drawn from tragedy; it refers to the last
portion of a work.) The prologue and epilogue are distinguished from
the body of the dialogue in that they are not part of the series of
speeches praising Eros, but descriptions of events preceding and
following the encomia. Thus, the epilogue begins where Socrates'
speech ends, even as the prologue ends where Phaedrus' speech
begins.

Although the epilogue does include a speech, namely,

Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates, the subject matter is sufficiently
different to distinguish it from the speeches that make up the body of
the dialogue. Alcibiades' speech praises a man, not a god, and
contains more drama than the speeches in the body of the dialogue.2
Thus, it does not belong with the other six encomia, but marks the
beginning of the epilogue.
The epilogue consists of two parts: Alcibiades' encomium of
Socrates (212c4-222b7) and the break-up of the symposium (222c1 ".
223d12). It combines speech and drama. The speech, however, is
not merely abstract talk. It is full of drama, while underscoring the

2 Mitchell, 215-216, recognizing this, has characterized
Alcibiades' speech as a "satyr-play." The encomium form is kept, but
the object of the encomium has been changed.
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philosophical significance of the dramatic action of the dialogue-including the prologue. For although the speech ostensibly narrates
the behavior of Socrates, it is also a drama of Eros at work in one
individual. The qualities that Alcibiades describes as being present in
Socrates are precisely those Socrates describes as being present in
Eros.3
Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates is without doubt one of the
most dramatic of the speeches in the dialogue. No other speaker,
with the possible exception of Socrates, discusses to such a degree
the actions of the one lauded without lapsing into a list of his benefits
to mankind. Unwittingly following the pattern laid down by Socrates in
his encomium of Eros, Alcibiades is content to give a simple narration
of some characteristic events in the life of Socrates. 4 Alcibiades does
so without making overt philosophical statements about the gods,
human nature, passion, sexuality, and the like, as Socrates does.
Because of his intoxication, he is capable of little more than an
"honest" narration of select facts {215a2-3, d6-e1; 217e1-6).5

3Alcibiades is a self-professed expert on Eros; as Plutarch's Vit.
Ale. 16.2 reveals, Alcibiades had an emblem of Eros with a
thunderbolt on his shield. Cf. Bury, Iii, Ix.
4Cf. Kenneth Darter, "The Significance of the Speeches in
Plato's Symposium," Philosophy and Rhetoric 2 (1969): 232.
5Alcibiades' speech also receives greater weight because his
arrival is foretold in the prologue (172b1 ), but delayed until the
epilogue. See Friedlander, 3:4; Warner, 162.
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Alcibiades' speech, however, is as much a philosophical
evaluation of Eros as the other encomia are.6 Like the encomiasts of
Eros, Alcibiades cannot help drawing moral conclusions from the
behavior of the man he praises.

In fact, the deeds Alcibiades

recounts have been selected to prove his thesis that Socrates is a
hubristic lover and, thus, a person who cannot expound a cogent
theory of love. As Nussbaum has noted, Alcibiades' speech is a
refutation of Socrates' abstract Eros and a plea for love of individuals.
Alcibiades refutes Socrates by being the one to appear suddenly
(e~a(cpvns),

whereas Socrates had stated in his speech that Absolute

Beauty appears suddenly. 7 Alcibiades is no Absolute Beauty or even
a lover of it. He loves particular instances of beauty, not the "universal
Good." He is, in fact, the opposite of Socrates' Eros and Absolute
Beauty. Thus, Alcibiades' speech necessarily enters the realm of
philosophy; it does not merely recount the actions of a particular man,

6ct. the weight his speech has received from scholars, as
Krischer, 51-53, observes. Nussbaum, 186, calls Alcibiades' a
defender of the traditional Greek education through poetry, with its
emphasis on the particular, not the abstract; thus, Alcibiades
conscientiously rejects philosophy and prefers to use images and
metaphors in his speech, which are inferior forms of education
according to Republic 7. Nussbaum is correct, provided that we
understand that a deliberate rejection of philosophy is also a
philosophical position.
7As Diodorus Siculus, 12.68.3-5, observes, every party of the
Athenians saw in Alcibiades the characteristics they were looking for,
so much that slaves and free alike vied to be in his presence.
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but demands that Alcibiades' view of love be deemed the proper one
and Socrates' philosophy of Eros rejected.a
Alcibiades' speech reinforces the notion that philosophical
discourse and dramatic action are not so far removed from one
another as one might think.

Because behavior reflects ethical,

ontological, and sometimes epistemological presuppositions,
dramatic action is necessarily philosophical. Since Socrates' behavior
reflects his views of Eros, his actions as outlined by Alcibiades must
have philosophical significance. Furthermore, Alcibiades' criticism of
Socrates' behavior necessarily becomes a critique of Socrates'
philosophy. Thus, even though Alcibiades' speech is not overtly
philosophical, as those of other guests are, it nonetheless is an
integral part of the philosophical discussion in the dialogue. To the
degree that it evaluates Socrates' philosophy of Eros, it serves as
commentary on the key philosophical exposition of the dialogue.

BNussbaum, 184-185; Cf. Rosen, 279-280. Wolz, 349-351,
argues that Alcibiades' speech serves the same function as the myth
of Er. Both passages demonstrate that the philosophical system
espoused in their dialogues is not without its problems. In the
Republic, Er saw a man with the best possible education in virtue
choosing his next life foolishly. In the Symposium, Alcibiades
demonstrates that, to retain self-identity and the power to choose, a
human being would have to resist the sight of Absolute Beauty. But
this could only mean that a person would have to turn from good to
evil.
Wolz and Nussbaum have properly discerned the difference of
views between Alcibiades and Socrates, even though Alcibiades
largely confirms that Socrates is true to his beliefs about Eros. We will
explore later (pages 198-206) how the position of Socrates is largely
vindicated, but Wolz and Nussbaum rightly observe the seeds of
doubt sown into Socrates' theory by Alcibiades.
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Because of the philosophical import of the drama in Alcibiades'
speech, we ought to expect that the drama of the conclusion of the
party (222c1-223d12) will likewise imply a philosophy of Eros. This
expectation is warranted, as we will see in the remainder of the
chapter. Although a thorough explication of the epilogue would reveal
its philosophy, such an effort would be beyond the scope of this
present work, which focuses on the prologue.

Instead, we will

examine in this chapter the way in which the dramatic parallels
between the epilogue and prologue reflect a similar philosophy of
Eros. Specifically, we will examine how the prologue and epilogue
demonstrate the limits of typical symposiastic behavior in pursuing
Eros. Then we will examine how the uniqueness of Agathon's party
and of its chief guest, Socrates, reflects the uniqueness of the
Socratic theory of Eros.
The Sway of Eros at Symposia
As we noted in the first chapter, symposia in the ancient world
were associated with drinking and sex.

Naturally, therefore, one

would expect that Eros would be a force at any symposium, including
Agathon's. He is indeed present, even if in a slightly unconventional
form:

Instead of indulging their sexual longings (Eros), the men

discuss them. Yet though Eros' presence in the Symposium is more
cerebral, the reader's expectation--and Glaucon's (172b2)--that the
symposium will be driven to a large degree by Eros is fulfilled.
Moreover, to the degree that Eros is manifested differently at this
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symposium than at a typical symposium, the limits of the latter in
satisfying the longings of Eros are shown.
The erotic nature of Agathon's party, as portrayed in the
prologue and epilogue, is clearly seen when it is compared to
Aphrodite's birthday party (as told by Diotima through Socrates),
which serves as the archetype for all erotic symposia.

It is at

Aphrodite's party that Eros is first associated with symposia. Socrates
narrates the events of her party to explain the role of Eros in general
and his behavior at symposia in particular, where he leads men to
discover beauty.

Eros was conceived at Aphrodite's party; at

Agathon's the guests and, above all, Socrates attempt to give birth to
him again. At Aphrodite's party, Eros was born as a demi-god; at
Agathon's party, he is born as a subject of philosophical inquiry.
The parallels between Agathon's and Aphrodite's parties are
not accidental. Plato has intentionally had Socrates craft his telling of
Aphrodite's party to reflect the data of Agathon's party.

Since

Agathon's party is a fiction invented by Plato and Socrates' account of
Aphrodite's party is a fiction within a fiction,9 it is not surprising that
there will be parallels between the two parties. But the fictional nature
of the parties does not undermine the argument that the parallels
between them are significant. Indeed, their fictional nature confirms

9Dover, Symposium, 141-142, finds no precedent in Greek
literature or mythology for the story of Poros and Penia; he concludes
that it is Plato's own invention created in the fashion of his day. There
are antecedents for Poros in Aleman, but his cosmogony is different.
Penia had been personified in 388 in Aristophanes' Plutus, written
shortly before Plato's Symposium.

177
the importance of those parallels.

Parallels between events in a

historical work may be coincidental, but parallels between dramatic
events in a work of fiction cannot entirely be due to chance.
As we seek to discover the parallels between the two parties, we
must ask which characters play similar roles at the two parties. Upon
reflection, it becomes clear that Socrates behaves at Agathon's party
as Penia does at Aphrodite's, Agathon behaves as Poros does, and
Diotima functions much as Aphrodite does. 1O Although elsewhere we
have argued that Socrates manifests the qualities of Eros mentioned
in 203c6-e5, it does not follow that Socrates cannot be most akin to
Penia at Aphrodite's banquet in 203b1-c1.

Eros seems to have

inherited most of his traits from his mother, not his father. Even his
resourcefulness and his search for beauty are traits that can be seen
in Penia, who cleverly found a way to get pregnant by a god. Thus,
the resemblance between Socrates and Penia actually emphasizes
Socrates' Eros-like qualities.
Both Penia and Socrates do not participate fully in their
banquets. Penia comes after the banquet to receive the left-overs
(203b3-4).

Socrates enters while the banquet is half completed

(175c4-6) and so cannot enjoy the meal fully. To underscore their

1 OSince Diotima is not present in either the prologue or
epilogue, her affinity to Aphrodite will not be treated here.
Nonetheless, the parallels between the two are striking: Both are
learned in the ways of love and impart that knowledge to males. Eros
and Socrates are attendants of Aphrodite and Diotima, respectively.
And it is through these two women that Eros and Socrates find the
way to have their longings satisfied.
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exclusion from full participation in the banquet, both stand outside.
Penia stands at the door (203b5) and never enters Zeus' house.
Later she espies Poros who has gone out into the garden; there she
seduces him. Socrates, similarly, stands on the neighbor's porch
(175a8).
Why are Penia and Socrates excluded from their parties? Penia
does not belong in the world of the gods, since she does not enjoy
their bliss. Similarly, Socrates does not belong with the handsome
aristocrats at Agathon's house. After all, he is poor--or at least acts as
if he were, as his customary shoelessness suggests.

Moreover,

Socrates is usually ugly and disheveled and, thus, hardly the sort of
man who deserves to be Agathon's guest of honor. Nonetheless,
Socrates' exclusion from the banquet, unlike Penia's, is at his own
instigation.

Though he has received an invitation from Agathon

(174a6-8), who eagerly desires to seat him next to himself (175c6d1 ), Socrates to some degree merits Alcibiades' barb: He does not
deserve to be sitting next to handsome men such as Agathon and
Alcibiades (213c3-5).
Whether or not they are truly welcome, Socrates and Penia
arrive at their banquets to encounter two men under the influence of
alcohol: Socrates encounters Agathon; Penia, Poros. Technically
speaking, Agathon is not drunk, but suffering from a hangover. A
person with a hangover, however, is in the process of becoming
sober but is still too weakened by the intake of alcohol and its
aftermath to function altogether coherently. Both Socrates and Penia
recognize the drunkenness of the men they meet to be an
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opportunity. Penia, recognizing that she is unable to attract a mate
because of her desperate circumstances, sees the drunken Poros as
a potential father of her child. Similarly, Socrates recognizes that he is
unable to produce any great wisdom on his own (175d8-e6).
Therefore he uses the inebriated Agathon as a source to become
"pregnant in his soul" (Kvovmv ... KaTa Ti]v '+'VXiJv; 206c1-3).
Penia and Socrates can become pregnant only through
seduction. They, however, cannot use physical beauty to seduce,
since they possess none, but must employ other methods.11 Penia
uses alcohol, while Socrates uses alcohol and rhetoric. Socrates can
use alcohol because he himself is immune to the influence of alcohol
(176c3-6; 214a4-5; 220a1-5), though the other guests are not. But
his main instrument of seduction is his rhetoric. He makes young men
like Apollodorus search out what he has said (172c5-6). Even those
who are not his "pupils" are interested in his words, as Glaucon is
(172a7-b3). As Alcibiades indicates, Socrates has "seduced" him and
the other guests through his irresistible words (215e1-216a2; 218a2b4).
Although Socrates has attempted to "seduce" many young men
with his rhetoric (222a4-b4 ), he is preoccupied chiefly with Agathon in
the symposium. It is next to Agathon that Socrates reclines (175c8),
even as Penia lies down next to Poros (203b8-c1 ). It is the beauty of
Agathon which has impelled Socrates to come in the first place. And it
is Agathon with his "superior'' wisdom that can get Socrates pregnant

11 Cf Bury, xii.
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in his soul. For Socrates needs the ideas of other people in order to
apprehend the truth, since his knowledge derives more from the
rejection or modification of the ideas of other people than from ideas
he originates.12
Thus, the reader would expect that Agathon possesses a
degree of bliss Socrates does not, even as the gods (including Poros)
are happier than Penia. On further inspection, however, this does not
appear to be the case--and not merely because Socrates' praise of
Agathon is ironic. The respective behaviors of Agathon and Poros
indicate that they are worse off than Socrates and Penia, for their
drunkenness reveals a more profound poverty than that of Socrates
and Penia. Though by every standard Agathon and Poros should be
deemed fortunate, their behavior at their respective banquets argues
the contrary.13
In fact, the behavior of the four--Agathon and Socrates, Poros
and Penia--at their banquets demonstrates their longings and their
fulfillment, since oel'TTva in and of themselves are designed to satisfy a

12Cf. Pl. Tht. 149a-151d; Symp. 175d2-e6. The latter is spoken
with irony, to be sure, but it is the Socratic irony that characterizes him
throughout the Platonic corpus.
13Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 98, equates both Alcibiades and
Socrates with Penia and Poros: Alcibiades is handsome and wealthy,
like Poros, but comes uninvited to the banquet like Penia. Socrates
embodies virtue, as does Poros, but is ugly and poor like Penia. In
this way, argues Lowenstam, Socrates and Alcibiades exchange
roles, much as Socrates forces his beloveds to become his lovers.
Lowenstam's interpretation, however, is skewed in that he does not
discern the ironic poverty of Resourcefulness and the
resourcefulness of Poverty.
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longing, chiefly for food and drink, but sometimes for sex. Hence, it is
not surprising that Eros was conceived at Aphrodite's party. But the
way in which Socrates and Penia enjoy their banquets is different
from the way in which Agathon and Poros do. Because Penia senses
her cnrop[a, she is attracted to Aphrodite's party. She seeks not only
alms but, when given the opportunity, she also seeks to get pregnant
by a powerful deity. The oel'Tivov, thus, offers her the way to have her
basic needs (food and drink) fulfilled while also giving her a chance to
enjoy a beautiful god, Poros, and to achieve immortality through her
offspring (cf 203b7-c1 ). In a similar way, Socrates and the other
guests at the party desire to come into contact with Agathon because
he has been successful recently in the theater. The guests hope not
only to be well fed and entertained, but also to get a glimpse of the
talent that astounded so many people a few days earlier (175e4-6; cf.
194a8-b5).
It is not only the guests, however, who desire to obtain a
glimpse of Beauty and the Good. Agathon himself needs the acclaim
and gratification that his banquet offers him. In this way, he is very
much akin to Poros, who should be so blissful that he would not need
to drink to surfeit. Nonetheless, Poros indulges in the pleasures at
Aphrodite's party, gets drunk, and allows himself to be seduced by
Penia.
The drunkenness of Poros, therefore, illustrates the limits of the
banquet in satisfying the desire for Beauty and the Good. In one
sense, Poros is truly Resourcefulness himself, in that he is _filled to
surfeit with the indulgence in sensual pleasures.

He knows what
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pleases him and sets about getting them. Yet if Poros is filled in the
course of the banquet, he must have entered it unsatisfied. And, if
Poros can be credited in knowing how to get his desires fulfilled,
Penia, too, deserves recognition for seducing Poros. She, too, was
able to discern how best to have her needs fulfilled. Thus, Poros
ultimately is little better than Penia. In fact, Penia is the more
resourceful of the two, for Poros allows himself to be overcome by
wine and Penia, while Penia has enough presence of mind to see an
opportunity for achieving what she longs for.14
Drunkenness, then, reveals that Resourcefulness is not so
resourceful after all, but lacks full satisfaction of its desires.
Drunkenness also reveals thatPoverty is not so poor so as to have no
chance of obtaining her desires, so long as she is not overwhelmed
by drink. It is in this environment that Eros is conceived and operates.
Eros takes advantage of beautiful hedonists and uses his poverty of
beauty to acquire Beauty, just as his mother did. Therefore, the
greatest sensualist cannot acquire Absolute Beauty, but Socrates-the ugliest person and one most impervious to pleasure--can ascend
to see that Beauty by taking advantage of the 8EtTivov.
The 8EtTivov, then, gives birth to Eros, in that it awakens
longings that cannot be satisfied by it. It reveals to guests that they
have a lack, but it cannot fulfill the lack. Because the 8EtTivov is the

14Mitchell, 128, is not far from this understanding when he
writes that ''this woman Diotima must not be allowed to trick, us into
forgetting that while an immortal slept, mortal Neediness seized upon
the Way Over. The result is Eros."
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initial experience of Eros, it is an appropriate beginning for Eros, but
cannot be the goal, of the erotic experience.

As Agathon tells

Socrates, vuv oe Tipos To oe'LTivov TipWTa TPETiov.

Dining--the

indulging in sensual pleasures--is the beginning of the erotic
experience, even as Aphrodite's birthday party was where Eros was
conceived, but not where Eros found ultimate satisfaction. Without
the banquet it is impossible to be aware of the erotic, but the banquet
also manifests the lack of satisfaction that comes with indulging the
senses. Only later, when the flute girl and wine are dismissed, can the
banquet lead to the appreciation of higher forms of beauty.15
Since those who let themselves be overcome by drinking
(Agathon and Poros) are used by more sober individuals (Socrates
and Penia) to awaken and satisfy erotic desires, Eros and Dionysus
are akin, but are not,

contra Anderson, one and the same.1 6

15Although Anderson is not correct in identifying Eros and
Dionysus (see fn. 16 below), the reader ought not to assume that
Dionysus (excessive drunkenness) is inherently anti-erotic.
16Anderson, 7-8, argues that, as Dionysus makes the actors in
his plays wear masks, so he too puts on a mask in the Symposium,
namely, the mask of Eros. To be sure, there are many qualities of
Dionysus that Socrates uses to describe Eros: Eros dies and
reappears, even as Dionysus undergoes a death and (ebirth each
year; Eros, like Dionysus, is a daemon; Eros is a force that dwells in all
mankind, even as Dionysus is said in the Orphic myth to be spread
through all life. Moreover, Anderson argues each character in the
dialogue wears a mask, in effect, and is part of a Dionysian-driven
drama. But Plato does not explicitly identify Eros with Dionysus.
Whatever qualities the two may share, in that they are both
ephemeral demi-gods, they are not equated with one another in the
dialogue. Furthermore, it is only when Dionysus is banished or
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Dionysus and Eros are akin to the degree that they both strive after
some pleasure: Dionysus seeks the pleasure of wine and the mantic,
while Eros seeks the pleasure of beauty (including the beauty of
truth). Moreover, their spheres of influence overlap, since Eros and
Dionysus are credited with the mantic art.17 Yet, as we have seen in
the previous chapter, those who are overwhelmed by the quest for
Dionysian pleasure are those who cannot pursue erotic pleasures in a
nobler way.

Pausanias and Aristophanes are limited by their

overindulgence in alcohol, so that they cannot see a greater or nobler
manifestation of Eros than sex.
Dionysian indulgence serves two functions:

It manifests the

erotic quest for fulfillment that drives all humans; it serves as an
introduction to the love of beauty, but by itself cannot lead to Absolute
Beauty. The 8el'TTvov, then, serves as a metaphor for Dionysian
indulgence.

Not only the heavy drinking associated with the

symposium, but also the eating of much food demonstrate men's
sense of lack. It shows that its participants recognize an absence of
fulfillment. Therefore, they desire satisfaction in the 8eTTTvov.
Thus, Socrates' behavior in the prologue and Diotima's myth of
the origin of Eros reveal that wine is not a good instrument to awaken
erotic pursuit of beauty. To be sure, it was because of wine that Poros
restricted that full expression is given to Eros; that is to say, the
encomia of Eros appear only after the consumption of wine is limited.
17Eryximachus credits Eros for the power of prophecy; he uses
Eros as a metaphor for the daemonic, the realm that reconciles man
and god (188b6-d3). Socrates portrays Diotima as a prophetess from
Mantinea, i.e., Prophet-land (201 d2-5).
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begot Eros. But Peros had no control over the process; the sober
Penia manipulated Peros to achieve the satisfaction of her own
desires. In the same way, the ever sober Socrates manipulates the
drunken crowd to satisfy his own quest for Absolute Beauty. To the
degree that Socrates apprehends Beauty better than the other guests
do, it is because he is a unique guest and has used the rather unique
circumstances of the symposium to suit his purposes. For he has
made Dionysian frivolity give way to truly Erotic philosophy.
The Unigueness of Agathon's Symposium
Agathon's symposium is rather unusual in that several elements
normally associated with a symposium are removed in the prologue
and reintroduced in the epilogue.

Most notably, Eryximachus

banishes the flute girl and heavy drinking, and Socrates attempts to
avoid a large crowd. Ultimately, neither Eryximachus nor Socrates is
able to have his wish. In the epilogue, Alcibiades brings in a flute girl
with him (212d6) and drains a cooler of wine, while ordering the
others to do the same (213d7-214a3). A small retinue of revelers
enters with Alcibiades (212d7), but later a large crowd crashes the
party, effectively putting an end to all discourse of Eros (223b2-6).
Thus, wine, flute-girl, and crowd--banished in the prologue--are
returned to the party in the epilogue.
The most obvious effect of the banishment and reintroduction of
these three elements is to make the epilogue complete the prologue,
so that the dialogue takes a symmetrical form. The prologue begins
with drunken men (or to be more accurate, men who are recovering
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from drunkenness) who have just feasted; the body of the dialogue
shows men recovering from this overindulgence (hence the
hiccoughs of Aristophanes occur roughly in the middle of the
encomia 18); the epilogue returns the dialogue to feasting and
drinking. Moreover, the dialogue begins with allusions to the crowded
party on the previous day (174a6-7; 176a6-b1); the body of the
dialogue, in contrast, portrays an intimate group of men discussing
Eros; the epilogue adds Alcibiades and his entourage to the party and
then brings in a crowd of revelers so that the symposium ends in
pandemonium. In effect, then, we have a Chinese-box effect, with the
epilogue reintroducing items removed in the prologue.19

181f we assume with von Blanckenhagen, 57, that there were
two other guests between Pausanias and Phaedrus (the aAAovs
Tt vex s of 180c2), then there would be a total of nine guests.
Eryximachus' speech would then be the middle speech, being
preceded by those of Phaedrus, the two unnamed guests and
Pausanias, and followed by those of Aristophanes, Aristodemus,
Agathon, and Socrates. Aristophanes hiccoughs, which occur during
Eryximachus' speech, would then occupy the exact center of the
encomia.
Moreover, as Lowenstam, "Paradoxes," 89, observes,
Aristophanes' hiccoughs are caused by his overindulgence (vno
nAnaµovfls, 185c6) and must be "emptied" by sneezing. They
physician who knows all about "emptiness and fullness (nAT)aµovf]v
Kal Kevcuatv, 186c7)" then "fills in" for Aristophanes. Later,
Eryximachus asks Aristophanes "to fill any gaps he has left
(avanAT)pwaat, 188e3)." This emphasis on filling and emptying
continues through Aristophanes' and Agathon's speeches.
19Halperin, "Narrativity," 97, has rightly noted that the dialogue
does not have a perfect chiastic structure in that the epilogue does
not return the reader to the Apollodorian narrative.
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The banishment and reintroduction of wine, flautist, and crowd,
however, not only set up a general chiastic structure for the dialogue,
but also highlight the unusual character of Agathon's symposium.
Although it was not necessary that all three elements be present at a
symposium, one would expect to find at least one of the three present.
If a symposium had plenty of wine, the guests could make do without
a flute-girl. Nor was it necessary to invite a large crowd to have a
successful symposium.

The archaeological evidence seems to

indicate that a banquet room with couches for seven or nine people
was typical.20

Thus, Agathon's intimate symposium is no more

unusual than the large bash he threw the night before.
What is highly unusual, however, is the absence or severe
restriction of drinking.21

One would expect that a drinking party,

avµTI6atov, would involve at least some drinking. The peculiarity of

this party is underscored in both the prologue and the epilogue. In the
prologue Eryximachus calls a banquet without heavy drinking a stroke
of good luck (an Epµa'lov, 176c1-d4). In the epilogue Eryximachus
reiterates the unusual terms of the banquet to Alcibiades (214b9-c5).
Eryximachus is content to be part of the group, he says in the
prologue, because there will be some relief from the typical drinking.

20Banquet rooms had either seven or nine couches, which
were usually occupied by one person only. Von Blanckenhagen, 57.
21 This does not imply that ordinary drinking would be
unrestrained; it was the duty of the symposiarch to regulate the
drinking so that the guests would be jovial but not incoherent. See
Ezio Pellizer, "Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment" in
Sympotica, 178-179.
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When the relief ends and the symposium turns into a real symposium,
complete with drunken revelers, Eryximachus leaves.22
In the prologue, Eryximachus becomes the magister bibendi
because Pausanias and Agathon decline to take the job.

Under

Eryximachus' guidance, the symposium becomes an opportunity to
imbibe words, not wine (177e4-10).23 After the guests have drunk
fully from each other's speeches, a new guest arrives, Alcibiades,
who steals Eryximachus' job from him. Alcibiades first challenges the
performance of Eryximachus as magister bibendi by stating that the
men are too sober for a drinking party (213e7-8). Then Alcibiades
ignores the limits set by Eryximachus, as he drains a cooler of wine
(213e10-214a 1). Although Eryximachus protests that encomia, not
wine, are the refreshment for the evening, Eryximachus cannot keep
him from drinking heavily. Nor can Eryximachus prevent other guests
from crashing the party and bringing in their drunken revelry (223b28). By default, Alcibiades becomes the new magister bibendi.

22As Mitchell, 3, observes, the content of the dialogue fails to
live up to its title.
23Anderson, 17-18, suggests that Phaedrus is the
symposiarch; for this reason, he is the first of the guests to speak, so
that he can then attend his duties. Anderson cites as evidence the
three occasions when Phaedrus seems to exercise authority over the
group (194d; 195a; 199b). On those occasions, however, Phaedrus
acts more as naTi]p A6yov than symposiarch. And in 195a, Socrates
makes the appeal explicitly to Eryximachus, as moderator of the
evening's discussion. Moreover, Phaedrus submits to the drinking
instructions of Eryximachus (176d5-7), so that even if Phaedrus in
some way controlled the drinking, he would be doing so at
Eryximachus' bidding.
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The prologue, then, contains the necessary ingredients for a
symposium, but banishes them, while the epilogue reintroduces
them. Why? These two parts of the dialogue mark the thresholds
between the world of Eros and the world of talk about Eros. The body
of the dialogue takes place in a world of almost surreal circumstances;
the prologue removes the constraints of "symposiastic reality," while
the epilogue reintroduces them. By removing these elements of the
ordinary world, the symposium is marked as being a different sort of
discussion.
The crossing of a threshold is underscored by Socrates' bathing
in both the prologue and the epilogue. As the prologue indicates
{174a3-4), such behavior is rather unusual for Socrates. What makes
it even more unusual is that Socrates repeats the bath less than
twenty-four hours later (223d10-11 ). Certainly, hygiene alone is not
his only consideration, since that matters little to him (172a3-4; cf. also
219e7-220d5, where Alcibiades describes Socrates' indifference to
social conventions). Instead, the bathing marks a transition. The first
bath brings Socrates from the world of his natural ugliness and
uncleanliness into the world of beauty. He has made himself beautiful
so that he can enjoy the beauty of Agathon (174a8-9).24 The second
bath, however, marks the transition back into his unkempt state. It
purifies him from whatever sacrilege he may have encountered at the

24oover, Symposium, 81, observes that the Greeks commonly
bathed before a banquet. This explain in part Socrates' first bath, but
not his second one.
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banquet, as the guests praised Eros in false terms.25 As Brentlinger
has observed, it is significant that Socrates bathes the second time in
the grove at the Lyceum, adjacent to the Temple of Apollo.
Brentlinger takes this to mean that Eros is marked not only by
Dionysian youthfulness, but by a "striving for death," as embodied by
Apollo. A better interpretation, however, is that the oblique reference
to Apollo implies that Socrates is absolving himself of any Dionysian
excess the previous day.
The ancient Greeks would have been familiar with the concept
of bath as ritual cleansing. At the Plynteria the Athenian women
brought the image of Athena to the sea, purified it by washing it, and
then brought it back to the city. Sometimes, as part of the ceremony,
murderers and other criminals were allowed to rejoin the community
after undergoing the same ritual purification as the statue of Athena.
A ritual bath, moreover, was part of the initiation into the Eleusinian
mysteries.26 Since the parody of the mysteries27 occurred shortly
25John A. Brentlinger, "Introduction" to The Symposium of
Plato, tr. Suzy Q. Groden (University of Massachusetts Press, 1970),
2.
26Walter Burkert, Greek Religion (hereafter Burkert, Greek
Religion), tr. John Rattan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1985), 78-79; See also H. W. Parke, Festivals of the
Athenians, Aspects of Greek and Roman Life, ed. H. H. Scullard
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 152-153 for the
Plynteria; 62-63 for the ritual washing in the Eleusinian Mysteries.
Douglas Stewart, "Socrates' Last Bath," Journal of the History of
Philosophy 1O (1972) 253-259, argues that Socrates' bath in the
Phaedo uses the language of the Orphic mysteries to demonstrate
that Socrates was hoping to break free from the "Orphic wheel" of life,
death, and reincarnation.
Thus, a religious-philosophical
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after the dramatic date of the symposium, it is fitting to see in the
bathing Plato's own appropriation of the Eleusinian mysteries.
Indeed, such an explanation accords well with Diotima's use of terms
such as "initiate" and "highest form of the mysteries" (21 Oa1 ).28
As happens frequently in his works, Plato uses religious
terminology and actions to make a philosophical point.29 Plato sets
up the Symposium as an initiation into the mysteries of a demigod.
Thus, there is ritual purification (Socrates' washing) and abstention
from sex and drink.30

Moreover, the masses--6 ox.Aos--are not

understanding of the bath in the Symposium is not without precedent
in the Platonic corpus. Although the Symposium (and indeed much of
Plato's writings) are possibly tinged with Orphic language and ideas,
Plato seems to have the Eleusinian mysteries in mind in this dialogue.
271n 415 B.C., shortly before the expedition to Sicily left Athens,
a number of the herms were mutilated. As this crime was
investigated, it was discovered that in the year leading up to the
expedition the Mysteries had been parodied--or at least performed
for unauthorized people. See Thuc., 6.27-29; Andoc. 1.
28Cf. also the allusion to initiation used by Alcibiades in 218b, as
Anderson, 120, notes, and Socrates' rebuke to Alcibiades (ovK
evq>nµfiaets, 214d5), as Mitchell, 181, notes. As a woman and mantic,
Diotima is the appropriate person to initiate the guests at Agathon's
party. See Dover, Symposium, 137.
29Plato refers a number of times to the mysteries ( Cri. 54d, Grg.
497c, Meno 76e, Phd. 69c, 81a, Phdr. 250b, Resp. 2.378a) and
sacrifices (Resp. 1.327a, 328c). Yet as Phd. 69c-d indicates, the
religious phenomena portray in crude fashion profound philosophical
points. Thus, for example, when Socrates is about to die in the
Phaedo (117a7-8), he asks that a cock be sacrificed to the god of
healing, Asclepius; thereby, Plato uses a ritual to make the
philosophical point that the soul is cured through the death of the
body.
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permitted to undergo the full initiation.

Diotima initiates Socrates

(209e5-21Oa1) and he shares his experience with only a handful of
people. Yet all of this serves a philosophical point, namely, to enable
the initiates to apprehend the force of Eros on mankind and to discern
Absolute Beauty.

Despite the religious language of the text, the

encounter that Diotima outlines is not a mystical encounter, but rather
a process that involves apprehension of sensual beauty and a
thoughtful discussion of laws and ideas.31

30Cf. the Antletriae, who had to abstain from sex during the
Thesmophoria, and the practice of fasting associated with both the
Eleusinian and Thesmophorian observances. See Parke, 69, 83, 86.
Turner's anthropological explanation of abstention from sex in
Ndembu installation rites can be applied to the situation of the
symposium, since the ties formed by the epaaTns-epwµevos
relationship resembled those of kinship in force: "[l]n preindustrial
society, with its strong stress on kinship as the basis of many types of
group affiliation, sexual continence has additional religious force. For
kinship, or relations shaped by the kinship, is one of the main factors
in structural differentiation. The undifferentiated character of
liminality is reflected by the discontinuance of sexual relations and the
absence of marked sexual polarity." Victor W. Turner, The Ritual
Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company, 1969), 104.
31 Burkert observes what many later Platonists ignore, namely,
that Plato is using the metaphor of religion to express a philosophical
truth. Plato is not necessarily establishing a new cosmology, nor is he
necessarily advocating a retreat into mysticism. Rather, he uses the
language of his contemporary Athenian religion to express his
philosophical concepts. Burkert, Greek Religion, 322-324. In this
respect, his use of religion parallels his use of "cobblers" and other
aspects of the culture of his day. Cf. O' Brien, 203-205, for a similar
analysis. O' Brien, 204, states the case well: "Lest we take the
mystical form of Dionysus' speech more seriously than the
philosophical context, we should note that it has its boozy counterpart
in the speech of Alcibiades." Cf. Allen, 86.
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The prologue, thus, describes the transition from the ordinary
world into the mysteries of Eros, while the epilogue returns the reader
to the ordinary world. But the abstention from wine, sex, and the
crowd--along with Socrates' ritual bathing--serves a greater purpose
than to set up the body of the dialogue as an initiation into the
mysteries of Eros. It not only signals the commencement of a unique
discussion of Eros, but also facilitates it. As we saw in the last chapter,
indulgence in sensual beauty can sidetrack one from the pursuit of a
nobler Beauty. Lower forms of beauty would charm all the guests
except for the highly self-disciplined Socrates, so that none of them
would be able to discern--much less discuss--nobler objects of desire.
Therefore, all objects that would tempt the "inferior'' lovers must be
removed.
Alcohol, first of all, must be banished or severely restricted
since, if the guests were permitted, all but Socrates would lose their
reason in drink. Pausanias and Aristophanes, being addicted to drink,
would become drunk once again; they are, after all, able to become
drunk, even though they are oi 5vvaTc0TaTot Tiivetv (176c2-3).
Eryximachus and Phaedrus, too, if compelled to drink, would likewise
fall under the sway of alcohol, though more unwillingly. They cannot
Anderson, 64, argues that Socrates uses the metaphor of the
mysteries because he is fully aware that his metaphysical system
cannot be proved by using his customary epistemological method,
dialectic. Diotima's Ascent to Beauty reveals an ontological
understanding of the world that is in a sense derived from the
dialectical method, but cannot be proved with the certainty that the
dialectical method demands. Thus, Anderson believes that Plato was
as aware of the problems of participation of the Forms in the
Symposium as in the Parmenides.
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handle alcohol, as they Confess: i)µElS CxEl yap CxOVVOTOl (176C3).
Only Socrates can drink and be unaffected (176c3-5).

With the

temptation of drunkenness gone, however, the guests can pursue a
higher form of beauty. As sober men, they can reflect more critically
on Eros and his place in society.
Similarly, the removal of the flute-girl prevents the erotic
attention of the men from focusing on one manifestation of sensual
beauty. Consequently, the guests can see Eros as the universal force
that he is. The dismissal of the flute girl, moreover, allows Socrates to
become the real flautist of the dialogue.

As Alcibiades notes,

Socrates is a real Marsyas, who is able to charm all men by his
playing (215b3-d1 ). In fact, Socrates is better than Marsyas, since he
needs no instrument to charm men. His words have such a hypnotic
effect that Alcibiades finds them irresistible.32 Moreover, Socrates in
his encomium introduces a flute-girl, a woman who genuinely know all
about erotic matters (201 d5; 207a5-6)--Diotima.33 Diotima becomes
the dialogue's expert in love, much as a flute-girl at a symposium
would have been the "expert" in the art of love. Like Socrates, she
derives her seductive power from her ability to describe the workings

32Cf. Mitchell, 188. Friedlander, 3:27, insightfully observes that
Alcibiades in praising Socrates is at the same time praising Plato, the
true Marsyas, who is able to have his protagonist (Socrates) say such
persuasive words.
33As we argued earlier, p. 48, fn. 5, Diotima is a fictional
character. Nonetheless, the character Socrates has fashioned his
fictional teacher to be a woman who knows the workings of Eros
better than any flute-girl.
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of Eros. Thus, Socrates--and Diotima speaking through Socrates-are the real flautists of the dialogue. Hence their rival, the ordinary
flute girl, must be removed from the symposium.
As the removal of wine and the flute girl facilitates the discussion
of Eros, so does the removal of the crowd. The crowd would not only
have distracted the guests by its indulgence in alcohol and sex, it
would also have prevented the discussion from being as frank as it is.
Socrates' pursuit of Beauty appears strange even to a friend like
Alcibiades (cf. 221c2-3); a crowd would not have given Socrates an
opportunity to air his views.34

Since the crowd had acclaimed

Agathon's poetic prowess two days earlier, it would most likely have
been taken in by Agathon's arguments at the symposium and not
given Socrates a chance to expound his views. Similarly, Pausanias
receives a fairer hearing--and is, consequently, more frank about the
laws of Athens--than he would have been had a crowd been present.
Even Agathon is perhaps more irreverent to the gods than the
presence of a crowd would have allowed.35
The removal of the crowd serves another purpose. It shows
that no act of hubris is committed until the crowd bursts in. The
ancient reader would have expected the symposium at Agathon's
house to have been a hubristic party for two reasons.

First,

Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Alcibiades were present; these men

34oover, Symposium, 4-5.
35see Dorter, 218, who demonstrates that Pausanias' views
are an attack on Athenian legal conventions of the day.
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were all implicated in the mutilation of the herms the next year (415
B.C.).

Second, the symposium is set only one year before the

mutilation of the herms; it was during this year that the Eleusinian
mysteries were parodied in the course of a party.36 Thus, because of
the guests and the setting of the symposium, the ancient reader
would have expected that the symposium had either parodied the
mysteries or performed some other hubristic action that would
ultimately have led to the mutilation of the herms in the following year.
Neither event occurs.
To be sure, there are some allusions to these events of 416 and
415 BC. Employing a term used to describe, among other things, the
parodying of the mysteries (ecp' v[3pEl, Thucydides 6.28.2), Alcibiades
and Agathon say that Socrates has been hubristic in his treatment of
them (v[3ptOTfJS ET, 175e7; EllTOV a µE v[3ptOEV, 222a8). Socrates,
moreover, employs the terminology of the mysteries in his speech:
Socrates is an initiate but may not be able to understand the full
import of the mystery rites (209e5-21 Oa3). The ascent to Beauty is
described as culminating in the sight of Absolute Beauty, much as the
highlight of the mysteries would be the observing of the ETIOTITtK6:
(210a1 ).
Nonetheless, employing vocabulary similar to that employed by
the mysteries is not exactly the same as parodying them. Although

361t may be more accurate to say that the Mysteries were
parodied not so much by substituting mocking words for the rttuals of
the mysteries as by performing the rituals in front of some uninitiated
people. See Murray, 155-156.
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Socrates does in a sense "initiate" the guests into his understanding
of Eros, he does not use the rituals normally associated with the
mysteries. Nor does Socrates have the guests act out the mysteries,
as those who parodied them did. 37 The reference to the mysteries
remains words and fairly generic words at that: Thus, although the
words v'3ptcrTfis and v'3p(setv can be used to denote the parodying of
mysteries, they can also denote any insolent behavior against man
and god alike.38 Had Socrates used the words of the liturgy of the
mysteries, substituting Eros for Demeter in the appropriate places, he
would have been guilty of parodying the mysteries. But there is no
indication that he did so, for then Plato's contemporaries would have
charged him with parodying the mysteries in his Symposium.39

37 Andoc. 1.11 : ,AAKl'3lCx0f)V OE TOV OTPOTilYOV CXTTOOEl~C.U vµ'lv
Ta µvcrTf)pta TTOtoOvTa ev oiK(~ µe8' ETEpc.uv.
38LSJ, s.v. v'3p(sc.u and v'3ptcrTfis, 1841. Although we have few
examples of a ypacpn v'3pec.us, it is a much discussed charge among
the orators. An act of v'3pts was not necessarily an offense against
the gods or religion, but "the core concept of hubris is to be found
either in the psychology of the attacker, as one who misuses his
strength, or else (perhaps better) in the sociology of his victim, such
that hubris is an action which intentionally causes damage to the time
(honour) of the person suffering it." See S.C. Todd, The Shape of
Athenian Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 107, 270-271, 379~
380.
39When Aeschylus accidentally used a number of the same
words employed by the mysteries in one of his plays, he was taken to
court. Though he was ultimately acquitted, the lawsuit demonstrates
that an ancient Greek had to be careful in his choice of words.
Certainly, Plato would have been brought to court, had his
Symposium been thought to parody the mysteries outright.
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Thus, although the guests at the symposium frequently employ the
metaphor and terminology of the mysteries, there is no parody of
them.
Thus, there was neither sacrilege at Agathon's party nor a plot
to undertake a hubristic action such as the mutilation of the herms.
Although there is an anti-democratic and hubristic tone to the
dialogue, its hubris is more subtle. Some of the notions espoused by
the guests (particularly Pausanias) may offend the conventions of
Athenian democracy, but the dialogue as a whole is not as blatantly
hubristic as the parody of the mysteries and the mutilation of the
herms were.
In fact, the party does not become wild until after the crowd
enters in the epilogue.

The crowd distracts the guests from the

pursuit from Absolute Beauty, for the crowd brings in the other
elements (flute girl and wine) that had been excluded from the party in
the prologue. Thus, Socrates' emphasis that the pursuit of Absolute
Beauty is a solitary one receives confirmation.

Though he can

discuss Beauty and Eros with a small group of guests, he cannot
describe to his host the vision of Absolute Beauty he saw on the way
to the symposium (175d3-7).

To pursue Beauty, Socrates must

usually keep his distance from the crowd (174a7); he is unkempt and
lacking social graces. When he does interact with the crowd, it is
usually to reveal their ignorance by interrogating them.40

40cf. Ap. 21 c-23b, as well as Socrates' behavior in questioning
Euthrypho in Euthyphro. Although Euthyphro is the only individual
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Thus, all of the guests are at their best during the body of the
dialogue. Since, moreover, the prologue and epilogue allow elements
forbidden through most of the dialogue, the guests appear at their
worst in these portions of the dialogue. For example, in the prologue
Pausanias

and

Aristophanes

are

recovering

from

their

overindulgence in alcohol the night before. Consequently, in the
prologue they discuss only their drunken condition (176a5-b4). But in
the body of the dialogue they develop encomia that expound a logical
argument with some flair and literary grace. In the epilogue, they get
swept away by the party, which no longer permits orderly drinking
(223b5-6).

Presumably, Pausanias falls into a drunken sleep

(223c3}, while Aristophanes stays up drinking with Socrates and
Agathon (223c4-5).
There is good reason, therefore, that the symposium banishes
the crowd along with the flute-girl and wine for most of the dialogue.
But why should these elements be reintroduced? If they were so
counterproductive to the working of Eros--or at least the nobler
working of Eros--why should these items be reintroduced once they
have been banished?
First, the reintroduction of the removed items calls attention to
them. If by chance the reader missed seeing any significance to their
banishment in the prologue, their reintroduction in the epilogue gives
him another chance to consider why they have been absent for most

with whom Socrates speaks, he exemplifies the sort of attitudes that
lay behind Socrates' accusers in the Apology.
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of the dialogue. In this way, the epilogue confirms the significance of
the drama of the prologue.
More importantly, the reintroduction of the banished elements
returns the symposium to reality. After all, it is fine to theorize about
the effects of Eros, but any theory about Eros must face up to the real
world. Although the surreal environment of the symposium is an
attractive and even necessary setting in which to consider Eros, it
cannot be expected to continue indefinitely.

Sooner or later,

distracting elements from the real world will enter and the theories of
Eros espoused by the guests will have to be tested by reality.41
Not all of the guests can handle the real world, as the epilogue
reveals. Phaedrus and Eryximachus leave shortly after the unruly
crowd enters (223b6-8).

Indeed, Eryximachus can scarcely bear

Alcibiades' heavy drinking (215b9-c1 ).

Given Eryximachus'

opposition to indulgence in wine as stated in the prologue (175c5-d4),
his reaction in the epilogue is not surprising.42

Meanwhile,

Pausanias either leaves, being one of the unnamed others to depart

41 As Turner, 129, has observed, a healthy society needs both
the "immediacy of communitas" and the "mediacy of structure."
Communitas emerges as people of disparate backgrounds undergo
an initiation together and are forced to recognize their common
humanity.
42Anderson, 39, insightfully observes that Eryximachus can be
influenced by alcohol as much as the other guests: "Although it is
hard to see a self-centered pedant--especially a pompous one like
Eryximakhos--out desecrating herms, it is not difficult to see Phaidros,
drunk, persuaded by Alkibiades, and in turn persuading a drunken
Eryximakhos that so long as they do not get caught there should be
no problem."
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(aAAovs Ttvas, 223b7), or remains silent at the party. His departure
or silence is not surprising; despite his fondness for drink, his views on
Eros are too unconventional to find much approval among the crowd.
Aristodemus stays, but sleeps for most of the night (223b8-c1 ). Since
he is one of the soberer individuals (176c2) yet cannot depart from his
teacher Socrates, he finds his retreat from the symposium in sleep.
None of these men can handle the erotic pursuit of Beauty amid the
distractions of symposiastic elements. 43
The only people to stay at the party and to stay alert are
Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon. They are all drinking (223c45), as may be expected from the descriptions of them in the prologue
(176c2-5), but Socrates is the one in control of the situation. Although
Agathon and Aristophanes are the two guests who should know the
most about poetry, Socrates is teaching them about their craft, not
they him (223c6-d6).44
Thus, Socrates alone is able to face the real world and maintain
his theory of Eros. He neither flees from symposiastic reality by
leaving (as do Eryximachus and Phaedrus) nor flees from it in sleep
(as does Aristodemus), nor indulges in it while losing control of his
faculties (as do Aristophanes and Agathon). Why? To Socrates,
even drink, beautiful flute-girls, and the hubbub of the crowd contain

43Mitchell, 222, suggests--not unreasonably, though without
conclusive proof--that Alcibiades leaves before the revellers come in.
Indeed, the door left open by Alcibiades, Dionysus incarnate (cf.
Anderson, 101 ), allows the drunken revelers to enter.
44Cf. Anderson, 15.
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the beginnings of the erotic process. They can lead to Beauty, even if
they are not themselves the final goal of Eros. Though some people
may despise these elements and others be seduced by them,
Socrates uses them to accomplish his purpose. He prevents himself
from being mastered by them and instead makes them lead him to
Absolute Beauty.
Thus, the reintroduction of the banished elements supports
Eryximachus' claim that Socrates can indulge or refrain from
indulging (176c3-5).

In either case, Socrates uses the better

elements in his environment to pursue Absolute Beauty while
avoiding being seduced by the baser elements. Although the other
guests must have these elements removed so that they can get a
glimpse of Absolute Beauty through hearing Socrates' speech, he has
no such need. For he is the unique guest at Agathon's symposium.
Socrates. the Man Who Best Reflects
the Unigueness of Agathon's Symposium
So far, we have seen that Agathon's symposium is unique and
that its uniqueness allows its participants to investigate Eros on a
higher plane than would otherwise be possible. That uniqueness is
best embodied in Socrates, whom we saw in the third chapter to be
the best representation of Eros in the dialogue. Although we have
already seen how the prologue portrays the erotic qualities of
Socrates, it will be helpful to examine how the epilogue confirms this
portrait. In this section, therefore, we will explore how Alcibiades'
characterization of Socrates accords well with his behavior in the
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prologue. For Alcibiades spends most of his speech describing the
unusual behavior of Socrates, which reflects the latter's unusual
views of Eros.

And since the extraordinary circumstances of

Agathon's symposium suit Socrates so well, Alcibiades' comments
about Socrates highlight the unusual features of the symposium.
Alcibiades' speech confirms the prologue's allusion to Socrates'

cptAepaaTia. This is significant, for the dialogue as a whole evaluates
Socrates' claim to erotic knowledge.45 In the prologue, Socrates
claims that the only thing he knows is Ta Epc.uTtKa (177d7-8}. This is
no idle boast, the epilogue reveals, for Alcibiades fears Socrates'

<ptAepaaTia. Alcibiades claims that Socrates is so ruled by Eros (and
thus knowledgeable in matters pertaining to him) that Socrates
becomes intensely jealous and cannot keep his hands to himself, if
one of his beloveds should praise anyone but himself (214d2-4}.
Not surprisingly, then, Socrates ends up seated beside
handsome men in both the prologue and the epilogue.

In the

prologue, Agathon invites him to sit next to him on his couch.
Presumably, the only people to share a couch are Socrates and
45Krischer, 53-55 argues that usually the last person to speak
in a contest of speeches is the winner. If the Symposium is such a
contest--and not everyone agrees that it is--then Alcibiades, not
Socrates, would be the winner. Yet, as Krischer rightly argues,
Alcibiades' speech confirms Socrates' victory--something that
Socrates could not do without being rude. Thus, Socrates' speech is
to be taken as the fullest explanation of Eros in the dialogue;
Alcibiades' speech evaluates and confirms that claim. Nussbaum,
166-167, has also argues that Alcibiades' speech causes the reader
of the Symposium to re-evaluate the truth of Diotima's radical notions
of Eros. Thus, for Nussbaum, Alcibiades refutes--not confirms--the
arguments of Socrates.
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Agathon (175c6-8), and Aristodemus and Eryximachus (175a4-5);
Alcibiades' remark about a "third" person being present on Agathon's
couch implies that the guests were generally each sitting one to a
couch.46 Thus, Socrates is granted the privilege of sitting next to a
handsome man, something none of the other guests is permitted.
(Eryximachus is not so privileged by having Aristodemus seated next
to him:

Aristodemus is aµtKp6s and apes Socrates' anti-social

behavior, including the custom of walking shoeless; while Socrates
improved his appearance for the occasion, Aristodemus did not have
the opportunity to do so.) In the epilogue, Socrates again sits next to
a handsome man, Alcibiades. When Alcibiades has completed his
speech, Agathon moves to the other side of Socrates, so that
Socrates has Alcibiades on his left and Agathon on his right. Socrates
ends up getting the seating arrangement he prefers, while Alcibiades
cannot, his first choice being the current arrangement (AgathonAlcibiades-Socrates) and his second choice the arrangement with
Agathon in the middle (Alcibiades-Agathon-Socrates).47
Despite Socrates' fascination with beauty, however, he does not
act as a typical lover. In fact, he makes the beloveds take the more
46For a fuller discussion, see von Blanckenhagen, 55, who
argues that only young men or a man and his young lover would sit at
the same couch.
471t is Socrates who determines the seating order at the end of
the dialogue; in the prologue, however, it is determined by Agathon.
Nonetheless, Alcibiades credits Socrates with the ability of always
finagling a seat next to a handsome youth (213c2-5). To the degree
that Socrates' stature as an intellectual has charmed Agathon,
Socrates deserves credit for the seating arrangement in the prologue.
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aggressive role, in effect making his beloveds lovers.48 Thus, in the
prologue Aristodemus is called a lover (EpaaTi]s, 173b3) of Socrates,
even though Aristodemus' youth ought to have made him an

Epc.0µevos. Similarly, it is Agathon, not Socrates, who determines that
the two will share a couch (175c6-8).

Although Socrates is not

displeased with the results, Agathon is the one who takes the
initiative.
In the epilogue, Alcibiades reiterates the point that Socrates
forces his beloveds to invert the roles with him. Socrates refuses to
capitalize on any opportunity that an aristocratic Athenian would have:
He is unmoved by physical beauty, wealth, and reputation (216d7e2); he makes no amorous advances when alone with Alcibiades
(217b3-7), nor does he make an improper move while wrestling with
him (217b7-c4). Even when dining alone (217c7-d6) or sharing the
same bed (219b4-d2), Socrates does not take advantage of the

48Nussbaum, 165-199, and Vlastos, 30-34, have criticized
Plato speaking in the voice of Diotima/Socrates for promoting a form
of love that overlooks the individual to pursue an abstract beauty. For
this reason, Nussbaum, views Alcibiades' speech as a commentary
on the implausibility of such love. Nye defends Diotima by noting that
a healthy relationship between lovers demands that they love not only
each other's bodies, but also their lover's friends, family, and ideas.
See Nye, "Diotima," 143-145. Donald Levy, "The Definition of Love in
Plato's Symposium," Journal of the History of Ideas 40 (1979) 286287, defends Diotima's view of love by arguing that it may have more
to do with love as it is rather than love as it ought to be. Moreover, if
love inculcates virtue, there must be some concern for others. Levy
has a point, but Alcibiades' speech does not bear him out, since
Socrates is hardly successful at inculcating virtue in him.
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situation.

No matter how hard Alcibiades attempts to seduce

Socrates, he cannot get him to yield.
Alcibiades, moreover, as the epilogue reveals, is not the only
lover to suffer such mistreatment from Socrates. Charmides, the son
of Glaucon, Euthydemus, the son of Diocles, and countless others
have experienced similar treatment by Socrates (222a8-b3). With
some justification, Alcibiades avers that all the guests at the
symposium have been bitten by affection for Socrates and,
consequently,

experienced

Socrates'

unique

manner

of

demonstrating his love (218a7-b3). Thus, Alcibiades' speech in the
epilogue demonstrates that Socrates' treatment of Agathon in the
prologue is not unusuat.49
Nonetheless, Socrates' epwµEvoL admire him and pursue him
who does not pursue them in the ordinary way. This erotic effect of
Socrates on his beloveds can only be termed madness.

Thus,

Alcbiades refers to "the madness and frenzy of his philosophy"
(218b3-4).50 This madness is especially visible in Apollodorus, who
asks his friends (173e1 -3), "Friend, am I clearly so disposed
concerning myself and you that I am crazy and have lost my wits?"51

49Belfiore, 148, notes the similarity between Alcibiades'
situation and Agathon's. She sees Alcibiades' speech as a warning to
Agathon.
50-rfts cptAoa6cpov µovios TE KOL (3oKxEios.
51.,.W cpiAToTE, KOL SfjA6v yE Sf) oTL ovTw OLovoovµEvos KOL
TTEpL EµaVTOV KOL TTEpL vµwv µOLVOµOL KOL TTOpaTTOLVJ;
''

-

\
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-
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Though his friends avoid answering the question by calling his
attention back to the task of narrating the dialogue, Apollodorus has
guessed correctly: He is indeed mad and his madness comes from
Socrates, the only man against whom he does not rail (173d4-10).52
Because of their madness, Socrates' beloveds become volatile.
Their attachment to philosophy becomes emotional, since erotic
pursuits are not conducted entirely in a calm, rational manner. Thus,
Apollodorus is overjoyed whenever he engages in philosophy,
whether or not it benefits him in any way {173c2-5). And Alcibiades
emphasizes primarily the seductive quality of Socrates' words rather
than their content (215d3-216c3).

Because of their emotional

attachment to Socrates, his lovers imitate even the most minute of his
quirks, such as his shoelessness (173b2).
Yet their emotional volatility--a volatility difficult to avoid when in
the presence of an Eros-like man so valiant in the pursuit of Beauty--is
ultimately their undoing. By the time of the retelling of the dialogue (a
dozen years after the symposium), Aristodemus is doubtlessly no
longer a pupil of Socrates, even though he is still alive.53 Had he still

52 De Vries, 68-69, has noted the connection between
Alcibiades' and Apollodorus' praise of Socrates. Both direct irony
against Plato the philosopher: Alcibiades, by consciously using irony
to praise Socrates (and, thus, his pupil Plato); Apollodorus, by his
fanaticism, demonstrates the same characteristics Alcibiades
criticizes in Socrates.
53Apparently, Aristodemus had told a few details about the
story to Phoenix and one of Glaucon's friends had overheard the
conversation. Then, the friend told Glaucon, giving him the
impression that the symposium had happened recently, since he had
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been interested in Socrates, he could have narrated the dialogue or
Apollodorus could have referred Glaucon to him for an account of the
symposium. But as Apollodorus describes him, Aristodemus was one
of Socrates' lovers at the time of the symposium (Twv TOTE, 173b34). Similarly, Socrates' influence on Alcibiades has also diminished by
the time of the symposium. No longer is he in any sense a pupil of
Socrates; though he is very much in love with Socrates (222c1-3), he
cannot bring himself to follow him.
The explanation for the volatility of Socrates' lovers lies chiefly in
that, as much as they admire him, they cannot help feeling wronged
by him. Agathon and Alcibiades have both been snubbed as Socrates
pursues a more ethereal Beauty rather than concentrate only on
them at their banquets (175a7-c6; 217c7-219b2). To both, Socrates
has spoken elpc.vvtKws. Thus, both men threaten to bring charges
against Socrates. They employ legal language to make their point:
Agathon (175e6-9) says that he will go to court (otaotKaa6µe8a)
concerning whose wisdom is greater; he will use Dionysus as his
judge (otKaaTij).54 Alcibiades calls his audience jurors (avopes
otKaaTa[, 219c5) because they are actually serving as judges of
Socrates' arrogance (219c6-7). In effect, Alcibiades in the epilogue
only heard Aristodemus and Phoenix talking about it recently. From
this we can assume that Aristodemus was still alive when Apollodorus
narrated the symposium to Glaucon.
54A otaotKaa[a occurred when two parties made claim to the
right to a certain property. Since neither of them was in possession of
the property at the time, one of the disputants could not serve as a
prosecutor and the other as a defendant. Instead, the dispute was
seen as one between equals. See Todd, 119-120.
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takes up where Agathon leaves off in the prologue. There Agathon
states his desire to bring Socrates to trial, but his wish is carried out by
Alcibiades. 55
A paradox emerges: Socrates loves beautiful young men and
they in turn are devoted to him, but Socrates' behavior ultimately
turns them against him. Agathon and Alcibiades love Socrates, yet
both profess a desire to take revenge on him for his hubristic
treatment of them. No matter how jokingly or gently these criticisms
are made, they are nonetheless reproaches leveled against Socrates
and his concept of proper erotic behavior.
Why, then, does Plato portray Socrates' lovers in this way?
First, this portrayal defends Socrates against the charge of corrupting
the youth. Alcibiades and Agathon have attempted to seduce him, not
he them. If Alcibiades is to any degree culpable for the downfall of
Athens, Socrates is in no way to blame. In fact, Socrates is portrayed
as having a greater effect on restraining Alcibiades than Pericles and
the other statesmen (215e4-216a2)

Thus, the Symposium--and

Plato's portrayal of Socrates' lovers in it--serves as an apology for the
character of Socrates.
More importantly, the behavior of Socrates' lovers highlights the
contrast between their behavior and Socrates'.

Alcibiades, for

55oover, 166, insightfully notes that "the usual hybris of satyrs
is sexual assault," but the hubris of the satyr Socrates lies in his
refusal to gratify his sexual desires. But, as Allen, 104-108, observes,
Alcibiades, not Socrates, is guilty of hubris. Alcibiades loves an
eH5c.uAov, not Beauty itself. This leaves him as divided and torn
asunder as the statues to which he alludes in his speech.
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example, approaches love from a traditional understanding, namely,
that a lover should pursue a beloved with a beautiful body and then
seduce him. But Socrates rejects that type of love and refuses to
pretend that a lover is giving a beloved "wisdom" or some other virtue,
when in reality the lover is simply gratifying his sexual urges. To be
sure, this view of Eros does not satisfy Alcibiades. Consequently, no
matter how much he admires Socrates, he cannot bring himself to
follow him.
Thus, a distinction is made between those who have seen
Absolute Beauty and those who admire or mimic the behavior of
people who have. Both Alcibiades and Aristodemus have watched
Socrates entranced as he ascends to Beauty. Alcibiades finds it
partially an amusement (220c1-d5); Agathon, a distraction (175a1011 ); and Aristodemus, an oddity best ignored (175b1-3). But they
remain observers from the outside and never experience Absolute
Beauty themselves. As such, they cannot comprehend what Socrates
has experienced.56
This contrast between the behavior of Socrates' professed
lovers and Socrates himself underscores Socrates' <pt:AEpaaT[a.

56Warner, 161: Alcibiades "provides, as it were, an account of
[Socrates' activity] from the perspective of the Cave-dwellers--which
is, of course, that of the readers of the dialogues, ourselves." From a
different perspective, Nussbaum, 198-199, argues that in the
Symposium Plato offers two visions of love: the abstract (expounded
by Socrates) and the particular (expounded by Alcibiades). One
cannot mix the two, adding love of a particular beloved with Absolute
Beauty, as Alcibiades wants. One must choose one vision of love or
the other. Thus, the two kinds of lovers are ultimately unable to
communicate his or her view of love to the other.
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Socrates is unique among the guests at the symposium in his
understanding of what Ta epwTtK6: is. Because this understanding is
more cognizant of a greater Beauty, Socrates' uniqueness is to be
praised.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that the symposium in and of itself
was an erotic event. Usually, the presence of Eros was seen in the
indulgence in wine, women, and song that characterized a
symposium. Agathon's symposium, however, takes on a different
character. It is an improvement on the typical symposium, since the
banishment of wine, the flute-girl, and a large crowd allows for the
manifestation of Eros in a nobler manner. Nonetheless, the unusual
character of the symposium cannot continue indefinitely.

In the

epilogue, the forbidden elements return and most of the guests are
overcome by them. The vision of Eros espoused by Socrates recedes
as the baser erotic forces of the symposium take over. Only Socrates,
who has seen a glimpse of Absolute Beauty, remains unaffected.
Since Socrates' <ptAepaaTia is unique, it is implicitly and
explicitly analyzed and criticized in the prologue and the epilogue,
especially by Agathon and Alcibiades. Although Socrates cannot lead
Alcibiades, who equates the work of Eros with seduction, to
understand where true Beauty lies, Socrates' perception of Eros is
shown to be superior to that of Alcibiades. The prologue and epilogue
reveal that, though everyone cannot understand the proper role and
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object of Eros, the attentive reader can see a glimpse of Eros at work
by looking at Socrates.
These two parts of the dialogue, then, serve an important
function, when considered together. They set up the body of the
dialogue to reflect conditions that best suit Socrates, where he can
get a fair hearing from the guests. At the same time, these portions of
the dialogue evaluate Socrates' claims by demonstrating that
Socrates alone is able to keep to the pursuit of Absolute Beauty, as he
lives in the real world.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
Why did Plato write a dramatic prologue for his Symposium?
How is the prologue related to the rest of the dialogue, especially to
the philosophical content of the dialogue? These are the questions
that I set out to investigate in this dissertation. In the first chapter, I
rejected an all too common approach to the dialogue, namely, to
ignore the prologue and turn immediately to Phaedrus' speech. I
argued that it would be a poor way to explicate the Symposium to
ignore six Stephanus pages, or roughly a tenth of the total dialogue.
Likewise, I refused merely to comment on the "dramatic charm" or
"literary grace" of the prologue, while ignoring its philosophical import,
as many scholars have done. If the prologue is at all relevant to the
dialogue, it must be worthy of being treated in the same earnest as
the body of the dialogue.
In making this assumption, I have followed the premises of the
dramatic approach to Plato This approach emphasizes that Plato did
not write philosophical treatises, but dialogues that deal with
philosophical issues. Although his dialogues contain philosophical
propositions and arguments, the dialogues are not exclusively a
collection of such elements, as one might expect to find in a treatise.
Instead, they are real life conversations with intellectuals who have
213
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not yet turned philosophy into an academic specialty. Since a major
portion of the Greek intellectual life was found in poetry and the
theater, an ancient Greek would not have separated drama from
philosophy. Therefore, we did not come to the Symposium with the
preconception that the "dramatic" elements could have no bearing on
the "philosophical" or vice versa. Rather, we have assumed that the
drama of the dialogue colored the philosophical discussion, as well as
illustrated how a particular philosophical truth accorded with the
observed phenomena of real life.
Therefore, we set out to draw connections between the
prologue and the body of the dialogue. We were not looking for the
connections to demonstrate that Plato had the ability to craft a
masterfully intricate dialogue--that point has been granted by nearly
all scholars of Plato.

Instead, we set out to investigate how the

dramatic action in the prologue and the philosophical discussion in
the body of the dialogue were designed to supplement each other.
Some of the dramatic elements in the prologue are easily
recognized as necessary for the development of the dialogue and its
philosophy. Eryximachus' speech, which urges the assembled guests
to discuss Eros (177a2-d5), sets the stage for the rest of the dialogue.
It introduces the topic and prepares the reader to expect a series of
speeches rather than the give-and-take of Socratic eAeyxos. By and
large, these expectations are fulfilled in the body of the dialogue. Of
course, Plato could have set up his work differently. He could have
written a treatise on Eros, possibly alluding to a half dozen different
views on the subject and then arguing for the view that he embraced.
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This, however, was not the method he chose. He chose to put the
expositions of different views of Eros into the mouths of certain
characters.
This method has a certain advantage:

Rather than treat

arguments in the abstract, Plato lets the characters of the dialogue
argue as eloquently as possible for their view. This method means,
however, that Plato not only had to introduce the topic of the dialogue,
but the characters who would argue it. A well developed prologue
became necessary in order to give the background information of the
dialogue so that the arguments of the guests will not come from
"straw men." As we saw in the third chapter, Plato introduces the
reader to the characters in the prologue. Without doubt, Plato built on
whatever impression of the characters his audience would have had.
In the prologue, however, Socrates emphasizes those particular traits
that would have some bearing on the dialogue.

For example,

Pausanias may have been better known to Plato's contemporaries
than to us, but the only trait of Pausanias Plato reveals in the prologue
is that Pausanias has drunk to excess on the previous night. For the
purposes of the dialogue, this aspect of Pausanias' moral character is
most important. To evaluate Pausanias' speech, one must know that
it is spoken by a person who indulges in sensual pleasure.
Behind every action of a character is an implicit theory of Eros
and Beauty.

The behavior of the characters in the prologue is

predicated upon their particular understanding of what true Beauty is
and how one ought to pursue it. Indeed, not only the actions and
personality of the characters, but also the very words of the prologue
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reflect particular views about Eros. As we discovered in the fourth
chapter, the prologue is filled with words that have "erotic" overtones,
which gain meaning as one progresses through the body of the
dialogue. Ordinary words in the prologue are recalled in a new light,
when those same words are used later in the dialogue to describe
Eros, Beauty and other matters of philosophical import. Thus, even
simple actions and words can reflect Eros' effect on an individual and
that individual's perception of Eros and Beauty.
Furthermore, as we discovered in the fifth chapter, the
symposium itself manifests a peculiar understanding of Eros--one
that accords best with Socrates' intentions for the symposium.
Agathon's party is a symposium, but without the usual characteristics
of a symposium. There is no indulgence in drink and flute-girls, but in
encomia. Instead of pursuing objects of physical beauty, the crowd
talks about Beauty and the desire for Beauty. Although no guest
obtains lasting possession of Absolute Beauty, Socrates uses the
symposium to encourage the other guests--and the reader--to see
how to pursue Absolute Beauty in the best manner. For those who,
like Socrates, have gotten a glimpse of Absolute Beauty are unable to
be seduced by the elements reintroduced in the epilogue.
The thesis of Socrates is two-fold: all men are lovers of Beauty,
but not all men pursue Beauty in the proper way.

Not only has this

truth been demonstrated by the setting of the symposium and by the
behavior and vocabulary of the guests, but it is also proved in the
seemingly least germane part of the dialogue, the ApoUodoran
prologue.

As we saw in the second chapter, Glaucon and
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Apollodorus' friends are interested in hearing the dialogue and
Apollodorus is glad to tell it because they all desire a glimpse of
Beauty. Although narration, especially of events not experienced
first-hand, is open to distortion, it runs the same risk Eros does. Eros
flourishes one minute and loses his life in the next one, then quickly
comes back to life again. He is sometimes wealthy, sometimes poor.
Thus, he is a perfect metaphor for the process of narration.
Sometimes a narrative is able to relate the facts without
embellishment or omission; other times narration fails to give an
accurate summary of the dialogue.

Thus, inasmuch as

the

Symposium is a narrated dialogue, it reminds the reader of the
exhilaration and the pitfalls of the search for Beauty.
As we have examined the connections between the prologue
and the philosophy of Eros espoused in the dialogue, we have
frequently observed that the phenomena of the prologue are best
explained by Socrates' encomium of Eros. This is not to say that
Socrates' views are entirely consistent or without their difficulties,
when applied to real life. Nor is this to say that Socrates posits a
positive doctrine, when he says he knows all about Eros. If any truth
can be learned from his speech, it is this: Humans lack permanent
possession of beauty, especially Absolute Beauty; the best that
people can do is to understand their lack and to pursue Beauty in the
most productive way.
This view is the most comprehensive of all those espoused by
the guests.

While some of the guests equate Eros with sexual

gratification or avoid the topic of sex, Socrates incorporates both a
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sexual and an asexual understanding of Eros in his encomium.
Although he will argue that the highest form of Eros is that of an
intangible, invisible Absolute Beauty, he will not deny the value of
pursuing other manifestations of beauty. Thus, his views of Eros are
at the same time the most realistic of those proposed by the guests
and the most idealizing. He does not etherialize Eros by denying the
corporeal objects of Eros; he grants that those who love beautiful
bodies are legitimately called lovers. Nonetheless, he establishes a
hierarchy of values that encourages the reader to transcend physical
beauty and pursue the beauty that does not fade as time passes.
Plato, therefore, through Socrates encourages the reader to
see Eros at work in the drama of the characters, but he also asks the
reader to evaluate the drama through philosophy. Thus, we cannot
separate the dramatic and the philosophical. The philosophy of the
dialogue gives us insights into the drama of the prologue, while the
drama of the prologue evaluates the merits of the dialogue's
philosophy. There can be no better method to study the works of the
man best known for advocating the "examined life."
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